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Post by whitebull on May 5, 2012 19:07:23 GMT -5
Joe, I can see where you are coming from and I get what you mean. My question is this, how do you know which hill was the one that Custer saw the village. Also I would like to know how is it that you can be sure that Custer saw the village for the first time at either one of those hills.
I was under the meaning that the village had been spotted long before from the Crow's Nest. Another thing, I find it hard to understand that only 12 Indians were at the ford and had the nerve to fire on two troops of soldiers. How was it that only 12 Indians were able to see Custer coming? Where was the rest of the Indians? At a party?
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Post by tbw on May 5, 2012 21:15:37 GMT -5
My theory does have it's weakness I will admit but, it explains some circumstances that heretofore puzzled me. For example,why did Custer sent two troops down MTC yet remain with headquarters on Nye Cartwright? This movement had to be a feint and certainly not an attack for two reasons, the vast number of warriors would have demanded all of Custer's forces. An implied "thrust" may have resulted in a great discontentment to the warriors military rear and enable some of the pressure on Reno to subside. Secondly, Cheyenne testimony pretty much established The fact that around a dozen warriors or so fired at the encroaching troops, not enough men to stop Custer if he did not wish to be stopped. The fact that the "feint" was unsuccessful does not translate into the "fact" that Custer did not try it As for Weir Point, there are only two promontories (Weir and Sharpshooter ridge) tt hat would afforded Custer the opportunity to see the village for the first time and, identify passages that would lead him down to the village proper. It was also the first time that he realized that Benteen was desperately needed, hence the written order. Lakota testimony and the position of dead soldiers pretty much established the skirmish line on Calhoun Hill which originally faced south (to counter Gall's attack) then was forced to shift west to meet the debacle that was caused by the movement led by Lame Man. Again, as you know I would never claim to have the facts as to what occurred just a theory with a whole lot of holes.  Please do understand, I do respect everyone's right to think what they want to, it's not you personally, nor even your thought processes that I am objecting to here. It the history and what has become accepted for well over 135 years now. Many authors have tried to write about this battle, some have done exceptional research, and have and will continue to show amazing talent in their works, for which such effort should rightly be applauded. But, and here's the kicker here, those "where's" that have become ingrained as right as rain are about as clear as well accepted cloud of inversion smog starving the minds of those who think its nothing, and is a bad fog that should clear by mid-day. Lets take those time-motion studies and see just how well it doesn't work. This along with those well accepted "where's" that in reality had nothing to do with it at all. Take for example the 2 to 6 minutes that it took Martin to ride back to the "same hill" where he and Custer first observed the village. This time can and rightly should be able to be expanded to account for discrepancies and error. And I'm more than willing to admit a couple of extra minutes one way or the other. Martin could have been on a dead run for all we know when he left Custer, unlikely, but we don't know that, and it wasn't ever stated for us to understand. So yeah he might have been able to have ran that horse the first 500 yard and have gotten there in under a minute's time. Same on the other end where an extra 2 minutes might have been the case as he stopped to talk to Boston, so yeah who knows for sure, say maybe 8 minutes might not be unreasonable, so now we have anywhere from less than a minutes time up to 8 minutes for this ride to have Martin get back to that "same hill". There are to many variables interfering with such efforts, making any for certain judgement calls about this part of his ride impossible to pinpoint any time as reliable, and so it goes with much of the rest of trying to pinpoint any time in a reliable way. Where and when did Benteen see Martin? And here's the conundrum with that one. Sure pick any point on a map, place Benteen there and make Martin ride to him from that point about two miles away. Now pick another point on a map where Martin left Custer, this according to Benteen was something like 600 yards from the river. Now make sure Martin's ride back early on is in a coulee that isn't any longer than 3/4ths of a mile back culminating in what could be classified as that "same hill. How many coulee's were/are there 3/4ths of a mile or less in length? How many culminate in a hill where Custer could have seen "Plenty of them down there for all of us". Add to this what Curley said more than once, and Martin said at least once, and try it again. They said that Custer "skirted" or "rode around" those hills, not over them! Reload and keep trying because there's more, and it doesn't have a nickels worth of cherry picking to fuss about and no one will be eliminating one participants statement in the process. Keep in mind here, relative times, relative numbers etc. are fallible data from which to work, and therefore a location stated as fact is just as fallible today as it was when it was first proposed. I reached a conclusion a long time ago about