Topic: Volume 2 Issue No. 1 - CF Cavalry Journal

[tbw]

INDIAN CULTURE, WARFARE TACTICS AND US MILITARY PREPAREDNESS POST CIVIL WAR

First Installment


There are some common myths and mis-perceptions about our military and the Indian ways of warfare that today are greatly exaggerated. These myths were spawned by newspaper articles and books written at the time and perpetually kept alive today by ignorance and an unwillingness to learn the Indian culture and their tactics in warfare.

It is well known that the battles of any new war are fought with the tactics of the previous war. This was clearly the case in WW's I and II, the Korean conflict, through Vietnam and onward to this day. And it was no different for the US Army after the Civil War to adopt the same tactics they used in the Civil War against the Indians. And, they did. What had proven to be acceptable tactical norms for the Civil War was not easily adaptable to this new conflict; and was inadequate to handle the job needed to accomplish the goals necessary to combat this enemy let alone adequate enough to pursue this foe.

Right after the Civil War, the Army columns were slow and cumbersome as there were no roads on the plains for their supply wagons. And even when there were parts of a trail or a well worn path or improved roads, when it was muddy and wet the wagons would slow the columns down to less than 15 miles per day. The most they could get out of any such expedition, fully supplied and ready to boogie, was about 20 some days, which limited their range. These slow moving columns were easily spotted by Indians scouts; and in the early years the Indians would take advantage of this to set ambushes and traps.

The Army in the early years right after the Civil War, used mounted infantry in an attempt to subdue the Indians. If and when they ever made contact with the enemy, which was usually upon the Indians choice of ground, these infantry were to close to contact, dismount, and deploy into a skirmish line. and if time permitted, were to dig foxholes or trenches. While this tactic worked well during the Civil war for the mounted as well as the unmounted infantry, on the plains against a constant mobile foe on horseback, it made little if any sense. Because the Indians immediate response to such tactics was to flank the entrenched position or skirmish line and attack the horseholders about 100 yards to the rear, a fourth the size of the skirmish line in number of soldiers, who were not only overwhelmed easily & quickly but the Indians made off with the soldiers horses leaving them afoot and easy to pick off. The Army in its infinite wisdom never gave up on the idea of the skirmish line, a carry over from the American Civil War, and an inadequate way to tactically deal with the Indians that was never corrected.

Rather ironically it was the Indians who made best use of the tactical genius of the skirmish line for what it could be best employed to do, defend. On the American plains the skirmish line was best employed as a defensive tactic and had very little use as an offensive one. Its best chance of being successful and effective was when it was used where the terrain would restrict the area where the Army could not outflank the Indians and charge their village. This tactic was employed by the Cheyenne's at the Battle of Solomon Fork in 1857; and from this success they learned the value of its continued use, which they also used with overwhelming effectiveness at the LBH battle. Here, at the Battle of Solomon Fork in 1857, they sent out mounted warriors armed mainly with bows and arrows and only a few rifles to form a mounted skirmish line to defend a village on the other side of a pass. Its intended purpose was to slow down the Army attackers to allow enough time (only about an hour or so) for the women to pack up the village and disperse in different directions. It was one battle where the Indians didn't technically run away to fight another day, but instead themselves broke up into small groups and quite simply ran the cavalry's horses down so that they couldn't pursue them when they left the field. This occurred because the Cavalry commander did something the Indians didn't expect him to do. He ordered a mounted Cavalry charge with sabers in hand. The Indians expected them to advance to pistol range and begin a pistol charge, where such range would have been effective for their bows and arrows. When this didn't happen they simply dispersed into small groups for the cavalry to chase. It was a simple case of adapt and overcome. They continued this practice throughout the Indian wars and was very successful in its execution.

