Custer's furthest advance

[tbw]

Lets try a little exercise in "where" futility here:

Lets take Curley's earliest newspaper account as it was told in the Helena Herald on July 15, 1876 and use it to start a discussion.

This has long been one of those areas on Custer's battlefield that still seems to baffle a lot of people, and there is little else to go upon. It's not just the area of Custer's approach to his battlefield after separating from Reno, but also what happened once he arrives there. The area of discussion in particular we will focus our attention on at this time is where Curley said this,

"When they neared the river the Indians, concealed in the underbrush on the opposite side of the river, opened fire on the troops, which checked the advance. Here a portion of the command were dismounted and thrown forward to the river, and returned the fire of the Indians."

"During this time the warriors were seen riding out of the village by hundreds, deploying across his front to his left, as if with the intention of crossing the stream on his right, while the women and children were seen hastening out of the village in large numbers in the opposite direction."

"During the fight at this point Curley saw two of Custer's men killed, who fell into the stream. After fighting a few moments here, Custer seemed to be convinced that it was impracticable to cross, as it only could be done in column of fours exposed during the movement to a heavy fire from the front and both flanks. He therefore ordered the head of the column to the right, and bore diagonally into the hills, downstream, his men on foot leading their horses. In the meantime the Indians had crossed the river (below) in immense numbers, and began to appear on his right flank and in his rear; and he had proceeded but a few hundred yards in the direction the column had taken, when it became necessary to renew the fight with the Indians who had crossed the stream."

What I would like here is input from you on what you think all of that meant. Particularly "Where" you think all this happened. We should also entertain other participant comments to compare with these statements to make our best educated guesses and see if we can all come together on one simple solution in answer to Curley's comments. To further interest and speculation we should add these comments by Curley,


"At first the command remained together, but after some minutes' fighting, it was divided, a portion deployed circularly to the left, and the remainder similarly to the right, so that when the line was formed, it bore a rude resemblance to a circle, advantage being taken as far as possible of the protection afforded by the ground. The horses were in the rear, the men on the line being dismounted, fighting on foot. Of the incidents of the fight in other parts of the field than his own, Curley is not well informed, as he was himself concealed in a ravine, from which but a small portion of the field was visible."

Once again what I'd like from you are your thoughts on whether or not the whole command went to the river in the first place or not, using Curley's comments above as a guide but by no means excluding other participants comments which may or may not shed light upon this subject.

PS: Note to self and others. I rarely if ever discuss this portion of the battle. And the reason is really simple, it really is an area of discussion that is unknown. It relies upon fragmentary and oftentimes confusing sets of information where anyone can impose their will upon the outcome. But here, in this unknown area of discourse, I feel the truth is held in the hearts and minds of those whose beliefs reign supreme. There is no right or wrong way of seeing these events, and your opinion is just as good as any other, no matter how ridiculous you may feel it is. In fact, I have oftentimes observed those being more reliable than what has been thought before.

[bc]

Apr 30, 2012 10:51:48 GMT -5 tbw said:

Lets try a little exercise in "where" futility here:

Lets take Curley's earliest newspaper account as it was told in the Helena Herald on July 15, 1876 and use it to start a discussion.

This has long been one of those areas on Custer's battlefield that still seems to baffle a lot of people, and there is little else to go upon. It's not just the area of Custer's approach to his battlefield after separating from Reno, but also what happened once he arrives there. The area of discussion in particular we will focus our attention on at this time is where Curley said this,

"When they neared the river the Indians, concealed in the underbrush on the opposite side of the river, opened fire on the troops, which checked the advance. Here a portion of the command were dismounted and thrown forward to the river, and returned the fire of the Indians."

"During this time the warriors were seen riding out of the village by hundreds, deploying across his front to his left, as if with the intention of crossing the stream on his right, while the women and children were seen hastening out of the village in large numbers in the opposite direction."

"During the fight at this point Curley saw two of Custer's men killed, who fell into the stream. After fighting a few moments here, Custer seemed to be convinced that it was impracticable to cross, as it only could be done in column of fours exposed during the movement to a heavy fire from the front and both flanks. He therefore ordered the head of the column to the right, and bore diagonally into the hills, downstream, his men on foot leading their horses. In the meantime the Indians had crossed the river (below) in immense numbers, and began to appear on his right flank and in his rear; and he had proceeded but a few hundred yards in the direction the column had taken, when it became necessary to renew the fight with the Indians who had crossed the stream."

What I would like here is input from you on what you think all of that meant. Particularly "Where" you think all this happened. We should also entertain other participant comments to compare with these statements to make our best educated guesses and see if we can all come together on one simple solution in answer to Curley's comments. To further interest and speculation we should add these comments by Curley,


"At first the command remained together, but after some minutes' fighting, it was divided, a portion deployed circularly to the left, and the remainder similarly to the right, so that when the line was formed, it bore a rude resemblance to a circle, advantage being taken as far as possible of the protection afforded by the ground. The horses were in the rear, the men on the line being dismounted, fighting on foot. Of the incidents of the fight in other parts of the field than his own, Curley is not well informed, as he was himself concealed in a ravine, from which but a small portion of the field was visible."

Once again what I'd like from you are your thoughts on whether or not the whole command went to the river in the first place or not, using Curley's comments above as a guide but by no means excluding other participants comments which may or may not shed light upon this subject.

PS: Note to self and others. I rarely if ever discuss this portion of the battle. And the reason is really simple, it really is an area of discussion that is unknown. It relies upon fragmentary and oftentimes confusing sets of information where anyone can impose their will upon the outcome. But here, in this unknown area of discourse, I feel the truth is held in the hearts and minds of those whose beliefs reign supreme. There is no right or wrong way of seeing these events, and your opinion is just as good as any other, no matter how ridiculous you may feel it is. In fact, I have oftentimes observed those being more reliable than what has been thought before.