the research techniques & processes one can not use, that of sightings and what was said about those sightings, because from an observational perspective, two can stand on the same mountain and not see the exact same thing or describe it the same way. Where one might have seen a herd of elk, the other might not have seen it if his attention was not drawn to it, and even if it was, he/she might not be interested in the elk herd, but instead more interested in the mama bear and her two cubs the other observer didn't see, or for that matter even had a clue about. More times than not its about what interests the person making the observation, because there might just as well have been two herds of Elk within easy sighting of either observant, as there was any linear thought as to why one should see and say something different than the other. And, it will never make any sense no matter what anyone tries to do, because each person's interests have been, are and ever will be different from another. Many a time its not about the methodology of the reasoning used to acquire the knowledge, but the other way around. Using what knowledge one has wisely enough to reason the methodology of those under your study, otherwise errors will occur exponentially when trying to chose one elk watcher who liked watching the bears picking ripe cherry's instead. And we wonder where all the distortions come from? What most do here is they over analyze what those who participated had to say and then exacerbate the situation by not realizing the difference between the sexes. Sure that's an analogy, but relevant to this post, because a male chauvinist never will understand why she said what she did, or for that matter why she did what she did. Its not necessary to blame everything on those who participated and then throw their statements under the bus because it conflicted with what you think, she'll tell you that in less than a moments time - guaranteed, just make sure you're a conceited male chauvinist. Sometimes the problem is staring you in the face whenever you look in the mirror, and has as much to do with prejudice and bias and the reasons to distort anything they the participants ever did. We're all prone to such reflections, even me, because there are no perfect words in a human world in which to express it as absolute truth, where it can never be discerned as such. |
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Post by joewiggs on May 6, 2012 9:37:06 GMT -5
I truly understand your position and philosophy and take no umbrage with your position. Your perspectives have always maintained a high degree of logic and more than a fair amount of reasonableness. I have and always will appreciate your candor in our discussions.
In fact, I particularly agree with you about the "time-motion" studies of Gray's; far too meticulous for the reality of war. I also disagree with his position of the "Counter clock" movement of the troops based upon his decision that sane men would not run towards Deep Ravine but must have been force there. This theory clearly disregards mental debilitation resulting from the shock of close proximately with the enemy that may have occurred in the battle.
My position is based upon the works of Gray and Fox both of whom (particularly Fox) are regarded by some as a bit extravagant in their theories.
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Post by tbw on May 6, 2012 12:55:42 GMT -5
The following doesn't apply to anyone here. It is an observation about human nature of which we all share in the foibles and folly's, and quite a natural occurrence within all things human.
It is usually through mankind's short vision that we see things and tend to believe ourselves in ignorance the masters of our own universe. Its like the visitors from outer space, friendly or not scenario, where after victory after victory makes one feel secure within their own borders, so much so that such conceit does little to humble or cause apology in advance, even when as such it would be to late. We've been here before, And it is quite humbling, no matter the excuse. To think that we are not alone, and the prospects of a more advanced civilization finding us first would not just be humbling but downright frightening as to their intentions. And the results would of course be, because we are by human nature quite blind in the face of our own stupidity over issues we think we have perfect control over. Naturally expected, the attitude should be, so what, we couldn't do anything about it anyway, right? Where's the conceited person then, when you need them to inspire with the same empty words of encouragement? Sadly most rocks aren't that big to crawl under.
Its that same short vision, that way to many people today try to advance their own agendas when it comes the the LBH. Sure, its easier to call someone else a liar or a moron because they don't think the same way you do, but who is, it might be better to judge by how near sighted they are. Or for that matter, the matter of cherry picking what one would call the best evidence, when in reality what happened required a broader scope of vision, and only what one man either stated or ever testified to. It isn't a democracy where the mostest with the vote gets the nod, its what was true, and who has the broadest of minds to see farther into the truth, and then see how foolish they were because the others who stated things or testified to the well accepted short vision, which seemed different, but were in reality in agreement with the odd man out, only in a different context than what had been thought possible.