The Indians realized that it was the horse that kept them mobile and they also realized that - that same thing kept the Army pursuing them. They always sought a way to catch the Army units off guard when his horses were exhausted and theirs weren't. And each Indian always had a fresh mount stashed near the battlefield, hidden and waiting with an Indian maiden or young man awaiting the warrior to come get his fresh mount. One of the tactics the Indians were famous for; was placing small groups of warriors out away from the main village as, more or less, bait; what Reno at the COI called "decoys". A method was made to attract attention to their presence, and when the Army column first observed them, they would stop suddenly in as if in a startled manner and act surpized at the Army's presence. They then, once again, pretended to run frantically away as if terrified. And they would ride several miles, perhaps as much as 3 or 4 miles at a dead gallop, at least far enough away from the main column, where if a detachment was sent to deal with them, they wouldn't or couldn't easily be reinforced or relieved. The Army was ever predictable in this as they would always send out only enough men to defeat the enemy force they observed. A trap was then sprung when a large body of Indians would charge from concealment, of course on fresh horses, and attack the smaller army detachment sent after the decoys. The Army's horses of course by this time were exhausted from the chase and they couldn't run away, even if they wanted to. This tactic was used quite effectively at the Fetterman Massacre in 1866, and again at the LBH in 1876.

[tbw]

Insert #1 from NARA:

Report of Gen. George A. Custer Regarding Major Elliot
Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General (Main Series), 1861-1870
M619 roll 812
National Archives & Records Administration

Headquarters Troops Operating South of the Arkansas
In the Field, Indian Territory December 22nd 1868

---

Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel J. Schuyler Crosby
Acting Assistant Adjutant General
Department of the Missouri



Colonel:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from the 7th instant up to the present date.

Acting under the instructions of the Major General Commanding the Department, who though not exercising command of the troops accompanied the expedition, I moved from the Supply Depot, on Beaver Creek, on the morning of the 7th instant. The expedition was composed of eleven companies of the 7th U.S. Cavalry - ten companies of the 19th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, Colonel S. J. Crawford Commanding[,] a detachment of scouts under Lieutenant Pe[p?]oon 10th Cavalry, and between twenty and thirty whites, Osage and Kaw Indians, as guides and trailers. I aimed by a new route to strike the Washita below, and near to, the scene of the late battle between the 7th Cavalry, and the combined bands of the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Sioux, Apaches and Commanches. On the evening of the 10th my command reached camp, on the Washita six miles below the battleground. A halt of one day was made at this point, to rest and graze the animals and to afford an opportunity of visiting the battlefield to learn, if possible, the exact fate of Major Elliott and his party of (17) Seventeen men, who on the opening of the attack on Black Kettle's village had pursued a party of fleeing Indians beyond our lines, and had never returned. So confident was I of their fate, however that in my official report of the battle I numbered them in my list of Killed. With One hundred men of the 7th Cavalry, under command of Captain Yates, I proceeded to the battlefield early on the morning of the 11th . Indians had evidently paid a hurried visit to the scene of the late conflict.

The bodies of nearly all the warriors, killed in the fight, had been concealed or removed; while those of the squaws and children, who had been slain in the excitement and confusion of the first charge, as well as in self defense were wrapped in blankets and bound with lariats, preparatory to removal and burial. Many of the Indian dogs were still found in the vicinity lately occupied by the lodges of their owners: they probably subsisting on the bodies of the ponies that had been killed and then covered several acres of ground near by. As ten days had elapsed since the battle, and scores of Indian bodies still remained unburied or unconcealed, some idea may be had of the precipitate hase [haste] with which the Indians had abandoned that section country.

A thorough examination of the immediate battle ground failed to discover anything worthy of special report, except that that the Indian bodies were found which had not previously been reported in my first dispatch; and which went to prove what we are all well aware of now, that the enemy's loss in killed warriors, far exceeded the number (One hundred and three) first reported by me.