Hello Boston, I guess I haven't heard of Curley's story in the Helena Herald. I'm trying to sort it out. First I have to see if I can get all the rights and lefts sorted out. I may have done that.

Then see if it jives with what Martini saw. He saw troops going backwards towards the ridges probably Luce and later Nye-Cartwright. The action by the river seems to jive with what Peter Thompson saw assuming this group of NAs forming on the left and going to the right were riding in their typical circle.

If some mounted soldiers made the river and were killed, possibly out of sight of Curley, then White Cow Bulls line of bull comes into play.

Thompson saw the soldier in a semi-circle fighting a withdrawal. I don't know if this is the circle Curley is talking about or if you can make a circle including troops on Luce who probably moved over to NC ridges at the same time.

Finally, the renewed attack with NAs on the right sounds like a good way for soldiers to get killed on Greasy Grassy Hill where it is alleged that a number of dead soldiers were found.

So where was Curley? The other Crows were on Bouyer's Bluff. Maybe he was in Western or Middle Coulee?

bc

[tbw]

Welcome bc, thanks for joining us.

And thanks for you summation.

In answer to your question about Curley, that would depend upon where you thought this attack was being staged, ford "B" or one of those other fords on downstream, there really isn't credible enough evidence to contend that it is any for certain single one. Some people, in fact I think probably most base what little is known of this event from Walter M. Camps interviews. Camp had a way of leading the witness, so to speak, or in this case those he interviewed. In far to many of his interviews he assumed this ford was "B" and centered his questions around ford "b" and presented the questions to them that way. For example, and I paraphrase, "When Custer went to ford "b", or "if Custer went to ford "b" etc. These were all questions put first and foremost to them without asking them which ford it was, quite simply he assumed it was "b" and asked the questions from there. Was it ford "b" as Camp assumed and really never took the time and effort to find out, or was it a different ford on downstream?

[tbw]

Curley's Helena Herald interview in its entirety.


"Custer, with his five companies, after separating from Reno and his seven companies, moved to the right around the base of a hill overlooking the valley of the Little Horn, through a ravine just wide enough to admit his column of fours. There was no sign of the presence of Indians in the hills on that side (the right) of the Little Horn, and the column moved steadily on until it rounded the hill and came in sight of the village lying in the valley below them. Custer appeared very much elated and ordered the bugle to sound a charge, and moved on at the head of his column, waving his hat to encourage his men. When they neared the river the Indians, concealed in the underbrush on the opposite side of the river, opened fire on the troops, which checked the advance. Here a portion of the command were dismounted and thrown forward to the river, and returned the fire of the Indians.

"During this time the warriors were seen riding out of the village by hundreds, deploying across his front to his left, as if with the intention of crossing the stream on his right, while the women and children were seen hastening out of the village in large numbers in the opposite direction.

"During the fight at this point Curley saw two of Custer's men killed, who fell into the stream. After fighting a few moments here, Custer seemed to be convinced that it was impracticable to cross, as it only could be done in column of fours exposed during the movement to a heavy fire from the front and both flanks. He therefore ordered the head of the column to the right, and bore diagonally into the hills, downstream, his men on foot leading their horses. In the meantime the Indians had crossed the river (below) in immense numbers, and began to appear on his right flank and in his rear; and he had proceeded but a few hundred yards in the direction the column had taken, when it became necessary to renew the fight with the Indians who had crossed the stream.

"At first the command remained together, but after some minutes' fighting, it was divided, a portion deployed circularly to the left, and the remainder similarly to the right, so that when the line was formed, it bore a rude resemblance to a circle, advantage being taken as far as possible of the protection afforded by the ground. The horses were in the rear, the men on the line being dismounted, fighting on foot. Of the incidents of the fight in other parts of the field than his own, Curley is not well informed, as he was himself concealed in a ravine, from which but a small portion of the field was visible.

"The fight appears to have begun, from Curley's description of the situation of the sun, about 2:30 or 3 o'clock p.m., and continued without intermission until nearly sunset. The Indians had completely surrounded the command, leaving their horses in ravines well to the rear, themselves pressing forward to attack on foot. Confident in the superiority of their numbers, they made several charges on all points of Custer's line, but the troops held their position firmly, and delivered a heavy fire, and every time drove them back. Curley said the firing was more rapid than anything he had ever conceived of, being a continuous roll, as he expressed it, "the snapping of the threads in the tearing of a blanket. The troops expended all the ammunition in their belts, and then sought their horses for the reserve ammunition carried in their saddle pockets.

"As long as their ammunition held out, the troops, though losing considerable in the fight, maintained their position in spite of the efforts of the Sioux. From the weakening of their fire toward the close of the afternoon, the Indians appeared to believe their ammunition was about exhausted, and they made a grand final charge, in the course of which the last of the command was destroyed, the men being shot where they lay in their position in the line, at such close quarters that many were killed with arrows. Curley says that Custer remained alive through the greater part of the engagement, animating his men to determined resistance; but about an hour before the close of the fight, he received a mortal wound.

"Curley says the field was thickly strewn with dead bodies of the Sioux who fell in the attack, in number considerably more than the force of soldiers engaged. He is satisfied that their loss will exceed six hundred killed, beside an immense number wounded.

"Curley accomplished his escape by drawing his blanket around him in the manner of the Sioux and passing through an interval which had been made in their lines as they scattered over the field in their final charge. He says they must have seen him, for he was in plain view, but was probably mistaken by the Sioux for one of their number, or one of their allied Arapahos or Cheyennes.

