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Post by tbw on Jun 21, 2010 11:12:49 GMT -5
Custer knew before he ever left, that if the regiment he deployed was attacked or they had to attack the Indians, that from that campaign, he could expect at least some 200 to desert, balk or play sick, at least 7 to 8 men to die of disease during the campaign; and of the battle itself, that at least some 80 would lose their lives during battle, and of those, at least 4 to 5 of them would die of their wounds. These amounts were the equivalent of losing 2 of his 12 companies by casualty or disease alone, and the equivalent of another 4 to 5 company's to desert, balk or play sick. These rates, while not high in percentages overall, were higher than what most would expect. The reasons for this were because of the quality of soldier they could put into the field. Most were people who were poor or had criminal records. The pay wasn't the best and any future they could garnish from it was minimized with each patrol or campaign. This poor quality of soldier then wasn't just exacerbated by where they came from, usually from the cities on the impoverished side of town, but also in ability. Most of these not only lacked any knowledge or skill when it came to shooting or riding, their ability to learn was hampered by the Cavalry training and the quality of arms. And most of these didn't even know how to ride a horse,let alone how to stay on one; and the same applied to the weapons, most had never fired one. This was one of the primary reasons that the government changed policy after the Custer defeat, and its findings confirmed, that the recruits did have poor riding and shooting skills that were not being addressed by the training.
Prior to the battle, there was no standards set in what equipment was to be used. While they were issued one set of standard dress, it quickly disintegrated because of the poor quality during the hard and difficult missions. And even these were not used in times of extreme cold. There was no standard issue for cold weather, and the men wore what they could to keep warm from the brass on down. The same with weapons. While they were issued their rifles, many brought along preferred weapons of choice. Had the pay been sufficient, one would suppose, that many would have chosen to take with them the Henry or Winchester, there certainly was no standards set to say that they could not have.
The training the recruits received was horrible compared to modern standards. After the Civil war and continuing up until it was corrected after the battle, these men received only basic drill, and this didn't provide for learning how to ride the horse or for that matter on how to even stay on one - as the Cavalry didn't provide any training in that field. Imagine that, sad, but true. Only after the disaster which befell Custer did these training procedures change. Recruits were taught how to mount, ride and dismount a horse. They were taught how to shoot along with the standard march and basic drill routines.
The problems then can be readily and properly adduced then as to what occurred on June 25th 1876. Many of these men simply did not have the proper training against a foe who had learned not only how to ride a horse from the time they were grasshoppers, but to shoot from them as well! There just was no comparison between what the Indians did know, and what the untrained, ill equipped Cavalry trooper didn't know, and the archeology/anthropology backs this up on what they found in the skeletons of the men who died there.
Of the Cavalry troopers at the LBH, nearly half of them were new immigrants to the U.S., which not only posed the problem of not just properly training them, but communicating with them as well in the first place. Because the territories were more difficult to control by civil law, this is where most of the 'outlaws' came to reside. This then became another huge source of gaining more recruits for the Cavalry, which only degraded their service and commitment more. This hodge podge then of recruits would or could be expected to do what? Nearly 30 percent of them deserted, and it is little wonder that this desertion rate was higher than the death by battle, wounded or disease all totaled. What does this tell us about what Custer may have expected during his late spring early summer campaign of 1876? That he expected nearly 30% of those some 650 or so men that he took with him to desert, balk or play sick when confronted with the prospects of their own death? That's nearly 200 men! I think most will see the truth in this by how many men were actually in the company's on June 25th 1876, and of those who went into battle (some 455), how many actually did or possibly could have deserted at a crucial point during that conflict? 130? This breaks down to about 30 men from Reno's battalion, 35 men from Benteen's battalion and some 65 men from Custer's battalion. Did Custer know something we don't see today? That of the men who went with him, in his battalion alone, that some 65 or so would desert, chicken out and/or run? This leaving him with only 150 or so men to stave off "hundreds of Indians"?
