Where Do You Stand?

[tbw]

WELCOME Muleskinner and Elkslayer.

I don't have much time here so I'll address both of your posts here.

I too share your views to a certain extent, and what brought all that about was a move towards really trying to understand what was being said instead of imposing my view, or, letting others impose their view upon what I was reading. I was, and still am, one juror amongst many. And what I heard and understood makes my jury vote equal in nature to any other. And what comes from this the most is that all of those men were human and could make mistakes. It is those mistakes that most center their attention on. And unfortunately, what is lost in that translation is the truth as was told by the participants.

I don't want anyone to ever think that what I say here is any different than anyone else's point of view. It is what it is, quite simply an opinion. Usually I try to play the Devil's advocate and question, not beyond reason, those statements that are fallible. Reno as well as Benteen and Custer was human and not above the saintly sacrifice of making error. And it is usually there where error is sought. And this all depends heavily upon when and where you believe each unit in that regiment was at any given moment in time. And it is here where the evidence points to the unbelievable and perhaps even the fantastic that most refuse to see in the evidence that was presented by those who survived. Not one man in Custer's battalion who survived to tell their story ever stated that Custer and his battalion didn't travel down that right bank at any less than a gallop all the way. And in accordance with this, they much prefer to try and coordinate what Reno's men observed as they were charging to contact amongst the dust, the excitement of the chase and the rifle fire that was to develop as they anticipated their own fates against a foe that gave no quarter.

Where Custer departed Reno is an important element in determining probable cause. It was about 5 miles to the nearest point on Custer's field and about 6 miles to where Custer fell. The old battle manuals tell us that the gallop they used was about 12 to 13 mph, this to maintain unit integrity and cohesion. And we know on at least one occasion, as was reported by Sgt. Kanipe that they did break this gait in favor of going faster. At this gait it would take Custer and his men about a half hour to get to the point where Custer fell. And about 15 minutes to get half that distance downstream. What makes sense here is where Lt. Varnum said he observed the white horses of E company, this in total accord with the average timing that was testified to at the COI by Reno and his men for his traverse down the left bank. This 15 minutes, or thereabouts, is crucial to understanding where these units were in relation to one another, approximately for both units about 3 miles from where they departed each other, with a caveat that crossing the river would consume about a 1/2 mile of time that it would take to do that maneuver would bring both those units online exactly when Lt. Varnum testified where he saw them at "point '2'". Which was, not in some arroyo, coulee or valley, but on the ridge line going down from Weir Peak into Weir Peak Coulee at the very time Reno was setting up his open skirmish line.

Girard hears the firing downstream. This single observation can also be timed to a near exact time. How so? Read Girards testimony concerning it. He stated that he heard the heavy firing downstream about "halfway through" Reno and G troops stay in timber trying to keep the Indians from outflanking them there. This duration was also testified to have been about 10 minutes, so Girards hearing observation came at about 5 minutes into G troops mission. It was testified to that G troop was taken off the skirmish line about 10 to 15 minutes after they set up that skirmish line. Which makes Girards hearing observation about 15 to 20 minutes after Varnum observed the white horses at point "2". Not only does Girards observation make sense, it corroborates Varnums statement as to the time and the place being where he said it was, "point 2".

What is interesting at this point is this 15 to 20 minutes after SL formation, when Girard heard that firing downstream. Why? Because Major Reno testified that - that skirmish line on the open plain was there "heavy firing" for about 20 minutes. Now watch what happens to Varnum/Girards testimony concerning his statement. If it was 15 minutes after the skirmish line began its formation when Girard heard that firing downstream it would have been a further 5 minutes (20 minutes in all) before G troop was withdrawn from the timber. If it was 20 minutes when Girard heard that firing downstream, it was a further 5 minutes before G troop was withdrawn from the timber. What is very hard to ignore here is this timing and the statements concerning what was going on with that open skirmish line and when it was withdrawn into the timber, which maneuvering would take a further 5 to 10 minutes to accomplish.