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Post by tbw on May 6, 2012 13:01:14 GMT -5
I truly understand your position and philosophy and take no umbrage with your position. Your perspectives have always maintained a high degree of logic and more than a fair amount of reasonableness. I have and always will appreciate your candor in our discussions. In fact, I particularly agree with you about the "time-motion" studies of Gray's; far too meticulous for the reality of war. I also disagree with his position of the "Counter clock" movement of the troops based upon his decision that sane men would not run towards Deep Ravine but must have been force there. This theory clearly disregards mental debilitation resulting from the shock of close proximately with the enemy that may have occurred in the battle. My position is based upon the works of Gray and Fox both of whom (particularly Fox) are regarded by some as a bit extravagant in their theories. That last line explains it all Joe. Your approach to this is to be admired and given due credit. Such insight is needed and in short supply when discussing the LBH. |
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Post by bc on May 7, 2012 18:08:39 GMT -5
Ok, so far it appears Joe believes the ford B move was a feint after finding out Reno retreated. But that doesn't quite jive with Curley's account which started this thread which was Custer attacking and about to be flanked on both sides so he pulled out. I can buy either theory but the Curley statement adds a little fact to the pull out.
I believe TBW is leaning for some kind of feint at B and that Curley was describing action at ford D. Correct me if I'm wrong here. I could buy that as well but I'm not sure the Sioux accounts and Cheyenne accounts support this. I personally think both fords were approached and possibly breached.
I've been following Gerry and Clair's discussion on the other board that puts NAs from atop the Reno Hill area after chasing Reno up there and then looking over to East Ridge and seeing some of Custer's troops there. I can buy into that scenario as well. I tend to explain this so called missing half hour by Custer and HQ as him being at Bouyer's bluff watching Reno while the rest of the command rode on. Custer then rode to the river and saw the Ree scout and Thompson & Watson.
Too make this work, early on Custer would have had to have been on a high prominence where he could not only see Reno and both ends of the village but also the low area around East Ridge for which he could send his troops while he went on a recon to the river. That also give him a chance to rest everyone's horses so they will be fresh when they charge. So where was this high prominence to see all three positions and then which coulee would they have gone down to get to East Ridge? The choices appear to be Weir Point, the Weir area sugarloaf or nearby high spot, or Sharpshooter Ridge. It was after one of these points that Martini was sent back but still has to be close enough for a quick ride to the bluffs and subsequent Thompson sighting.
bc
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Post by tbw on May 8, 2012 0:48:41 GMT -5
Ok, so far it appears Joe believes the ford B move was a feint after finding out Reno retreated. But that doesn't quite jive with Curley's account which started this thread which was Custer attacking and about to be flanked on both sides so he pulled out. I can buy either theory but the Curley statement adds a little fact to the pull out. I believe TBW is leaning for some kind of feint at B and that Curley was describing action at ford D. Correct me if I'm wrong here. I could buy that as well but I'm not sure the Sioux accounts and Cheyenne accounts support this. I personally think both fords were approached and possibly breached. I've been following Gerry and Clair's discussion on the other board that puts NAs from atop the Reno Hill area after chasing Reno up there and then looking over to East Ridge and seeing some of Custer's troops there. I can buy into that scenario as well. I tend to explain this so called missing half hour by Custer and HQ as him being at Bouyer's bluff watching Reno while the rest of the command rode on. Custer then rode to the river and saw the Ree scout and Thompson & Watson. Too make this work, early on Custer would have had to have been on a high prominence where he could not only see Reno and both ends of the village but also the low area around East Ridge for which he could send his troops while he went on a recon to the river. That also give him a chance to rest everyone's horses so they will be fresh when they charge. So where was this high prominence to see all three positions