While the above figures may seem impossible or preposterous, consider again. Here they had been on a long ride, under nourished by all accounts, exhausted by most, and they had the following to go up against. The finest light cavalry on the plains, perhaps in the world at that time; experienced in battle, whether by spear, bow and arrow or rifle. They knew how to shoot (fight) from their horses in true Cavalry style no matter what weapon of choice. They knew how to ride, inside from out without falling off. Captain Barnitz from his diary June 1867: "The indian pony was hardier than the Government animals, with greater stamina... They {The Indians} were usually mounted on ponies..., the ponies however were of a remarkable size, and very fleet and powerful. Our own horses were generally no match for them, either in speed or endurance." They usually didn't take prisoners, and "save the last bullet for yourself" wasn't just a cliche term, it meant a slow and brutal death by torture. So if the Indians didn't kill you, you might as well yourself. With this prospect in their near term, indeed how many would have 'deserted' or ran? How many did?
I think it fair to assess Custer's plans and/or strategy in light of these facts. There just wasn't and still isn't any way around it. Custer if he was to attain any advantage over these skilled and deadly lt. cavalry would have to do it quickly and with as much surprise as he could afford to garnish. He didn't have the luxury of time to permit them to gain the advantage over his battalions. And victory would have to be won early and not be of any great duration or length, or his fighting ability would diminish by equal amounts not just in casualties alone, but in rates of desertion. He knew his men would fight - if that fight was a one way 'turkey shoot'. But what he couldn't guarantee was that they would "stand" and "fight", if the shoe was on the other foot - they didn't!
What seemed the most to compromise any plans or strategy that Custer did devise, was thrown into disarray by one of his junior officers. None other than Frederick Benteen. What was inexcusable on Benteen's part is what some have termed his "dawdling" instead of getting into action quicker. Surely had Custer have known all the above, which he most assuredly did, why then would he have given any orders or made any orders as "senseless" as what Benteen made them out to be? The fact is, he didn't, nor would he have. What we see today from the testimony and statements of others is their lame attempts to excuse Benteen, as if he was right. But when one again examines the probable reasons for this, as stated above, it starts to paint a rather bleak image of the illustrious Captain and the charge of "dawdling", whether by design or not becomes all the more clear. What also makes more sense in light of this, is what Bouyer told Curley about "the others being scared off." Surely Benteen wasn't "scared off" was he? It seems so. But if Captain Frederick Benteen had anything to say about it, he would have you believe, because "thats the way he would have it": 'He'd be Turning off the turnpike at Federal at 76th, passing Hooker as if he's sitting still, stopping briefly at 76th & Benton before continuing on to join Sheridan, where he then stops off for a bracer at Hicc ups before going on to meet Meade at the River Gallery; after which they would toodle on down the way and have Coffee and Donuts and sing Christmas Carols at Lee's.'
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Post by joewiggs on Jun 21, 2010 17:31:31 GMT -5
You know what is amazing and sad;everything you wrote is true. Having said that, how then could the 7Th. Cavalry just march off in a whirl of joy,pride, confidence and, a total commitment to teach "ole Sitting Bull" a lesson he would never forget?
How does one explain the outlandish cheers and shouts of joy when the soldiers caught their first glance of the Indian village and Custer's need to reel them in before they took off on their own hook to spank the mighty Sioux?
I don't know but, I will venture a guess. Convinced that "savages" did not have the intellect, intestinal fortitude, nor the ability to "stand" before them (let alone defeat them) these men rushed to their deaths in a false belief that victory was simply there for the taking! They could not be defeated!
One can only imagine the horror, gut wrenching fear, and disbelief the soldiers experienced moments before the final curtain fell upon them. Only when one group visualizes another group as inferior may incidents of this nature take place.
I am convinced that had the instigators of this war collectively understood and respected the martial abilities and willingness of the Indians to fight for their families, the outcome of this battle would have been much different!
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Post by tbw on Jun 22, 2010 18:34:16 GMT -5
To be honest, I don't believe that they ever had such an assemblage of soldiers ever before on the plains. At least I don't recollect it. And I think quite a lot of it was "for show", a demonstration of power not unlike our reinforcement of Vietnam in the 60's, or our commitment and subsequent buildup of forces to win over Iraq in 03. One that would demonstrate that they could put up the largest force of soldiers ever to meet the Indians in battle and win.