In setting out, upon our return to camp, Captain Yates was directed to deploy his men in search of the bodies of Major Elliott and his party. After marching a distance of two miles, in the direction in which Major Elliott and his little party were last seen, we suddenly came upon the stark, stiff, naked, and horribly mutilated bodies of our dead comrades! No words were needed to tell how desperate the struggle which ensued before they were finally overpowered.

At a short distance, here and there, from the spot where the bodies lay, could be seen the carcasses of some of the horses of the party which had been, probably, killed early in the fight. Seeing the hopelessness of breaking through the lines which surrounded them, and which undoubtedly numbered more than one hundred to one. Elliott dismounted his men, tied their horses together, and prepared to sell their lives as dearly as possible. It may not be improper to add, that in describing, as far as possible, the details of Elliott's fight I rely not only upon a critical and personal Examination of the ground and attendant circumstances, but am sustained by the statements of Indian Chiefs and warriors who witnessed and participated in the fight; and who have since been forced to enter our lines and surrender themselves up, under circumstances which will be made to appear in other portions of this report.

The bodies of Elliott and his little band, with but a single exception, were all found lying within a circle not exceeding twenty yards in diameter. We found them exactly as they fell except their barbarous foes had stripped and mutilated the bodies in the most savage manner.

All the bodies were carried to camp; and there (was reached after dark It being the intention to resume the march before daylight, the following day) a grave was hastily prepared on a little knoll, near our camp, and with the exception of that of Major Elliott, whose remains were carried with us for interment at Fort Arbuckle, the bodies of the entire party, under the dim light of a few torches held in the hands of sorrowing comrades were consigned to our common resting place! No funeral note sounded to measure their passage to the grave: No volley was fired to tell us a comrade was receiving the last, sad rites of burial: yet not one of the living but felt that the fresh earth had closed over some of their truest and most daring soldiers!

Before interment, I caused a complete examination of each body to be made by Dr. Lippincott, Chief Medical Officer of the Expedition, with directions to report on the character and number of wounds received by each as well as to mutilations to which they had been subjected. The following extracts are taken from Dr. Lippencott's [sic] report.

Major Joel H. Elliott. Two bullet holes in head; one in left cheek; right hand cut off; left foot almost cut off x x x x [sic] deep gash in right groin; deep gashes in calves of both legs; little finger of left hand cut off and throat cut.

Sergt. Major Walter Kennedy. Bullet hole in right temple, head partly cut off, seventeen bullet holes in back and two in legs.

Corporal Harry Mercer, Troop E. Bullet hole in right axilla one; one in regeon [region] of heart, three in back, Eight arrow wounds in back, right ear cut off, head scalped and skull fractured, deep gashes in both legs and throat cut.

Private Thomas Christie, Troop E. Bullet hole in head, right foot cut off, bullet hole in abdomen and throat cut.

Corporal William Carrick, Troop H. Bullet hole in right parietal bone, both feet cut off, throat cut, left arm broken. x x x

Private Eugene Clover, Troop H. Head cut off, arrow wound in right side, both legs terribly mutilated.

Private William Milligan, Troop H. Bullet hole in left side of head, deep gashes in right leg, left arm deeply gashed, head scalped, and throat cut.

Corporal James F. Williams, Troop I. Bullet hole in back, head and both arms cut off, many and deep gashes in back x x x.

Private Thomas Dooney, Troop I. Arrow hole in regeon [region] of stomach, thorax cut open, head cut off and right shoulder cut by a tomahawk.

Farrier Thomas Fitzpatrick, Troop M. Scalped, two arrow and several bullet holes in back, deep gashes in face, throat cut.

Private Carsten. D.J. Meyers, Troop M. several bullet holes in head, scalped, nineteen bullet holes in body x x x x throat cut.

Private Cal. Sharpe, Troop M. Two bullet holes in right side, throat cut, one bullet hole in left side of head, one arrow hole in left side x x x x left arm broken.

Unknown, Head cut off, body partially destroyed by wolves.

Unknown, Head and right hand cut off, three bullet holes and nine arrow holes in back x x x x x.