"The most particulars of the account given by Curley of the fight are confirmed by the position of the trail made by Custer in his movements, and the general evidence of the battle field.

"Only one discrepancy is noted, which relates to the time when the fight came to an end. Officers of Reno's command, who, late in the afternoon, from high points, surveyed the country in anxious expectation of Custer's appearance, and commanded a view of the field where he had fought, say that no fighting was going on at that time, between 5 and 6 o'clock. It is evident, therefore, that the last of Custer's command was destroyed at an earlier hour in the day than Curley relates."

[bc]

I'm not sure you could put all this action anywhere else but around the B fords. I can't see this as all five troops taking Cemetery Ravine down to the D fords area. I generally put the Sioux in the south and the Cheyennes in the north. Curley got out with a Sioux blanket so I have to put him to the south and not in a position to see the D fords. Doran puts Curley in a ravine just east of Calhoun Hill which also supports a view of the B fords and not the D fords.

They must have had a very good translator to get that account as it is written as they don't sound like the words of Curley or any NA. The reporter was also well aware of the officer accounts.

The story could be easy to pick apart but there must be some gems in there somewhere. I think the troop movements should fit most theories except where someone has in mind a specific tactic by Custer that differs.

bc

[tbw]

May 1, 2012 17:13:22 GMT -5 bc said:

I'm not sure you could put all this action anywhere else but around the B fords. I can't see this as all five troops taking Cemetery Ravine down to the D fords area. I generally put the Sioux in the south and the Cheyennes in the north. Curley got out with a Sioux blanket so I have to put him to the south and not in a position to see the D fords. Doran puts Curley in a ravine just east of Calhoun Hill which also supports a view of the B fords and not the D fords.

They must have had a very good translator to get that account as it is written as they don't sound like the words of Curley or any NA. The reporter was also well aware of the officer accounts.

The story could be easy to pick apart but there must be some gems in there somewhere. I think the troop movements should fit most theories except where someone has in mind a specific tactic by Custer that differs.

bc

I've always understood the need to place that action at ford "b", but, and I'm not taking issue with any of your logic of it at all, its just that there are those who do argue that he also went to at least one of the ford "d"'s. I don't see that in Curley's narrative. Was it because he didn't see it, or was it because it never happened, or was it because it had nothing to do with Ford "b"? In other words what I'm getting here is that it had to be ford "b", but what comes after never made any sense to me. Let me postulate what I'm getting at here.

The ridge they fell back up the river to would be where?

From another of Curley's narratives he said that they went from that point on the ridge directly to the SE corner of the battlefield, this was told as either the Finley marker or somewhere near Calhoun hill. What he said in that interview tends to support the idea that Custer knew at that time that they were in serious trouble and would have to make a stand somewhere, right then and there. The question seems to be why would he withdraw from a ford that was lightly defended only to go on downstream, ie towards Calhoun hill and there proclaim this massive problem and of being forced in making a stand. The time it would have taken to go from the ford back up to the ridgeline on Greasy Grass ridge, assuming thats the right ridge as some do say cemetary ridge, would have taken how long? And from there to Calhoun, how long? Something doesn't jibe here with the attack at "b", then draw away from a place that should have been a cake walk and maybe somewhere in the vicinity of 10+/- minutes later after having gone away from help, if they should get into trouble to making a decision to go on downstream after the ford "b" retreat means what? Is anyone saying Ambush here? Because thats what it seems like Curley's narratives point to if it was ford "b". And if this is the case then how does one get any of them to any of the Ford's marked "d" and with how many troopers in tow? This supposedly after Custer had alreadly proclaimed they should be making a stand somehwere, not pushing on and trying to ford anywhere as making a stand indicated a defensive posture, not the other way around. And that's where this thing gets real squirrely. What the heck was Custer defending then and there and why? All of this is atypical of Custer in the extreme. And the only thing that makes any sense at all is a surprise attack and ambush by the Indians at a moment in time when they couldn't mount their mounts and make a dash ANYWHERE upstream to link up with the rest of his command? Surely if he knew at the time they had to make a stand, that soon, then and there, then they had to have been cut off quickly and with an overwhelming number of Indians intervening in their pathways back to their safety in numbers.

Curley's narratives will always be suspect, most of those who study this thing have to use part and parcel of his work, one way or another, to get anywhere near a cohesive and comprehensive understanding of what took place. And this is where the troop movements wont ever fit the best theory, and perhaps even the best tactical understanding of what did take place.

[bc]

I've been looking at a number of theories and one of them is attacking towards ford B and maybe some elements getting to the river. This would be on the Butler Ridge side of MTC towards the Real Bird fords. What started as light resistance that caused the lead elements to dismount and form a skirmish line. Same tactic used by Reno in his charge.

Ford B was in the middle to upper third end of the village. NAs coming from the Reno fight poured across Miniconjou ford and began forming to Custer's front and up the south slope of MTC where they began confronting the back battalion who moved up to Luce ridge to help lay cover fire on the NAs. This movement was seen by Martini when he looked over his shoulder. Other NAs moved up to the next ford down from the Real Bird ford and came up over GGR. Custer sent troops to Greasy Grass Hill to cover them. This would have been what looked like a circle of troops to Curley. Somewhere in this, Wolf Tooth and his band showed up as well and perhaps early on which was why one battalion moved up to Luce and with NAs in the rear may have been another reason to stop the charge near the river and form a skirmish line.