What is known here is that Reno took G troop from the timber into the open glade to begin forming them for the charge out of there. And what one must watch closely with this is who was there. And from the testimony we do know that at one point within a 5 to 10 minute period of time, Capt. Moylan and his company were also there forming up to as he testified to charge out of there.

What can be garnered with a certainty here is when and where Custer and Reno's men were at any given point in time, and from this what is known is that Custer was fully engaged at least 10 to 15 minutes before Reno retreated from those woods.

When Reno charged out of those woods for the safer environment of the heights, he was already planning to do so before the act was carried out, this is clear from Capt. Moylan's testimony. And what most simply do not understand, nor do they want to is the duress of the moment when it occurred. He had reports from his subordinates about what was happening to the open skirmish line, and he, and he alone was the one who gave the command for it to retreat into the timber because it was being flanked. We also know that Reno's position in the open glade was being flanked and ultimately compromised in the hail of bullets that struck one of Moylan's men and killed Bloody Knife. I struggle with the thought of what I would have done, let alone openly criticize Reno's action in response to it. When you have 2/3rds of your command engaged in forming up into column of fours and disaster strikes in the form of a hail of bullets killing your men, who could have done better? And more importantly, how - especially when his force was outnumbered 9 to 1 as testified to by Capt. Benteen. Fools may dream of the what if's here, but when faced with the certain reality of choice, none could have done better.

The real tragedy here is not what we think happened, but what those who were there testified to and remain, unheard and unbelieved.


Again WELCOME to both of you

ADMIN

[justinterested]

I come in on the “other” category too (neither). The phile/phobe ends of the spectrum require you to come down hard on the behavior of one of two proven soldiers, Custer or Benteen (I’ll steer clear of Reno for this discussion, because that would just distract and inflame). Both had good records, neither was a coward, and neither was stupid. They didn’t like each other either, but that’s another matter .

That neutral position allows me to look at the battle plan (there was one), and the reaction of the players to the shock of contact that destroyed that battle plan (as it always does) without some of the distractions that come from looking for fault in one side or the other. At least I like to think it does.

So I’m neither. Like any battle, there were mistakes and there were right decisions. And then there was that chaos of war, which definitely showed itself in this one. Custer had his share of all three of those things, as did others that were there, and I prefer to look at the material from that perspective.

[joewiggs]

Your points of contention are well defined and extremely clear! First of all, one should stay clear of Reno if there is any hope of a rational discussion as the mere mention of Reno's name creates antagonistic responses.

And yes, Custer did have a plan of action contrary to the insistence of those who claim he did not.

More importantly, to me, is your perspective regarding the chaos and shock that helps to create good and bad choices by commanders in war. the leaders in battle are responsible for conditions that often befuddles and polarize those who attempt to, subsequently, critique the battle after wards.

The key to success in achieving a rational conclusion as to what may or may not have occurred during a battle, I believe, is dependent upon an open discussion void of hostility.

Your response and the responses of our membership exemplify such an approach.

[whitebull]

Mar 20, 2012 16:17:37 GMT -5 muleskinner said:

As I've aged, and having read most of the Native American accounts that weren't available to me in my youth, my opinion of Custer has changed. As a child, he was of course heroic, but then became something of a rabid dog-type anti-hero - much like Mulligan's portrayal of him in "Little Big Man." Now, I see the general as a mixture of eccentricities, narcissim, arrogance and bravery. I can't really say that I'm a 'phobe' or a 'phile." In terms of his conduct at The Little Big Horn, I'm of the opinion that his battle plan MIGHT have worked, and wasn't necessarily the product of a deranged mind with a lust for a Pennsylvania Avenue mailing address. Alas, when waging war - total war - against a warrior society like the Sioux and Cheyenne, there aren't any do-overs or mulligans. When the coordination of Reno's move on the village and Custer's attack was fouled, the fate of Custer's command was pretty much sealed. Best case scenario: with the braves engaged with Reno, Custer's command enters the village and drives the women and children onto the plains, where they're rounded up and held hostage until the warriors give up and everyone heads back to the reservation. Things didn't unfold as I BELIEVE they were planned, obviously. With Reno already repulsed and galloping for his hill, Custer and his 200-odd men collided with a very angry and motivated Sioux behemoth. That doesn't make Custer stupid or insane; it makes him unlucky - for the first and last time in his professional career.