and then which coulee would they have gone down to get to East Ridge? The choices appear to be Weir Point, the Weir area sugarloaf or nearby high spot, or Sharpshooter Ridge. It was after one of these points that Martini was sent back but still has to be close enough for a quick ride to the bluffs and subsequent Thompson sighting. bc Sorry I gave the impression that I knew anything about it. I was merely postulating, and suggesting what might have been, not that I believed it. To tell the truth, I've never believed Custer sent anyone there, "B" that is. And it should have been difficult for anyone to have really discerned whether they had went there or not, after all there were about 140 or so mounts from Custer's battalion that went unaccounted for, and from the sound of it, there were quite a number of mounts lost in Reno's battalion as well, so I'm not one for saying where Custer's trail went based upon hoofprints alone, that to include Maguire's map that postulated where the trails went. Could just as easily have been a bunch of Indians riding them as anything else. Benteen sure wasn't convinced there was any activity there by Custer due to the fact that there wasn't any dead men or horses, except one, and that man was some 600 yards or so from the ford. About the only real evidence is where those men died, and that isn't saying much in how they arrived there. There are problems with Clairs theory about those Indians going up to the top of the bluffs. 1) Not one of them that I'm aware of ever said they did. And 2) none of the troopers ever indicated that they did it either. With all that was going on "up there" after their retreat, I find it difficult to believe anything of the kind. Reno was accused of going to look after Hodgeson, and that was according to those accounts, not long after they had retreated, so yeah, really Clair, you think he really did that with all them Indians out and about, running to and fro atop the bluffs? Then you have all those messengers and drop outs up there somewhere running about. All that was ever claimed was up there was something like about 5 or so Indians that had chased the pony captors up there, 5 hardly makes up a war party or even honorable mention, especially when those Ree's themselves had a battle up there with those Indians somewhere near Weir Peak, they even observed some of what was going on over on Custer's battlefield. If there was a full blown war party up there rest assured none of those Ree's would have ever made it out of there. So yeah, its going to take a lot more evidence to make me believe that any more than the reported 5 or so hostiles was up there. There are problems with that last paragraph. One was to paraphrase you, "resting of the horses". Once again the hooves of the fast horses meet the need to slow down, yet according to those who rode with Custer down that right bank they went at a gallop ALL the way down, and to quote Curley, they "didn't stop". But I do like what you're doing with the analysis portion of that last paragraph. "So where was this high prominence to see all three positions and then which coulee would they have gone down to get to East Ridge?" Why Weir? Why Sharpshooter? Why not Nye Cartwright or Luce? Or for that matter East ridge itself? Would Calhoun be acceptable? There are enough places to describe this, that to limit it to one or two places far behind his well recorded pace is rather silly as it retrogrades Custer's pace down that right bank as to what those who survived from Custer's outfit had to say. |
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Post by bc on May 8, 2012 10:09:02 GMT -5
Boston said: There are enough places to describe this, that to limit it to one or two places far behind his well recorded pace is rather silly as it retrogrades Custer's pace down that right bank as to what those who survived from Custer's outfit had to say.
I concur there was a fast pace to get to MTC with a halt or two along the way with one being around 3411 when Custer stopped and Kanipe was sent. However your well recorded fast pace does not preclude a halt. The halt would have multiple purposes but probably mainly to wait on Custer assuming he separated from his command. As far as Curley goes, he was probably with HQ and Custer and not the rest of the command which is what I was referring to as going towards East Ridge. Clair mentions another althernative for when East Ridge was chosen and that would be from 3411 which might work as well.
Keep in mind that I am working on more than one theory and this is just one of them that has a 30 minute plus-minus halt. My other theory is that Custer was attacking/began firing 15 minutes before Reno made his retreat.