The NAs used their standard circle method of attacking. Curley was only seeing one side of the circle and Thompson could see both. Custer always on the offensive decided to withdraw and move to another ford with one battalion while the other retrograded to Calhoun Hill. Once he established a defense on the hill, he moved to the D fords. Meanwhile the defense of Calhoun Hill became a long range fight for a while with the skirmish lines holding back the NAs.

This scenario seems to fit alot of the accounts although I haven't read all of Curley's stuff. There are other NA account(s) of Custer being encircled/crowded by three sides at the ford.

bc

[tbw]

Curley does record this dismounted action as you have stated it at the ford in several of his accounts, however there is a couple of his accounts where that isn't mentioned at all. And some could say that that was a 'see I told you so moment in time here where Curley fouled up and that would have been one of the reasons not to believe him'. But there is a continuity between like sets of his data in those same accounts that hasn't been looked at or seriously studied, and was one of the reasons I started this thread. This one seemed to be a good starting point because it was claimed to be one of, if not the first Interview he ever did.

Correct me if I'm wrong here, but from what little we know, wasn't there only like about 80 or so NA's who had ever made the claim that they went from one fight (Reno's) to the other, (Custers)? For a battalion of about 225 men that wouldn't have been very much to pressure the battalion, or even a part of it at all. And from those accounts of those who did state that they did that, when read, the vast majority of them don't get back to Custer's action until right at the end of that fight, this is evident from how they state things.

The only problem with trying to tie in other participant accounts with Curley's or for that matter any of them, is assuming the "where" first, in this case ford "b". What Martin observed could have realistically, and as easily, have occurred at any of those fords. But what, I think, we have to look at here is the trap or ambush factor that has never been seriously looked at, because there was only one person who ever made that claim, and this was Martin. Ere long time-motion studies pose a serious problem in trying to understand this battle as a whole. Where it is most useful, and helpful, is in these short term tactical analysis and even then we should be off my a factor of a couple of minutes one way or the other, here in situations like this, it definitely helps us to understand things a little better and find out what works best. Martin stated at the COI that the distance he went after departing Custer was about 500 to 600 yards or 3/4ths of a mile back to that same hill where they all had just been. The only gait speed associated directly with his ride was stated by Benteen as a "jog trot", which would have been on the lower end of the scale when it came to trots, placing that trot at about 5 miles per hour or so. But before we go any further with this we would have to determine when and "where" Martin's horse was shot, because that could have, and very likely was the reason that horse wasn't going faster when Benteen observed him. Lets assume for the sake of argument here that Benteen observed him most of the way back, which meant that Martins horse caught a stray bullet from the engagement at the ford as he left. It assumes the best case scenario, not that it is the one and only right one. More along these lines will develop from you and others as we go along, because each variation of accounts will have to adjust to make that event fit somewhere in their own accounts. Any way, those first two (500 - 600 yards) would be about a quarter to a third of a mile from where Martin had left Custer, and using Benteen's jog trot as a baseline to begin things here, it would have taken Martin at that speed, 2 to 3 minutes to have gotten to those respective points, and about 6 minutes or so to have gotten that 3/4ths of a mile. This using Benteens observed gait of Martin. Not saying he could have gone faster, and because his own statements indicate he was trying to go fast, I don't think it credible to say he went any slower than what Benteen observed. This would have meant that When Martin looked back, it had only been from 2 to 6 minutes since he had departed Custer's battalion with his orders. That's a very tight time to work with, and it doesn't leave much wiggle room time for Custer to do any fancy maneuvers and does corroborate Curley's statements about that ford, wherever it was, that they left there without any significant fighting or maneuvering for that ridge, wherever that was. And if any of them had been dismounted to fight, it appears from Martin's observation, in concert with Curley's that the purpose of it was to effect an immediate withdrawal.

From Curley's statements It appears at the time the "circle" observation he wasn't hiding anywhere, and what is done here with a lot of people who pick these things apart is try to hide that guy in a ditch all the way through, that never happened! He was an ever present part of that movement from beginning to end and not until near the end was his position and observations obscured. Remember here he did say something as they retreated from the ford that there was Indians all around them and described that to perfection, and then made the comment that he didn't know how they could have made it back to that ridge without casualties. So no, Doran nor anyone else sticking that guys head in the sand is not just a grave error on their part, but a preconceived notion to place less emphasis on what Curley did have to say and make it seem the guy was a total fraud. First, where and then 2nd when, not the other way around. So no, what Curley described as being a circle, taking advantage of the land, was a total observation of all those company's and described that action to perfection and the reasons for it because he had rode back up with them to that ridge and in later interviews described it to perfection. From there, with all the maneuvers going on, he had not just yet stuck his head in Doran's sand and wouldn't but for some minutes in time.

You said, "This scenario seems to fit alot of the accounts although I haven't read all of Curley's stuff. There are other NA account(s) of Custer being encircled/crowded by three sides at the ford." In fact there are a lot of those, but those 2 to 6 minutes either tells the story, or if trying to make it fit is the wrong ford.

[bc]

I'm not sure I follow you here Boston but I'll try. I tend to think Martini probably had his horse shot by some long range fire from NAs behind him on the bluffs that he never saw. I put his look back more in the nature of 15 minutes or so and his horse would have been in the same condition as the rest of Custer's.

We still have 2000 to 2500 warriors, give or take 500 more, that were there. That leaves plenty to move around Custer's 200 men. There was still quite a bit of time, more than an hour, before Custer's five companies were overrun and finished off. There was plenty of time for all the Reno fight warriors to join in and be part of the final charges. Most likely, Gall, Lame White Man, and Crazy Horse probably didn't do their thing until about all the NA warriors had arrived to bolster them.