I think it was a misplaced overconfidence in what they could do as opposed to what their training, equipment and troop quality told them that they could not do, if the Indians stood and fought. And I think that's why, as Girard put it that, Custer labored under the impression that when he sent Reno off, the Indians were on the run, when in fact they were not. Would that, or should that, as he put it, have meant something to Custer as far as "changing plans"? The key to understanding it at this point is Girards direct implication that Custer had "plans," which both Reno and Benteen denied he ever had. And it was Girards belief of some 30 odd years experience, in Indian country, that it did or should have meant something to Custer to know this. Also what bolsters Girards statements to the court about this, was Reno's own reaction to the same thing. Supposedly he sent off two of his own couriers to advise Custer of these developments. While the Court questioned Girard about his message to Lt. Cooke and questioned his veracity of it, they failed to follow up Reno's same reasoning, or associate both in actuality of the situation, as they both well knew, would or should have been interpreted as a "change of plans." And in order to "change those plans", they had to know Custer's original plans to begin with, otherwise, why change them if he didn't have any?
While some have Custer going to Reno Hill to observe developments in the Valley, and some men said that they observed him or his battalion as they rode down toward where the skirmish line later deployed, what cant be stated for certain is that Custer ever did what some attribute him as doing there. If he didn't directly observe it, did he know? And if - when Lt. Cooke and/or Reno's couriers did catch back up to him, where could that have been? If Custer and troops was well beyond Reno Hill by the time Lt. Cooke and/or Reno's couriers ever caught up with them, it tends to explain a lot. Custer was too far away to personally do anything about it, as far as his troops were concerned, but it wasn't too late to send back a courier to tell him to 'forget it and beat it downstream to help there.' In other words, don't beat your head against a stone wall, but retreat to a better position and when you can, effect a junction with my troops downstream.
I think that 'misplaced overconfidence' lead to as much of this as anything. Once you've put your army in the field, far from any communication back to the brass, the responsibility rest upon those who were supposed to carry out the actions that would lead to victory. I'm not going to state that what you suggest didn't occur, nor was any part of it, because I think it played into that 'misplaced overconfidence'. In reality it was like sending off a troop size regiment of boy scouts to attack the village and crossing your fingers that the Indians would run because of the size of the attack force. What if they didn't?
This singular thought had to have crossed Custer's mind at some point. And if he placed all his eggs in one basket to the effect that they were running, what does that say? I don't think he was totally unaware that the Indians were not running. He had plenty of Scouts out there and they could and did see that the Indians were not running. In fact there were so many hostiles, they were probably tripping over each other in the attempt to run, but couldn't. Once again though we are confronted with many an Indian tale about what they said they were doing when Custer's troops attacked them. Time after time they tell their accounts as if they were totally surprised. One of the first things they usually mention is getting the old men, women and children safely away before they do anything else. That this village was so unprepared for the battle seems to tell the story well. They weren't running because they had been surprised. Custer's statement about this seems to tell the rest of that story. The one where he said they "would finish up here and go home to our station."
But as with all stories where there is a mystery or a wonder to behold, this was no different. What most people forget is the Indians side of this story. Supposedly not long after Custer made that statement they attacked a ford. It was here where Curley observed the "hundreds of mounted warriors coming up from the rear." And he thought that Custer would have to stop that attack and quarter back on a ridge, which he did do. These "hundreds of mounted warriors" are usually fantasized as being figments of Curley's wild imagination. But, his story was confirmed by those Indians when they said that, 'at the time, those Indians were out getting their ponies' when Custer looked down on an empty village as the "others attacked Reno." Not even the best laid plans could have prevented that from happening to save Custer or his command. The only thing that would have, would have been an "observation point" where most have always claimed it had been. Had it been there, Custer most assuredly would have not attacked a ford when it was clear those mounted Indians were going to "come up from the rear" and beat him back to the ridges. Why attack - if what you see from an observation point, is what you would run from - if you attacked a few minutes later at a ford?
What happened after is easy to discern especially when one considers the lack of training and the troop quality and equipment Custer had at the time.