Unknown, Scalped, Skull fractured, six bullet and thirteen arrow holes in back, three bullet holes in chest.

In addition to the wounds and barbarities reported by Dr. Lippincott, I saw a portion of the stock of a "Lancaster rifle" protruding from the side of one of the men, the stock had been broken off, near the barrel and the butt of it, probably twelve inches in length, had been driven into the man's side a distance of eight inches.

The forest along the banks of the Washita from the battle ground to a distance of twelve miles was found to have been one continuous Indian village.

Black Kettle's band being above, then came other tribes, camped in the following order: Arapahoes under Little Raven: Kiowas under Satanta and Lone Wolf and the remaining bands of Cheyennes, Comanches and Apaches. Nothing could exceed the disorder and haste with which these tribes had fled from their camping grounds. They had abandoned thousands of lodge poles, some of which were still standing as when last used; immense numbers of camp kettles, cooking utensils, coffee mills, axes and several hundred buffalo robes were found in the abandoned camps, adjacent to that of Black Kettle's village but which had not been visited before by our Troops.

By actual examination and estimate it was computed that over six hundred lodges had been standing along the Washita, during the battle and within five miles of the battle ground; and it was from these villages, and others still lower down the stream, that the immense number of Warriors came, who after my route and destruction of Black Kettle and his band, surrounded my command and fought until defeated by the 7th Cavalry about 3 P.M. on the 27th Ultimo. It is safe to say that the warriors from these tribes, that attempted the relief of Black Kettle and his band, outnumbered my force three to one. On returning from the battle ground to the camp of my command and when in the deserted camp, which according to the statement of some of my Cheyenne prisoners, who were brought along with me, was lately occupied by Satanta with the Kiowas, my men discovered the bodies of a young white woman and child the former apparently about twenty three years of age, and the latter probably eighteen months old. They were evidently mother and child and had not long been in captivity as the woman still retained several articles of her wardrobe about her person, among others a pair of cloth gaiters but little worn ; everything indicated that she had been but recently captured: and upon our attacking and routing Black Kettle's camp, her captors, fearing she might be recaptured by us and her testimony used against them, had deliberately murdered her and her child in cold blood.

The woman had received a shot in the forehead, her entire scalp was removed and her skull horribly crushed. The child also bore numerous marks of violence.

At daylight on the following morning the entire command started on the trail of the Indian villages, nearly all of which had moved down the Washita towards Fort Cobb, where they had reason to believe they would receive protection. The Arapahoes and remaining band of Cheyennes left the Washita Valley and moved across in the direction of Red River. After following the trail of the Kiowas and other hostile indians [Indians], for seven days, over an almost impassible country, where it was necessary to keep two or three hundred men almost constantly at work with picks axes and spades before being able to advance with our train. My Osage scouts on the morning of the 17th reported a party of indians [Indians] in our front bearing a flag of truce. At the time a scout came from [the] same direction stating that he was from Fort Cobb and delivered to me a dispatch which read as follows.


Headquarters Southern Ind. Dist.
Fort Cobb 9 P.M. Dec. 16. 1868


To the Commanding Officer
Troops "In the Field"

Indians have just brought in word that our troops today reached the Washita some twenty miles above here. I send this to say that all the camps this side of the point reported to have been reached, are friendly and have not been on the War path this season. If this reaches you it would be well to communicate at once with Satanta or Black Eagle, Chiefs of the Kiowas, near where you now are, who will readily inform you of the position of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, also of my camp.

Respectfully
(Signed) W.B. Hazen
Bvt. Maj. Genl.


The scout at the same time informed me that a large party of Kiowa warriors under Lone Wolf, Satanta and other leading chiefs, were within less than a mile of my advance and notwithstanding the above certificate regarding their friendly character, had seized a scout who accompanied the bearer of the dispatch, disarmed him and held him a prisoner of war. Taking a small party with me, I proceeded beyond our lines to meet the flag of truce. I was met by several of the leading chiefs of the Kiowas including those above named.