Finally, I don't rule out Ford D as all the action mentioned by Curley but I'm not sure he puts that into his timeline of events. Remember Girard's rcoi testimony that he rode the river and found evidence from following tracks of troops moving to one ford and attempt a crossing and then moving over to another ford and crossing. Was that at 2 fords in the B area or B and D or 2 fords in the D area? There was enough evidence at Ford B to make all the 7th survivors along with Gibbon and Terry to believe that is where the action started and they didn't even know about Luce and NC ridges although that was likely the trail Godfrey saw. Neither ford has much evidence today of any kind of major action.

I believe Doran was using both JSIT and Curley to describe the final action. I never have been able to follow what he writes very well pertaining to the fight from MTC and on north. Have to reread it again, I guess.

bc

[tbw]

May 2, 2012 9:56:24 GMT -5 bc said:

I'm not sure I follow you here Boston but I'll try. I tend to think Martini probably had his horse shot by some long range fire from NAs behind him on the bluffs that he never saw. I put his look back more in the nature of 15 minutes or so and his horse would have been in the same condition as the rest of Custer's.

We still have 2000 to 2500 warriors, give or take 500 more, that were there. That leaves plenty to move around Custer's 200 men. There was still quite a bit of time, more than an hour, before Custer's five companies were overrun and finished off. There was plenty of time for all the Reno fight warriors to join in and be part of the final charges. Most likely, Gall, Lame White Man, and Crazy Horse probably didn't do their thing until about all the NA warriors had arrived to bolster them.

Finally, I don't rule out Ford D as all the action mentioned by Curley but I'm not sure he puts that into his timeline of events. Remember Girard's rcoi testimony that he rode the river and found evidence from following tracks of troops moving to one ford and attempt a crossing and then moving over to another ford and crossing. Was that at 2 fords in the B area or B and D or 2 fords in the D area? There was enough evidence at Ford B to make all the 7th survivors along with Gibbon and Terry to believe that is where the action started and they didn't even know about Luce and NC ridges although that was likely the trail Godfrey saw. Neither ford has much evidence today of any kind of major action.

I believe Doran was using both JSIT and Curley to describe the final action. I never have been able to follow what he writes very well pertaining to the fight from MTC and on north. Have to reread it again, I guess.

bc

I'll try to be a little more explicit, my error there, sorry.

Martin stated at the COI that he went back to that same hill he and Custer first observed the village and where he turned around in your version, and he estimated that distance back to that same hill as 500 to 600 yards or 3/4ths of a mile from where he left Custer's battalion. This is where my figures comes from.

Taking 15 minutes to go a quarter of a mile (abt. 500 yards), means that Martin was only going one mile per hour as he left to go back to Benteen. Taking 15 minutes to go a 1/3rd of a mile (abt. 600 yards) meant that he was only going about 1 and a 1/3rd mile per hour. And finally going 3/4ths of a mile using those same 15 minutes meant that he was only going about 3 miles per hour. The first two (500 - 600 yards) aren't even a walk for a horse, let alone a man on foot, the last (3/4ths of a mile from where he left Custer), 3 mph, is the walking pace for a man, the horse can go a little faster depending on that horses size, breeding etc. Timeing factors here don't support that 15 minute time to get back so little a distance, and it doesn't support what he himself said about trying to go fast, least of all support the final gait that Benteen observed him at, this estimated to have been a coverage area, I believe he said, of about 2 miles or so from where he first saw him to when Martin caught up to him. The gait of Martin's horse would not have been much less than Benteen's state gait rate of about 5 mph, it might have been more, but it would be hard pressed for anyone to support any notion that he rode less than that gait when he started his journey back, which as we've seen, was somewhere in the vicinity of 2 to 6 minutes (back to that same hill) give or take a couple here or there. From this it looks like you would need to cut your time (15 minutes) in half for his ride back that same hill, where he turned around and made that observation you noted earlier. I don't think anyone could, not should, but could buy that he went on his horse at a gait rate of less than a horses walk, and if he had been, I seriously doubt someone else might have been sent to make sure that message got through, Kanipe anyone?

I don't doubt your numbers of Indians, can't and won't, some say more, some say less, another one of thse grey areas that we'll never know for sure. Curley even mentioned them in association as to why Custer pulled away from one of these ford, might have been "B" for all we know. And if it was, as Curley once stated in another one of his interviews about some ford crossing attempt somewhere, that just as Custer started to cross the river, "around the corner" came hundreds of Indians with hundreds more coming up from the rear. Might this not have been the reason to dismount some of those troops to aid in the other's retreat and then follow up themselves asap a short time later? Action wise and time wise (2 to 6 minutes) would seem to support both Curley and Martin's statements about what happened at that ford, whichever it was.

About your ford "d" action that you mentioned. What always intriqued me the most here was those trails that were marked on Maguire's map showing the assumed two different pathways taken by the troopers away from that ford, which on the map at the court was marked "b". What it doesn't show is them going anywhere near the Finley or Calhoun hill area, could what you're talking about have been what we've been missing here all along? That they followed those trails as marked by Maguire downstream to another ford? And if it was, it seems more of a choice to go that way, than it was due to any Indian pressure that they made that move.

[bc]

May 2, 2012 11:38:10 GMT -5 tbw said:

May 2, 2012 9:56:24 GMT -5 bc said:

I'm not sure I follow you here Boston but I'll try. I tend to think Martini probably had his horse shot by some long range fire from NAs behind him on the bluffs that he never saw. I put his look back more in the nature of 15 minutes or so and his horse would have been in the same condition as the rest of Custer's.