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Post by strange on Jun 22, 2010 21:34:27 GMT -5
Over the years now that I have finally been educated into the manner, I do not feel that "white pride" had anything to do with the Indian Wars, at least not when the United States came into existence. European countries, on the other hand, are a much different matter, they have the biggest chips on their shoulders and are regularly trying to display their might. The United States, however, has been nothing but fair in probably 80-90 percent of all its wars over the years. I can suppose that Andrew Jackson was probably too severe on the cherokees, from what I hear, but all other Indian conflicts were handled to the very best of our human capacity.
The harder question is what the Indians could have done better to us and for themselves. Unfortunately, we're not completely sure. The Indians simply don't have a very wide reach over themselves, its impossible for us to meet eye to with every single band in existence.
We can control our fighting men a lot more than they can control theirs, for starters. Any few and far between war crime that we may have committed is nothing compared to the outright lack of organization they exhibit. We can correct our mistakes, but they can't. They can't "fire" people like Inkpaduta, they usually don't feel ashamed of what people like him have done. But America is moral because we critique and control ourselves, at least we certainly did back then, and that is why we have the victory over the Indians in every different way you can imagine. And the Indians are not strong without us. They are blessed to be beaten by us. The Indians can go ahead and take their chances with what the British did to Africa if they are even remotely unhappy with the way we treated them.
The Indians were not gonna keep their land without a country. They can be admired for their cunning on the battlefield while they lasted, that is all. The people of Europe would sooner kill them all rather than to devote single moments thought about their future, that is why America rebelled against Europe, Britain specifically, so that we could have a better mind about the people around us and so that we can eliminate the "class" barriers.
Strange
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Post by tbw on Jun 23, 2010 3:53:59 GMT -5
Strange,
What you call "white Pride" was really a "regimental pride" that went far beyond the hills and hollows of the Little Big Horn. The elements of this Joe openly expressed in his post. What made any of them feel that they could not be defeated? It certainly was not the undisciplined training they received, nor was their much evidence to prove that their firing accuracy was any better than their training had been to control their horses when in proximity to the enemy. Surely Custer knew of the Indian tactic of waving blankets to scare the horses, and should have provided some kind of "training" to acclimate the horses against this tactic. But it is most evident that this was not done.
Time was another enemy of Custer that day. There could be no slip ups of those under him, they had to be where he ordered them to be, or quite simply, it wasn't going to work, it didn't. Whether one chooses to believe whether Benteen dawdled or not, the effect was the same. Whether one chooses to accuse Reno of drunken abandon or not, the effect was the same. And this boils down to disciplined training, neither of which Benteen or Reno had an adequate initiative to acquire, nor does it appear, Custer had the time to invest. And in this regard Joe is right. Instead of Custer being with his troops before they left for the LBH, he was off to Washington testifying before Congress about some idiotic notion of Suttler improprieties. There at Ft. Abraham Lincoln, they were bringing in units from all over the country to form up the U.S. 7th Cavalry regiment and launch them in an assault against the Indians as soon as Custer returned. At least of which a 100 of which were "new recruits" who had not had enough time to load a gun, let alone shoot it. The Regiment was sorely in need of horses, and quite a few of the Cavalrymen had to walk that distance with the infantry because they didn't have enough time to acquire new mounts. That this was a rough shod, put together 3 stooge rinky dink outfit, was apparent from the beginning. yet the date had been set, and come hell, high water or congressional hearings they would march on the required date.
When the time came for battle, Benteen either got lost somewhere, god only knows but him, or, he indeed dragged his feet like some kind of spoiled brat because he thought he had been had. Yet, for that very mission, like some school child holding his hand up to be recognized by the teacher, here, Benteen was the first in line to recieve the assignment that would 1) first divide that regiment and 2) either give him the coveted right to attack "first" or 3) For some silly-senseless reason accuse Custer of "senseless orders" and "dawdle" along because he knew like Crook did that it was "senseless to attack those Indians"... Yet supposedly he had not known that about the Indians at the time, nor for that matter about Crook.