Large parties of their warriors could be seen posted in the neighboring ravines and upon the surrounding hills [sic] tops. All were painted and plumed for war and nearly all were armed with one rifle, two revolvers, bow and arrow, and lance. Their bows were strung. Their whole appearance and conduct plainly indicated that they had come for war. Their declaration to some of my guides and friendly Indians proved the same thing; and they were only deterred from hostile acts by discovering our strength to be far greater than they had imagined, and our scouts on the alert. Some twenty of the principal chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches, then approached and proposed to accompany us to Fort Cobb, the Kiowas assuring me that their village was already near that point and moving in to the post. Yet at the time these chiefs were giving me these assurances their entire village with the exception of the War party which accompanied them, was hastening away towards the Wichita mountains with no intention of proceeding to Fort Cobb and the proposition of the chiefs to accompany my column was intended as a mere ruse to cover the escape of the village. On reaching camp I gave rations to the entire party of Chiefs and warriors who accompanied my column intending to do no act that might be construed as unfriendly. They all promised to proceed to Fort Cobb with us the following day except two or three who were to rejoin the village and conduct it to the fort; but upon resuming the march the next morning it was found that but three Kiowas and two Apache chiefs remained: the rest had taken their departure.

Before proceeding far, the few who remained intimated their intention and desire to proceed to their village and change their horses as well as to give directions about the movement of the former to Fort Cobb.

This they repeated several times along the line of march. I finally permitted the Kiowa chief lowest in rank to set out for his village with the distinct understanding that it was for the purpose of hastening the march of his people to Fort Cobb. They were then represented as being within less than ten miles of the Post. I then placed Lone Wolf and Satanta the head chiefs of the Kiowas and two head chiefs of the Apaches under Guard, determined to hold them as hostages for the faithful fulfilment of the promise which they and their people had been under for several months, and which was one of the stipulations of the last treaty made with them.

At the same time I knew it was the intention of the Department Commander to assemble all the hostile tribes in the vicinity of Fort Cobb, by force if necessary in order that they might learn the decision of the Government regarding past offences and the treatment they might expect in future. The communication received through scouts from Bvt. Maj. Gen. Hazen U.S.A. Superintendent of the Southern Indian Agency, in which it was stated that, "All the camps this side of the point reported to have been reached, are friendly and have not been on the war path this season", occasioned me little surprise, upon the part of those who knew the hostile character of the indians referred to. We had followed day by day, the trail of the Kiowas, and other tribes, leading us directly from the dead bodies of our comrades, slain by them within the past few days, until we overtook them about forty miles from Fort Cobb. This of itself was conclusive evidence of the character of the tribes we were dealing with; but aside from these incontrovertible facts had we needed additional evidence of the openly hostile conduct of the Kiowas and Comanches and of their active participation in the late battle of the Washita, we have only to rely on the collected testimony of Black Eagle and other leading chiefs.

This testimony is now written and in the hands of the Agents of the Indian Bureau. It was given voluntarily by the Indian Chiefs referred to and was taken down at the time by the Indian Agent, not for the Army, or with a view of furnishing it to officers of the Army, but, simply for the benefit, and information of the Indian Bureau. This testimony making due allowance for the concealment of much that would be prejudicial to the interests of the Indians, plainly states, that the Kiowas and Comanches took part in the battle of the Washita; - that the former constituted a portion of the War party whose trail I followed and which my command [followed] into Black Kettle's village, and that some of the Kiowas remained in Black Kettle's village until the morning of the battle.

This evidence is all contained in a report made to one Thomas Murphy "Superintendant of Indian Affairs" by Phillip McCusker U.S. Interpreter for Kiowas and Comanches. This report is dated Fort Cobb Dec. 3rd while the communication from General Hazen, vouching for the peaceable character of the Kiowas, and other tribes, is dated at same place thirteen days later. It cannot be explained by supposing General Hazen ignorant of the information contained in the report, as I obtained a copy of the report from him. It only proves what the Indian Bureau regards as "friendly" Indians.