I think you hit it right on the head when you pointed out that Custer's finish at the Little Big Horn was just as probable a turn of bad luck as anything else! Who knows? How many times during the Civil was did he survive because of plain, old fashioned luck?

I will add this though, if Reno and Benteen had made a better showing Custer might have lived to tell his side of the story. Now wouldn't that be a hoot!

[tbw]

Welcome Justintersted

Joe, JI disagree with limiting the discussion based upon any bias, prejudice or phobia. All three of those men were there and what decisions they made or what they did or did not do weighed heavily into the base outcome of the disaster that befell almost 1/2 of that regiment. We tend to base our biases, prejudices and phobias upon canted views that like a buzz saw rips off massive chunks of truth without remorse from those who testified and stated what did happen. What exactly were the conditions that were responsible for the disaster? Was it the sole responsibility of those three men to create those conditions that today polarize and befuddles the bejesus out of those who refuse to see beyond the shadow of the huge warts of prejudices and biases on their own noses? Rational discussion requires, nay demands that those whose warts have exceeded the size of their own noses to listen to reason in contemplation of the evidence as presented. Many a time I've done this, and many a time I have changed my own view because I was at least willing to listen and/or present my case further for review with further evidence to support my own views.

What is massively infuriating is those who will not discuss in civility these issues beyond the biases and prejudices of their own polarized puss infected bumps, and instead chose to remain blind to what others have to say especially when they present evidence to support their views. Those who do not share evidence to support their views may suffer the indignity and rightful reprimand of the faithless, of which this world is multifarously diverse, and rightfully so in that regard.

I will not try to infect JI's statement with what I think he meant by "mistakes", by "right decisions" and by "chaos of war" other than what he did say, that he was "neither" in regards to a subject that such neutrality respects "without some of the distractions that come from looking for fault in one side or the other."

And that brings us full circle to Major Marcus Reno, Captain Fredrick Benteen and George Armstrong Custer. Opinions are a dime a dozen and cheaper than donuts without the support of evidence. I'll take mine glazed an jelly filled. Give me one that isn't and I'll know it.

What some of the new people here don't know about me is that I very often play the Devil's Advocate, whether I believe what I'm advocating or not. It is not out of disrespect that I do this. But it is to further share in civil discussion to further understand and with hope, perhaps, just perhaps discover something neither of us knew when we began.

Again Welcome JI.

Admin

[joewiggs]

I understand your concerns and agree completely with your perspective of not allowing ones personal vendettas to influence ones rationale regarding individual participant responsibility for success and/or failure of this battle; it was certainly a collective endeavor..

However, written correspondence, interviews, military reports, and opinions of persons actually involved in the battle along with military potentates who later scrutinized studied the results of this battle unanimously agree that some of the soldiers fought well while others not so well.

This salient possibility is not meant as an indictment of any individual but, a historical recognition of what may have occurred during the battle. Events that help to determine the "why" of the final results of the engagement.

It is my honest opinion that to regard all of Reno's Inquiry testimony as sacrosanct without delving into the human motivation that prompted said testimony would do much to maintain a facade of secrecy that was initiated by participants of the battle and a military hierarchy who were not directly involved but promulgated by the following:

a. Men ashamed of their role in the battle;
b. Men unwilling to accept responsibility for that role;
c. Men who allowed animosity and jealousy to lead them to feverishly denigrate Custer;
d. A political and social mind set of the nineteenth century that could not accept the possibility of an incident of military superiority of "savages" over ''White" troops;
e. that Custer was a mindlessly greedy and irresponsible field commander as portrayed by Reno and Benteen;
f. that the only way to hide the many errors (by those other than Custer) committed in this battle was for interested parties to place the preponderance of blame upon the shoulders of a dead man who could not testify in his own behalf and intimidate or influence those who might have testified in his defense.