Reno has been blamed for the retreat and not holding his position longer. Yet both Girard and Reno, who were at odds with each other, virtually agree that Custer had some kind of plan that needed to be changed when confronted with the fact that the Indians were not running away. Reno knew his orders "to attack the village after" was discretionary and totally dependent upon his own "prudent" judgment and no other. If Reno had any doubts about "attacking that village after", he did have the discretionary power not to. If he had the "prudent" discretionary powers not to in the first place, then he most certainly had the same when he executed that retreat! To further complicate the matters, it is not altogether inconceivable that after Custer had received the warnings about "the indians not running away" either from Cooke or either of Reno's couriers, that he, Custer, would have sent back a courier to make sure that Reno did retreat, AND, what he, Reno was supposed to do after he did. That this last matter was cleanly and neatly swept under the rug, all Reno had to do was tear the note in his pocket up and claim that he received no orders "from that source", nor any others. Thus and therefore, he could, on his own "prudent" discretion, not do a damn thing when he arrived at the hill. It wasn't the retreat that Reno should have been properly blamed for, it was what he was supposed to do after he retreated, and didn't do, that he should have been hung for.
Weir knew more than he ever told. In fact, he knew a hell of a lot more than what others, namely Reno and Benteen, wanted him to reveal. It was through this source that Whittaker made his charges against Major Reno and thus the RCOI came into being. But by coincidence or happenstance Weir's sudden death before the court convened seemed more convenient than what most suspect in the matter. What was supposed to be a revealing and defining moment in history instead turned into a 'one for all and all for one' cry of Regimental pride and the matter died with Weir.
What is let of this residue is the conflicting reports of each and every unprofessional, undisciplined, improperly trained trooper from top to bottom and Custer made the scapegoat for his own death. And we apparently were no better or worse than the Indians were, because they still defended the most suspicious and underhanded of characters who acted "senseless" if not irrational at a critical moments in the LBH battle and then blamed it on the ones who died there.
There were plenty of examples to show how ill prepared those troopers were. There were many moments when officers could not control their subordinates. There were way too many moments when orders were ignored or not followed through, which endangered not only those men but threatened the operation as a whole to failure. In the case of Reno and Benteen, there is no doubt that Custer would have benefited from better trained officers, and little if any doubt, that they all would have benefited greater from better trained and equipped troopers.
Custer was once described as being egotistical, yet what most don't see, or perhaps prefer not to see, is this same trait in Benteen and Reno. This had to have an impact and create some serious problems that were never properly addressed prior to the battle. All three of them had big ego's and each of them had their own ideas about what was "senseless" and what was not. Most of this came out at the RCOI in the form of whether or not they had any confidence in Custer as a commander, they didn't, yet with all this, they virtually blame him for his own "senseless" death in the same breath. I think what most don't realize, is that little "what if" that makes all this come full circle. What if it was Keogh or Yates who had reported themselves ready before Benteen, and it was one of those who had taken the "mission to the left" instead of Benteen?
Reno contrived excuses at the RCOI, when in fact all he had to do was present that piece of paper with Custer's orders on it that Goldin had handed him at the battle. From all that can be gleaned about it, he, Reno, was supposed to retreat out and then go downstream to effect a junction with Custer's troops. But there was more, a lot more, and that's why he didn't use it, because if all it was, was what we can discern, there was every reason to believe that he 1) did retreat as ordered, and 2) did try to go downstream to effect that Junction. There was no reason not to present it. That he chose the path harder to travel, more difficult to navigate, means that there was more, a lot more that he never wanted anyone to know.
I think it fair to say that both Reno and Benteen were frightened by what they saw and equally faulty in their contrived testimonies concerning their actions and conduct. If Reno did take a swig or two, rest assured it was with Benteen atop the hill when they didn't do what they were supposed to do.
And the Indians. I suppose one could blame them for defending their families, their traditions and way of life, when the soldiers surprised and struck that village. And when, if at any time did any of them think that they were at a point where they wouldn't survive the unfolding battle before their eyes, or likewise; when did they realize that they had it won? If we can discern from any Indian account what they were thinking when they were winning or perhaps losing, then we should be able to find out how Custer attacked them and why all of Custer's men perished. If all they did was react to Custer's moves, would this be enough to say that their victory was no more than compared to the swarming ants they themselves compared themselves to? To establish a discussion of the personality traits, what they thought, and from that, figure out how things progressed is what its all about. It's not about whether a certain tide, flow or rush of ants could be timed out to perfection because the Indians don't allow us that luxury. Were the Indians, as they themselves told it, "running or scattering" as Custer and other expected them to do? What was their thoughts on why he was where he was, and why he ended up where he did? Was it because he wanted to attack at a special ford near there, or perhaps to capture the women and children? What do they mention the most in association with this? Why did they think he went there?