bc
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Post by tbw on May 8, 2012 13:41:32 GMT -5
Boston said: There are enough places to describe this, that to limit it to one or two places far behind his well recorded pace is rather silly as it retrogrades Custer's pace down that right bank as to what those who survived from Custer's outfit had to say. I concur there was a fast pace to get to MTC with a halt or two along the way with one being around 3411 when Custer stopped and Kanipe was sent. However your well recorded fast pace does not preclude a halt. The halt would have multiple purposes but probably mainly to wait on Custer assuming he separated from his command. As far as Curley goes, he was probably with HQ and Custer and not the rest of the command which is what I was referring to as going towards East Ridge. Clair mentions another althernative for when East Ridge was chosen and that would be from 3411 which might work as well. Keep in mind that I am working on more than one theory and this is just one of them that has a 30 minute plus-minus halt. My other theory is that Custer was attacking/began firing 15 minutes before Reno made his retreat. bc First thing let me say that without knowing where your locations are that would make you think Custer stopped, when those who were with him stated otherwise, would tend to make those locations a contextual perception issue. Lets try this again. This time as one kindergartner to another. Who's Dad would be the greatest Dad in the whole world? What rhyme is the greatest? What cartoon is the greatest? Whose clothes are the prettiest? From what context and perception are they using to determine this? And it isn't any difference in the grown up world either for that matter when it comes to preferences and the bias is no different than whether someone likes ketchup on their eggs or not, whether someone chooses to wear pants or a skirt. And other's perceptions about whether any of it is right or wrong. The question shouldn't be "when" or "since when" but "where"? Ultimately we would get to this, and that would be where Custer went after departing Reno to get to where he and his men died? If they went the way Curley and Martin said they did ("around" rather than over those bluffs), then what did Custer not see or know about? Would it have even been possible for him to have observed Reno dismount and form a skirmish line? Would it have even been possible for him to have seen the full extent of the village? And would anyone have known whether he had fired on any Indians on that side of the river or not? There is not one word of discord when it comes to those who rode down the right bank with Custer about the directions taken and the speed involved in getting there, and slowing down or halting wasn't something that was ever mentioned by any of them. And by the time Custer was in a position to see that village, he knew that it was what? It was a quote "big village" as is evidenced by Martin's note not 5 minutes later issued. And at that time, and at that place, less than 3/4ths of a mile from where Martin was sent back, which was as Benteen confirmed about 600 yards from a ford they would attack is where he observed that village from, and rest assured it wasn't anywhere near Weir Peak. His words at the time speak clearly of his intentions, and those intentions from that village observation place were words of encouragement that they had acquired the tactical advantage and it wasn't about halting or slowing down, but charging from that moment on. To think that he would panzy ass around waiting at that time or even think of slowing down, it just wasn't and wouldn't have been in Custer's nature, especially when he said, 'we've got them now', not 5, 10 or even 20 minutes later, "NOW". The parsing intent in Martin's note is perhaps the saddest excuse that I've ever witnessed to make a mountain out of a mole hill. Anyone can parse these words to make them mean what they want them to mean, and the reasons why should be fairly clear to anyone from the paragraph above. "Benteen, come on, big village, be quick, bring pacs, ps bring packs." The "come on" aspect and the "be quick" aspect of this being the most misquoted nonsense in the history of the LBH. They are self explanatory and needs no explanation, but I'll try: Benteen: Come on, big village Come on, be quick Come on, bring pacs PS: Come on, bring pacs Does this message in any way imply, infer or even suggest that Custer was going to slow down or for that matter even stop wait for Benteen or those pacs? And Custer's intent was from the beginning? And Benteen didn't know about this intention from that note? Where was that note sent from? What was going on at the time it was sent? What was Custer going to do? What was he not going to do? Now, tell anyone why in the world Benteen should not have singled out the ammunition animals and sent them straight way to Custer' position, either upon receiving Martin's note or Kanipe's message? Had Custer engaged Wolftooth's band or others before he arrived at the place he would later die? Is this known? And if he had? What opportunity would he have had to safely send someone back minutes later (600 yards from the ford they were going to attack) to get them? For anyone to claim there wasn't urgency in Custer's note from Martin is sheer lunacy. If the distance back to that pack train was over 4 miles, it would have taken them longer for them to get there than their (Custer's) ammo would have lasted, and the reason is simple, and Custer damn well knew it, as it was a "big village" with a lot of Bucks, and he was running out of time and space. Now reflect upon Martin's note above and say that he didn't want those ammo packs pronto. The deliberate and methodical Benteen has painted a cozy picture of what he did do, but what isn't observed or given due credit is what he didn't do, and there is a lot of evidence still to this day to cast aspersions on his actions there at the LBH, and many still do. And maybe its right, whose to say? But there comes that point, that breaking point, just like little Johnny and little Bob over arguing about whose daddy is the greatest when kick comes to shove and blows fall in a brawl. It is a matter of perspective and personal preference and what was seen or not seen, and why and even more importantly "where", from the same mountain. And what it really amounts to is, to each his own. And I therefore say 3411 is using someone's imagination to tell a tall tale, guaranteed. |