Fortunately, this forum is blessed with a member ship of mature individuals who share a wealth of thoughts, facts and yes, even speculation freely and without fear of cyber intimidation; a mixture of positive ideologies that I'm proud to be associated with! I particularly thank Dennis for all that he has achieved!

[tbw]

Joe

And which if any of your a. through f. motivations, would apply to any of those that testified or stated that Custer's pace was at a gallop all the way down the right bank? Why should suspicion, speculation and other modus operandi abound when that timing was in accord with Reno and his mens movement down the left bank? To say that all of what they offered was pure bs because of these suspicions lessens all of what they did say and gives rise to pure and unadulterated speculation beyond reason. Sure, we must temper and test what they said, but to say that the RCOI was totally bunk, that just isn't right Joe. I hope you weren't saying that. I realize that you don't like the RCOI, but honestly, without it, there's nothing to discuss.

[joewiggs]

I'm sorry but I have no faith in the R.O.I.C. whatsoever, never had, and I don't anticipate changing my mind in the near future. This does not mean, of course, that I'm suggesting that my theory is infallible and that all discussions concerning this vital episode is, forthwith, closed. I have consistently strained to be as open minded as the next person. However, I must be true to myself and express what I feel within my heart regardless of the consequences.

I have been motivated, pushed, and slammed against the door of reality by 20 years of casual and intensive reading of every tad of information concerning this battle that has been made available to me. The present summation of this arduous but fascinating journey is this; we shall never know what really occurred. What we are capable of doing is asking hard questions regarding some very suspicious conclusions that somehow simply don't make sense!

According to The Reno Court of Inquiry (The Reno Court of Inquiry Graham) sixteen witnesses testified as to whether or not they head the sound of firing from down river, the area where Custer suffered his demise. Of the sixteen witnesses, thirteen emphatically did hear shots and volley firing. Three witnesses did not: Reno, Benteen, and Wallace.

In his official report to his superiors at Headquarters written on July 5, 1876 Reno wrote:

"We heard firing in that direction and knew it could only be Custer."
p. 278

Also:

"We now thought of Custer, of whom nothing had been seen and heard of since the firing in his direction about 6 p.m. on the eve of the 25Th.
p. 280

How then do we rational explain Reno's testimony at the Inquiry?

"I heard no firing from down river till after we moved out [2 hours later] in that direction and then only a few scattering shots. I thought they were from the village. It did not impress me as coming from a general engagement. Nothing that came to my attention on the 25Th. or 26th led me to suspect that Custer was destroyed.'
P.221

Another example of inquiry testimony by Reno:

"He [Custer] called the officers together and I attended, of course. He said the Indian Scouts reported a large village in view from the mountain;that he did not believe it himself."
P. 211

Reno's official report:

"

Custer called the officers together and informed us that beyond a doubt the village was in the valley of the Little Big Horn." [As reported by the scouts from the Crows Nest].
P. 276

Did Reno tell the truth in his official report on July 5, 1876 and lie at the Inquiry or, did he lie on his official report and tell the truth at the Inquiry? You can't have both.

When a witnesses perjures himself under oath, the tenants of sworn testimony demand that he/she forfeits all credibility.

The above is merely the tip of the "iceberg."

I am not professing that every morsel of the Reno Inquiry should be disregarded as that would be similar to throwing the baby out with the dirty wash water. What I am suggesting is that we, as students of the battle, can not accept the findings of the inquiry "en Toto" yet, we can and must utilize the inquiry as a means of investigation.

What I am saying is that it is human nature expound upon things we are contented and proud of and stifle and diminish those things we are ashamed of. the historian must understand this vital human equation in order to discern "truth" as much as possible if at all.

[tbw]

Thanks for the clarification. Much appreciated.

[joewiggs]

You're welcome and, thank you.