Unfortunately today we have number crunchers out there, instead of people who think in terms of strategy. But numbers by themselves wont tell the whole story. To figure out the strategies involved one must consider what the soldiers didn't see that the Indians did, what the Indians reacted to from the orders that were given. And there is one faltering soldier from which nothing initially can be discerned from Indian statements, and that soldier was none other than Captain Frederick Benteen.
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Post by tbw on Jun 23, 2010 19:55:31 GMT -5
Information concerning Cavalry Training was obtained in part from here: books.google.com/books?id=x772URxfKh8C&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=cavalry+training,+drill,+america&source=bl&ots=iAdzlvw2yH&sig=hRA1qDjm4YbthqD4qB7d4uBCGlI&hl=en&ei=bagiTMfsDsL_lgfyxuCCCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CAwQ6AEwAjg8#v=onepage&q&f=false The title of the online book is: The American Military on the Frontier By James P. Tate The section you need starts on Page 119. I usually do not post my sources, and I do this for obvious reasons. For those sources already known, and when I have been asked, I sometimes do. But this bombshell is what most today want from me, so here it is, but I guarantee, double-damn guarantee - it wont be the last one anyone finds that cares to do "the real research" and not just sit an spin this stupid battle into the yarns and barn sized lies that keeps Custer, Reno and Benteen at the top of supposed units that were considered by "someone" to be the "best of the best", "the cream of the crop", the epitomoy of the word "elite" - like those of The military Forums channel & Transference specialtly progams they keep on espousing and gut renchingly, and most tenasously keep on doing, and have done since their inceptions. Which some "over there" have came to believe "in their hearts and minds"; that those men, these men, whom I have just revealed, are to be "honored for their service" "their elite service", AND that people who have "never served their country "should not dishonor them, if they haven't been there and done that themselves". These stupid idiots who have never in their own supposed "elite" "military lives" - and those who supposedly do "honor them" would have ever believed this, and some still wont. They'll keep on digging in thousands of volumes where this has never been published - and keep on believing that cock and bull crap till hell freezes over. They'll keep on believing in their "hearts and minds" that theirs is the only way to the truth and the life of noble and "honored" Benteen's Valhalla. And YES, even those who have served, and who are serving - are not one bit better in discerning the truth about this battle than someone "who hasn't". This battle which occurred over 130 years ago, and those who wish to keep on "honoring them" for "this year, this month, this week, this hour, this minute, this second's service is sheer idiocy. NOT one person today alive, in this Nation, does not dishonor our service men and women, but what most of us today, don't realize, they didn't "dishonor them back then" either; just like we do not do now of our own troops today. But to keep on espousing, whether one is, or has been, in the military service; that Benteen, Reno and Custer led an "elite" unit into battle and lost to "ill trained, ignorant, stupid savages" is sheer bull crap. That this sort of bull crap tripe was published in Newspapers, Books, Magazine Articles and other places to give Benteen, Reno and Custer a most glorious and noble tribute "for their honored service," and ultimatly, the same, for their deaths, whether they rightly deserved it or not. For they not only buried martyred hero's, they buried along side of them, in time, Judas Iscariot and honored him, and those like him - in all his and their time honored glory. mymilitaryhistory.blogspot.com/2009/05/he-told-us-so-robert-m-utleys.html |
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Post by tbw on Jun 24, 2010 16:47:49 GMT -5
Those men who fought in the Vietnam war, who were there and fought for a noble cause also ultimately lost to a cause for which their noble enterprises were never fully recognised or even realized. Like Utley espoused and fully recognized and realized, it was the "training" from the lowliest of pfc's to the loftiest of General's, that should have filtered down from this nations leadership; that this missive needed to be corrected, from them to the leaders who thought like those who blindly follow their reasoning today, still don't recognise or fully appreciate what their foes bring to the table once the opening gun has been sounded, nor do they appreciate or recognise that same need for change when it occurred over 130 years ago.