We still have 2000 to 2500 warriors, give or take 500 more, that were there. That leaves plenty to move around Custer's 200 men. There was still quite a bit of time, more than an hour, before Custer's five companies were overrun and finished off. There was plenty of time for all the Reno fight warriors to join in and be part of the final charges. Most likely, Gall, Lame White Man, and Crazy Horse probably didn't do their thing until about all the NA warriors had arrived to bolster them.

Finally, I don't rule out Ford D as all the action mentioned by Curley but I'm not sure he puts that into his timeline of events. Remember Girard's rcoi testimony that he rode the river and found evidence from following tracks of troops moving to one ford and attempt a crossing and then moving over to another ford and crossing. Was that at 2 fords in the B area or B and D or 2 fords in the D area? There was enough evidence at Ford B to make all the 7th survivors along with Gibbon and Terry to believe that is where the action started and they didn't even know about Luce and NC ridges although that was likely the trail Godfrey saw. Neither ford has much evidence today of any kind of major action.

I believe Doran was using both JSIT and Curley to describe the final action. I never have been able to follow what he writes very well pertaining to the fight from MTC and on north. Have to reread it again, I guess.

bc

I'll try to be a little more explicit, my error there, sorry.

Martin stated at the COI that he went back to that same hill he and Custer first observed the village and where he turned around in your version, and he estimated that distance back to that same hill as 500 to 600 yards or 3/4ths of a mile from where he left Custer's battalion. This is where my figures comes from.

Taking 15 minutes to go a quarter of a mile (abt. 500 yards), means that Martin was only going one mile per hour as he left to go back to Benteen. Taking 15 minutes to go a 1/3rd of a mile (abt. 600 yards) meant that he was only going about 1 and a 1/3rd mile per hour. And finally going 3/4ths of a mile using those same 15 minutes meant that he was only going about 3 miles per hour. The first two (500 - 600 yards) aren't even a walk for a horse, let alone a man on foot, the last (3/4ths of a mile from where he left Custer), 3 mph, is the walking pace for a man, the horse can go a little faster depending on that horses size, breeding etc. Timeing factors here don't support that 15 minute time to get back so little a distance, and it doesn't support what he himself said about trying to go fast, least of all support the final gait that Benteen observed him at, this estimated to have been a coverage area, I believe he said, of about 2 miles or so from where he first saw him to when Martin caught up to him. The gait of Martin's horse would not have been much less than Benteen's state gait rate of about 5 mph, it might have been more, but it would be hard pressed for anyone to support any notion that he rode less than that gait when he started his journey back, which as we've seen, was somewhere in the vicinity of 2 to 6 minutes (back to that same hill) give or take a couple here or there. From this it looks like you would need to cut your time (15 minutes) in half for his ride back that same hill, where he turned around and made that observation you noted earlier. I don't think anyone could, not should, but could buy that he went on his horse at a gait rate of less than a horses walk, and if he had been, I seriously doubt someone else might have been sent to make sure that message got through, Kanipe anyone?

I don't doubt your numbers of Indians, can't and won't, some say more, some say less, another one of thse grey areas that we'll never know for sure. Curley even mentioned them in association as to why Custer pulled away from one of these ford, might have been "B" for all we know. And if it was, as Curley once stated in another one of his interviews about some ford crossing attempt somewhere, that just as Custer started to cross the river, "around the corner" came hundreds of Indians with hundreds more coming up from the rear. Might this not have been the reason to dismount some of those troops to aid in the other's retreat and then follow up themselves asap a short time later? Action wise and time wise (2 to 6 minutes) would seem to support both Curley and Martin's statements about what happened at that ford, whichever it was.

About your ford "d" action that you mentioned. What always intriqued me the most here was those trails that were marked on Maguire's map showing the assumed two different pathways taken by the troopers away from that ford, which on the map at the court was marked "b". What it doesn't show is them going anywhere near the Finley or Calhoun hill area, could what you're talking about have been what we've been missing here all along? That they followed those trails as marked by Maguire downstream to another ford? And if it was, it seems more of a choice to go that way, than it was due to any Indian pressure that they made that move.

I see your Martini timing here. Then that would suggest that the battalion moving to Luce was a designed move by Custer as opposed to a response to NA resistance. Either a feint or an attack with an alternate plan bravo where if the attacking battalion didn't succeed in crossing and driving the NAs off then they move to the other ford. I think that as soon as they saw an attack would fail, then the battalion on Luce had to send Co. C and maybe another company to cover the withdrawal.

Such a designed feint would require the remaining battalion to remain engaged with the NAs and perhaps withdrawing on purpose towards Calhoun Hill to keep sucking the NAs in and away from the D fords. No matter they would have to hold the backside until resistance broke or help came from Benteen.

Maguire's defined trails suggest troops moving in column formation for him to see it. That puts 2 companies taking the lower one and two the higher one to Calhoun Hill with C walking in a skirmish line retrograde. If all attacking companies at ford B were forced to retreat in a skirmish line retrograde because of heavy NA pressure, then there would be no trail for Maguire to find. So HQ and 2 companies must have departed on their own in column formation.

bc

[tbw]

Your mention of Luce in connection with the Martin timing places to great a trust in that location as being the place in question. If we're talking as if it was "B" then Luce might have been the place.