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Post by joewiggs on May 11, 2012 19:36:04 GMT -5
Ok, so far it appears Joe believes the ford B move was a feint after finding out Reno retreated. But that doesn't quite jive with Curley's account which started this thread which was Custer attacking and about to be flanked on both sides so he pulled out. I can buy either theory but the Curley statement adds a little fact to the pull out. bc bc, for the moment, I will only address this particular aspect of my post with the following explanation. It is my belief that at the time of the interview with Curley, it was not know that Custer's force had separated;"C", "I", and "L" remaining in the environs of Luce Ridge while "E" and "F" sauntered down to the ford "B" Curley and Bouyer, I believe, remained with the Headquarters staff. From that position, the scouts easily observed the movements of warriors who,eventually, responded to head off Custer. as a result of the "fatalistic theory", some students have condensed this episode into an immediate and overwhelming thrust by embolden warriors who chased and struck the the flanks and read of Custer's command forcing him to flee. This was not the case! In the meantime, Custer transversed Luce and Nye-Cartwright ridge in a pre-planned movement which called for a reunion of the five companies in the area of Calhoun Hill after the "feint." Calhoun Hill was selected as a viable position as the hill had a commanding view south, the direction in which Custer anticipated the arrival of Benteen. Calhoun Hill and and Custer Hill were the highest elevations in that general area. Of course, the military practicality of the formations were observed and selected from the heights of Luce Ridge. As "E" and "F" turned away from the mouth of MTC, they were eventually followed by Indians returning from the Reno area, in increasing numbers. However, there was no sudden outburst of a mass of screaming tremolo's from scathing warriors but, a slow,steady infiltration up the many ravines by the warriors that did, in fact, flank Custer's right and rear, while other warriors continued north down the river tracing and countering Custer's left flank. I believe that the first volleys heard on Reno Hill coming from the Custer command were ordered by him to force the approaching warriors to clutch the ground and slow their pace of infiltration. forcing them to hover in the ravines for some time. Some of these same warriors eventually occupied the Henry ville area and the incline south of Calhoun Hill. They would, eventually, overrun Calhoun Hill, but not at the moment. Indian testimony speaks of a quiet lull in the fighting at this time for an hour or so. This time was utilized to infiltrate,position warriors, and prepare for an assault of close proximity which, eventually did occur. Eventually the onslaught of warriors did occur at Calhoun Hill and Ridge after tremendous Indian fire from Greasy Grass Ridge, Henry ville, and south of Calhoun Hill decimated the troops which enabled the warriors to break through and make havoc among the troopers! |
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Post by bc on May 12, 2012 6:50:32 GMT -5
I understand your theory on this Joe. However, if Curley was there and saw the separation of the 2 battalions at MTC, wouldn't everybody know it then after Curley told them?
I guess we would have to refer back to Curley's original accounts to see what exactly he did say and whether it was interpreted right.
And maybe he did. Somebody got people like Blummer and Nye to start searching the ridges up above. Was it Curley who was part of the reservation police force there?
bc
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Post by joewiggs on May 12, 2012 10:21:06 GMT -5
Therein lies the significant but often misunderstood element of Curley's interviews;the reality that Curley spoke no English and,therefore, it was extremely difficult if not impossible for him to "direct" the interviews into areas of import that you and I would find no difficulty whatsoever to accomplish. If he did try, his efforts probably fell upon deaf ears. The questioners only solicited responses to specific areas of actions they were aware of. Imagine the difficulty you and I would experience in our interview of a Zulu warrior as he attempted to explain precise movements of the Zulu military formation of the "horn." Good luck with that! So much of what he said was so terribly misinterpreted that the man was saddled with the sobriquet of "liar" for quite sometime. I believe that Gray has done a tremendous jog of unraveling the voluminous threads misunderstanding that has hampered the studies of this portion of the Custer enigma. Excellent question and one I would love to know! As you say someone prompted their investigation. If not Curley directly, perhaps the reticule and animosity he suffered prompted their actions. I would think that Curley carried quite a burden for a long time. bc |
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Post by tbw on May 12, 2012 11:06:13 GMT -5
Curley became chief of his tribe. I don't know the years he served in that capacity, but in that role he may have been of some assistance.
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Post by stumblingbear on May 12, 2012 15:25:09 GMT -5
Great work Sir! I bet he did do a lot for his tribe! Hip, Hip, Hip for Curly!!!
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