From the equipment we used in Vietnam to the very bitter end, the needed changes were not always appreciated nor fully implemented across the board to all servicemen. The M-16 rifle being a result of the "need" for change against a foe who used a superior weapon to what existed at the time. Though it and other changes wouldn't stop the tide of guerilla fighters who ultimately won by the same strategy George Armstrong Custer and his ilk did use against the Indians in the Indian wars, to wear them out by constantly and relentlessly doing what all guerrilla fighters did in Vietnam. While one conventional doctrine didn't succeed at it because it failed to see the need for proper "training", another did, when they married it to the principles of their doctrine's strategy and tactics.
The Vietnam vets came home to throngs of people who protested our presence in a country where they didn't feel our efforts justified the need. What these vets felt, perhaps only they can say, and rightly should, perhaps bitterness, anger and frustration in one form or another. But they didn't then and still don't know where to direct that fusilade of torment. They still dont realize the impact proper training would have done to alleviate their pain and long suffering. What we accomplished in Iraq was conventional against conventional for the most part, the training still to this day hasn't addressed properly the need for proper training in the most basic of needs in guerilla warfare. And the old adage still applies, one does fight "fire with fire", and if you don't, you'll be consumed by it, as we were in Vietnam, and as George Armstrong Custer was in 1876.
We cannot totally blame those who fought in Vietnam, they were merely soldiers doing their duty, no matter how 'elite' they were. But like Vietnam, the Battle of The Little Big Horn produced many instances where certain battles brought shame and dishonor to "some" within those battles, My Lai being just one by parallel example. Do we blame all who fought in Vietnam for their intransigence, their failure? Or perhaps what they did, was what proper training would have told them they needed in the first place when confronted with the situation at hand? Custer's fight was no different in reality, nor in substance to the fact, what proper training of the men and the leaders who fought there could have endured had they been so blessed.
Fear is a terrible driving force when one is confronted by seemingly impossible odds, or the unseen in its thoughts which drive any man to survive no matter the era, especially if they have not been taught the right procedures to deal with it. Bravery is led by example, Courage followed by those properly trained, and Excellence defended only by the actions of the two combined with the will to succeed. But what one era deems "honorable," is often "dishonorable" in reality because of the opinion and thought formed and expressed by the standards of times in which they lived: And is best expressed as "if you didn't live through it, what right do you have to judge it for other than what it was?" We still see this as one peruses the history books, old newspapers and magazines expiated about Custer's Last Stand, the oft repeated and quoted sources that said the 7th Cavalry was an "elite" unit. A tale handed down by those wishing only to bestow "honor" on their fallen husbands, comrades or compatriots whether true or not, and only served to filter down to later generations as an absolute truth. Myths are born this way, and the perpetuation of the same has caused generations to venerate and still bestow upon them a false honor they never deserved, especially when those from within, who did know - that fear played an event turning part in the 7ths defeat, and took that truth to their graves; Much prefering the false honor bestowed upon them, than the cruel overtones, ridicule and scorn that "fear" implied.
Today one still looks back upon Vietnam and the ever present current goals in Afghanistan and wonder whether the same blame game will occur again. Only if our leadership can look past their current biases, and learn from our own history will they succeed. But to do that, they have to carefully measure the full true reasons for our failure in Vietnam and be able to discern the myths from the facts that occurred well over 130 years ago at a time and place far removed from their thoughts. Truth seldom finds absolution or honor in the time honored writings of those who began the myths, and for us who still live in them, still have to put up with the insanity it inspires concerning the futures of the men and women who still must endure the same lack of insight in a place called Afghanistan.
If we don't have the vision, the foresight and the will to see our past for what it was, then we are truly doomed to repeat those failures over and over again until we do.
If we must honor those who have fought and died in battles past, foreign or domestic. Then we should do so in the full knowledge of their defeats and what caused them. For it is only through our defeats and what truly and fully caused them, others in present or future wars and conflicts, will not, nor should not have died in vain for those who have already paid the price.
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Post by joewiggs on Jul 9, 2010 18:46:45 GMT -5
Dennis, what a wonderful and interesting source book. I'm going to purchase this book because I firmly believe that a fundamental understanding of Calvary training and Native American life styles are critical to understanding the nuances and enigma's of this battle.
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