The reasons for the withdrawal from the ford, again your assumption that it was "b" places to great a trust that it was. If it was "b" I don't think it can be ascertained why they did pull back from it. I don't think it was heavily defended, but don't know for sure. The feint ideas was, I think first proposed by John Gray. And as a personal side note, and opinion, I never took to great a stock in it as a tactic by anyone, let alone Custer would want to do against a foe that only knew swarm tactics and understood little else when it came to white mans tactical methodology. But just because I don't believe it to be a legitimate action, doesn't mean that Custer didn't try it. If he did, the question would be why? With what little we now know and understand, why feint against 12 to 13 defenders and then beat it downstream? They're just going to swarm to where he was going anyway, and was exactly what they did. As for the alternate plan b that you mentioned, that would assume that the attempt at whatever ford that was, be it "b" or elsewhere was actually meant to have succeeded. Not sure it was as simple as either of those two choices you posed. Could have been, but it doesn't look that way. Why head toward a "dead" end terrain feature like Deep Ravine, which is the way those trails led, with a bunch of yelling bloodthirsty Indians in hot pursuit? Why head away from your nearest support if the oncoming Indians were more than your unit could handle at the ford to begin with? And if they weren't? What would either a feint or an alternate plan b be, or for that matter accomplish except to make his unit the target for hot pursuit and ultimate surrounding of along with total annihalation of same? You'd either have to hit that ford with everything you had and made damn sure its where you wanted to attack before you did, or skirt the thing and find a more favorable ford than try something as idiotic as what it looked to be. If it was done, and it was at "b", then it was something that hasn't been proposed, or looked at serious enough to make sense of it. Which is why I asked the question, did Custer take all of his company's to the ford(s)?

Your take on this whole episode, assuming it was ford "b" as you do, does the same thing everyone else has done for the past 135 years or so. They assume because it was some kind of retreat that it was a defensive action designed to save his men from that moment on. What if it wasn't a defensive action but an offensive one? One not dependent upon Reno's unit in the least? And one that was designed for some other purpose we haven't discerned? One that did include the "HQ and * companies departing* on their own in column formation." And an action made against only about 12 or 13 defenders. If it spells feint, why? And more importantly for what purpose where?

I'll try to be a little more explicit on this, and my thought process behind it.

If Custer's action at ford "b" was offensive in nature, which it by appearances seemed to have been, they why should he have gone to Calhoun hill or anywhere near there, or for that matter Nye-Cartwright ridge? Those were the final defensive places they ended up, but what maneuvers they made to get there is little understood, and rarely if ever postulated in a positive military way that gave Custer that initiative to do so, ergo that mindset everyone seems to have gotten themselves into, which doesn't explain the trails as reported by Maguire on his map and it hasn't done much to our understanding of what Custer was thinking or trying to do when he apparently took those trails. It would have been more foolish for him to have sent someone to Calhoun from there than to have taken his battalion straightway back to the safety of his other units from that ford, that is, if it was so pressed by the Indians, I don't think it was, if ford "b" even existed in his plans. There would have been no earthly reason to send men back that far (Calhoun/Nye/C) from the assumed action at the next ford, especially at that time.

Once again, I'll reiterate this, this is merely discussion, thoughts and opinions and no one is correct here, most assuredly not myself, because all of this is sheer speculation based on what little record we have of it. I would tend to think most people would try to take the easy way out here and simply say he was hard pressed at "B" and withdrew straightway back to those positions where they died, it leaves little else to discuss and find evidence in the record of further maneuver and action by his company's and tidies up the mess quite easily without much fuss at all.

I'll end here by stating it again, no one has all the answers here and I seriously doubt it will ever be found or agreed upon with any certainty by anyone at any time. And one theory is as good as t he next, no matter how much one agrees or disagrees by opinion or thought expressed.

[joewiggs]

Fantastic job for the both of you! Welcome bc! As pointed out, theories are always interesting and, to me, always informative. Unfortunately, I believe, that a great deal of what Curley said was misunderstood, altered, and/or down right misinterpreted to suit the whims and aspirations of the interviewer.

An example; the three elder scouts became uneasy and disquieted due to the fame that Curley initially received for allegedly being a part of the battle. As such, they insisted they had no idea of what became of Curly hinting that he must have absconded before the battle began and hightailed home before they themselves departed. After all, a seventeen year old kid outdoing three grown men in battle was a bitter pill to swallow.

I believe that after Custer returned to his troops from the summit of Weir Point, he ordered the scouts to depart along the back trail. The up coming fight was not theirs to fight and they had completed their part of the mission. Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin thought the advise was good to heed and immediately left Custer and his command in the northerly bend of Cedar Coulee. What the three scouts may or may not have know was that Curley and Mitch Boyer remained atop Weir Point, at Custer's bequest, to report any significant change in Reno's condition. For you see, while atop Weir's Point Custer witnessed Reno's charge down the valley and warriors rushing toward Reno, also rushing toward the pony herd (west) and women and children in a wild melee north!

After Custer departed and returned to his command stationed in the bend of Cedar Coulee, Curley, and Mitch remained there to witness and report any subsequent actions. What they saw astounded them and probably sent shudders down their spines;Reno dismounted his troops and ordered them "to Skirmish!" A fatal decision when combating Plains Indians!


This tactic and the realization of the significant size of the village that Custer was able to view from the mount slammed home a critical and vital realization to Custer when he became aware of the significant change of events;Reno was in trouble but should be able to hold on for a bit if he receive assistance quickly.

The village was intact (unlike the Washita village that stretched for seven miles) thus the ammo needed to be forwarded quickly -hence- the written message was sent by Martin, and Custer ascertained from the high view that a flanking attack upon the village was possible traveling down MTC to what later became know as ford "B."

As the command paced down the dry ravine Curley and Mitch witnessed the totally unanticipated and horrifying sight of Reno's command rushing away from the timber in utter Chaos!

Mitch and Curley immediately rushed toward MTC and intercepted the command about a mile down the ravine and informed Custer of what had transpired. Custer must have been shocked at this unanticipated news.

It is possible that he immediately realized a military "thrust" at the MTC crossing could bring about the warriors from Reno's rear and, therefore, buy time until Benteen and the pack train could come up.