In addition to all the above evidence and facts, a personal conversation with Lone Wolf, Satanta, Black Eagle, and other prominent chiefs convinces me, even had we no other information to rely upon, that a large number of Kiowas, led by Kicking Bird, and other Kiowa chiefs voluntarily participated in the battle of the Washita; and that they formed a considerable portion of the hundreds who surrounded and killed Major Elliott and his party. The horse ridden by one of my men who was killed in that battle, has since been recognized in the hands of a Kiowa. All this testimony is more than confirmed by the statements of a very intelligent Cheyenne squaw: sister of Black Kettle, who is among my prisoners; and who on account of her intelligence and character, I dispatched a few days ago as bearer of a message to the hostile Cheyennes.

She pointed out to me, when in the vicinity of the late battle ground, the location of Satanta's village at the time of the battle. She, as well as other of my prisoners, are confident as well as positive, that Satanta and his tribe were there and that they participated in the engagement. It was from her, too, that I learned that it was in Satanta's village that the bodies of the white woman and child were found. I have not intimated to Lone Wolf or Satanta, that all this evidence is in our possession: nor do I propose doing so until the last Kiowa has come in.

Soon after reaching this point it became evident, that these chiefs were attempting their usual game of duplicity and falsehood. Under the pretence, that their village was coming to this post to renew friendly relations with the Government, they visited my Headquarters and professed the most peaceable intentions.

It was only after receiving information that their village was attempting to escape to the mountains, it was deemed necessary to resort to summary measures to compel these refractory chiefs to fulfil their promise.

They were placed under a strong guard the moment we reached this point. Even this failed to produce the desired effect. All evidence went to show that their village was still moving farther away. Then it was that I announced to Lone Wolf and Satanta the decision which had been arrived at regarding them. I gave them until sunrise the following morning to cause their people to come in, or to give satisfactory evidence that they were hastening to come in. If no such evidence appeared, both these Chiefs were to be hung at Sunrise to the nearest tree. At the same time I afforded them every facility to send runners and communicate their desires to their tribe. This produced the desired effect. By sunrise several of the leading Kiowas came to my camp and reported the entire village on the move, hastening to place themselves under our control.

At this date I have the satisfaction to report, that all the Apaches, nearly all of the Comanches, and the principal chiefs and bands of the Kiowas, have come in and placed themselves under our control; not to make a treaty and propose terms of settlement, but begging us to pronounce the terms, upon which, they can be allowed to resume peaceful relations with the Government.

Of the five tribes which were hostile at the opening of this campaign, three were already in our power, being virtually prisoners of War.

The remaining two, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were the principal sufferers in the battle of the Washita, and are no doubt the most anxious of all to abandon the War path. They are supposed to be concealed in the mountains, forty or fifty miles from this point, awaiting the result of the present negotiations with the three tribes now assembled here.

On the 20th inst. I sent one of my prisoners (a Cheyenne Squaw, Sister of Black Kettle), and a leading Apache chief as bearers of a message to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.

As in the case of the tribes now here, no promise or inducement has been held out. I have made no pretence to be friendly disposed. Whatever I have asked the tribes to do, or accede to, has been in the form of a demand.

They have, from the commencement of this campaign, been treated, not as independent nations but as refractory subjects of a common government. I have every reason to believe, that, within a few days or weeks at farthest, the two remaining hostile tribes, Cheyennes and Arapahoes, smarting under their heavy losses in the battle of the Washita will unconditionally come in and place themselves under the control of this command; willing to accede to any terms that may be proposed to them. The tribes now here have discarded the arrogant ideas in the indulgence of which, the numerous treaties recently entered into, have encouraged them. They now seem to realize that the Government, and not a few thieving, treacherous, chiefs of predatory bands of savages, backed up and encouraged by unprincipled and designing Indian Agents is the source of all authority.

The chiefs now here have repeatedly informed me that they no longer claim the right to propose terms regarding the future course of the Government towards them; but are not only ready, but anxious, to accede to any rule marked down for their control and guidance.

The above I believe contains a brief statement of the operations of this command, and the results thereof, up to this date. Everything indicates a speedy, satisfactory and permanent solution of the Indian difficulties, so far as the tribes referred to are concerned.

It is not proposed that they be permitted to resume peaceful relations with the Government until proper atonement be made for past offences, and sufficient guaranty for future good conduct be given.

I take pleasure in adding that although I am in command of the forces composing this expedition; the Major General Commanding the Department has accompanied it in person; and all negotiations and official action on my part regarding the Indian question has been in accordance with his previously expressed desire, or has received his subsequent approval. In relation to the battle of the Washita, I find by taking the admissions of the Indians who are now here and who participated in the battle, that the enemy's loss far exceeded that reported by me in my first dispatch concerning the fight.

I reported One hundred and three warriors left dead in our possession. The Indians admit a loss of One hundred and forty killed besides a heavy loss in wounded. This with the prisoners we have in our possession, makes the entire loss of the Indians in killed, wounded and missing, not far from three hundred (300). The report of the Indians, regarding their heavy losses is confirmed by the fact that on the march, and when revisiting the battle ground we found dead Indians six miles from the scene of the battle, where they had probably crawled and died, after receiving their wounds. Those of course, were not reported in my first dispatch. The leading chiefs now here admit that the Indians have never suffered so overwhelming a defeat with such terrible losses.

Upon referring to the terms of the treaty defining the limits of the reservation, upon which these hostile tribes were to locate themselves and upon which they were to remain, it is found that the battle of the Washita took place nearly One hundred miles outside the limits of the reservation.

Respectfully Submitted,
Signed G.A. Custer
Bvt. Maj. Gen. U.S.A.
Commanding Expedition

[tbw]

Part 2

The Plains Indians, had discovered from the onset of hostilities that the best tactics to defeat the US Army was to bring them to battle when they were far from their protective forts; and it was best to force or trick them into situations that would split them into small groups, and would therefore be more vulnerable to their style of fighting and on their terms when it came to choice of ground to fight on.

What was clear from the outset was that the US Army was totally unprepared to deal with the unconventional forces they were trying so desperately to fight in a conventional way. Even the Us Military training academies were vastly unprepared for the proper training that could have led to an early end to hostilities. They just had no experience from which to draw any kind of conclusion on how best to deal with a mounted mob on horseback with no permanent territory to defend. Instead, what developed was something very much like what happened to the United States when it became involved in the Vietnam war. They had to learn how to achieve their goals and when they could, more or less as they say - on the fly. Several alternative ways were proposed to deal with fighting these plains warriors, the first big problem was; they couldn't catch them to begin with and when they did, it was on their terms and territory, not the Army's.

One of the early alternatives was to basically do away with the supply wagons and instead organize a supply system that allowed the troopers to carry their own supply's (perhaps just a couple of days) on horseback and send them out in pursuit of the Indians. But a problem developed after it was tried, these pack horses usually ended up very tired and lame after only a few days into these expeditions. But this wasn't the half of it; they still couldn't overtake the Indians, whose nomadic lifestyle allowed them the luxury of not having to carry a lot from place to place, and they always had the ever present spare horses (read that fresh mounts) that always allowed them to escape; basically put, if they didn't want to engage the Army units, it just wasn't going to happen. And about the only time they did was when the Army horses were exhausted from the chase, their own were rested. and a good point of an ambush site or possible trap was opportunistically available.