Despite Indian testimony that avows that Custer was forced to turn back at MTC because of an Indian assault, evidence promotes that no more than a dozen or so warriors were at that location and actually fired upon the command. The abrupt turn of the column toward Calhoun Hill was a planned directive in order to complete a reunion of the five companies after convincing the warriors they were being threatened from there military rear. A reunion which was completed.

I also believe that shortly after arriving in the environs of Calhoun Hill, prior to the subsequent Warrior onslaught, Curley fled east (at Mitch's request) and escaped the faith of the others.

[tbw]

May 4, 2012 19:53:27 GMT -5 joewiggs said:

Fantastic job for the both of you! Welcome bc! As pointed out, theories are always interesting and, to me, always informative. Unfortunately, I believe, that a great deal of what Curley said was misunderstood, altered, and/or down right misinterpreted to suit the whims and aspirations of the interviewer.

An example; the three elder scouts became uneasy and disquieted due to the fame that Curley initially received for allegedly being a part of the battle. As such, they insisted they had no idea of what became of Curly hinting that he must have absconded before the battle began and hightailed home before they themselves departed. After all, a seventeen year old kid outdoing three grown men in battle was a bitter pill to swallow.

I believe that after Custer returned to his troops from the summit of Weir Point, he ordered the scouts to depart along the back trail. The up coming fight was not theirs to fight and they had completed their part of the mission. Goes Ahead, White Man Runs Him, and Hairy Moccasin thought the advise was good to heed and immediately left Custer and his command in the northerly bend of Cedar Coulee. What the three scouts may or may not have know was that Curley and Mitch Boyer remained atop Weir Point, at Custer's bequest, to report any significant change in Reno's condition. For you see, while atop Weir's Point Custer witnessed Reno's charge down the valley and warriors rushing toward Reno, also rushing toward the pony herd (west) and women and children in a wild melee north!

After Custer departed and returned to his command stationed in the bend of Cedar Coulee, Curley, and Mitch remained there to witness and report any subsequent actions. What they saw astounded them and probably sent shudders down their spines;Reno dismounted his troops and ordered them "to Skirmish!" A fatal decision when combating Plains Indians!


This tactic and the realization of the significant size of the village that Custer was able to view from the mount slammed home a critical and vital realization to Custer when he became aware of the significant change of events;Reno was in trouble but should be able to hold on for a bit if he receive assistance quickly.

The village was intact (unlike the Washita village that stretched for seven miles) thus the ammo needed to be forwarded quickly -hence- the written message was sent by Martin, and Custer ascertained from the high view that a flanking attack upon the village was possible traveling down MTC to what later became know as ford "B."

As the command paced down the dry ravine Curley and Mitch witnessed the totally unanticipated and horrifying sight of Reno's command rushing away from the timber in utter Chaos!

Mitch and Curley immediately rushed toward MTC and intercepted the command about a mile down the ravine and informed Custer of what had transpired. Custer must have been shocked at this unanticipated news.

It is possible that he immediately realized a military "thrust" at the MTC crossing could bring about the warriors from Reno's rear and, therefore, buy time until Benteen and the pack train could come up.

Despite Indian testimony that avows that Custer was forced to turn back at MTC because of an Indian assault, evidence promotes that no more than a dozen or so warriors were at that location and actually fired upon the command. The abrupt turn of the column toward Calhoun Hill was a planned directive in order to complete a reunion of the five companies after convincing the warriors they were being threatened from there military rear. A reunion which was completed.

I also believe that shortly after arriving in the environs of Calhoun Hill, prior to the subsequent Warrior onslaught, Curley fled east (at Mitch's request) and escaped the faith of the others.

You are most certainly entitled to your opinion here. And its again pretty standard stuff that I've heard before. Some of the origins of those "wheres" you talk about drive me batty. A few are, "Weir Peak", "Cedar Coulee", "Calhoun Hill. No one to date has been able to positively identify Weir Peak as the place what you said happened. Supposition, sure, but there's not one shred of evidence that it was. Same for Calhoun Hill as you described the action there. As for Cedar Coulee, it's too blasted long. Martin described that "North-South" coulee at the COI as 500 - 600 yards or 3/4ths of a mile. Cedar Coulee is much longer than all three of those estimates of distance, so no, it wasn't Cedar Coulee much to the chagrin of those who still think it is. Find one not over 3/4ths of a mile, and maybe I'd buy it.

[joewiggs]

My theory does have it's weakness I will admit but, it explains some circumstances that heretofore puzzled me. For example,why did Custer sent two troops down MTC yet remain with headquarters on Nye Cartwright? This movement had to be a feint and certainly not an attack for two reasons, the vast number of warriors would have demanded all of Custer's forces. An implied "thrust" may have resulted in a great discontentment to the warriors military rear and enable some of the pressure on Reno to subside. Secondly, Cheyenne testimony pretty much established The fact that around a dozen warriors or so fired at the encroaching troops, not enough men to stop Custer if he did not wish to be stopped. The fact that the "feint" was unsuccessful does not translate into the "fact" that Custer did not try it

As for Weir Point, there are only two promontories (Weir and Sharpshooter ridge) tt hat would afforded Custer the opportunity to see the village for the first time and, identify passages that would lead him down to the village proper. It was also the first time that he realized that Benteen was desperately needed, hence the written order.

Lakota testimony and the position of dead soldiers pretty much established the skirmish line on Calhoun Hill which originally faced south (to counter Gall's attack) then was forced to shift west to meet the debacle that was caused by the movement led by Lame Man.

Again, as you know I would never claim to have the facts as to what occurred just a theory with a whole lot of holes.