After several years of trial and a lot of errors, The Army realized that they couldn't continue to fight such an elusive enemy the way they had been trying to. Their own forces just weren't mobile enough to even catch up to them. These tactics would have to change drastically if they were to have any chance at besting such an elusive enemy. Some other kind of tactical/logistical system was clearly called for and quite long overdue. So they roll out the red carpet on another new plan. They would basically strip down and speed up their own cavalry units. How could this possibly be accomplished? Well, they armed their cavalry units with just pistols and swords; they didn't carry any extra equipment or even extra rations. In other words they would make them as fleet of foot as the Indians were. The cavalry units would rendezvous, when they could, with its supply wagons at a predetermined point, which itself was guarded by mounted or unmounted infantry. This allowed the cavalry strike force the freedom to operate away from the supply wagons. And because the supply wagons themselves didn't follow behind the Cavalry to slow them down. they instead went a separate way to meet up with them at a later rendezvous area. Thus allowing the Cavalry units to deploy quickly into Indian terriroty to deal with the threats as they arose. This new tactic matched the Indians in speed and more than matched them in firepower.

This new Cavalry tactic appeared to be just what the doctor ordered. But it did have its drawbacks, one of which was the distance they couldn't go from the forts. This new tactic basically placed their operational range not far from the fort where they were stationed; thus more forts had to be built. Along with this was the idea of supply depots also being developed in areas strategically located so that the Cavalry units wouldn't have to return to the forts to resupply themselves. These depots or cantonments were of course defended by Infantry units to prevent their capture into the Indians hands. This new tactical approach could of course mean only one thing, a build of US forces on the plains would necessitate expanding the number of troops requited to meet the need. In the 10 years prior to the Battle at the Washita, because of the influence of this new tactical approach, the battles between the Indians and the cavalry were primarily small skirmishes between cavalry patrols and Indians on raids.

[stumblingbear]

Wow! You have done such a wonderful job collecting and posting interesting facts that are not only a welcome to read but, information that goes so far to help us understand the how things occurred as well. Thanks again!

[tbw]

Thank you SB, you'll have to pardon me for initializing your name. My glasses broke and don't see so well without them. It has also caused many a fit in trying to proof read what I wrote before they broke. And if anyone wonders, it is my work and words. I have collected this information over the years and never put it into a very readable format before, but I felt it important enough to share with others. There is a sharp contrast to what was believed to have happened and what actually did. I will attempt to summarize several points of those contrasting differences after the final installment, part 3, which I will try to post soon.

[tbw]

Sheridan's orders to Custer for the Washita:

"To proceed south, in the direction of the Antelope Hills, thense

towards the Washita River, the supposed winter seat of the hostile

tribes; to destroy their village and ponies; to kill or hang all

warriors, and bring back all women and children."

--------


HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH U. S. CAVALRY,

IN THE FIELD ON THE Washita RIVER

November 28, 1868.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan,
Commanding Department of the Missouri:

GENERAL.--On the morning of the 26th inst., this command,

comprising eleven troops of the Seventh Cavalry, struck the trail of

an Indian war party, numbering about one hundred (100) warriors.

The trail was not quite twenty-four hours old, and was first

discovered near the point where the Texas boundary line crosses

the Canadian river. The direction was toward the southeast. The

ground being covered by over twelve inches of snow, no difficulty

was experienced in following the trail. A vigorous pursuit was at

once instituted. Wagons, tents, and all other impediments to a

rapid march were abandoned. From daylight until 9 o'clock at night

the pursuit was unchecked. Horses and men were then allowed

one hour for refreshment, and at 10 P. M. the march was resumed

and continued until 1.30 A. M., when our Osage traders reported a

village within less than a mile from our advance.


The column was counter-marched and withdrew to a retired

point to prevent discovery. After reconnoitering with all the officers

of the command the location of the village, which was situated in a

strip of heavy timber, I divided the command into four columns of

nearly equal strength; the first, consisting of three companies,

under Major Elliott, was to attack in the timber from below the

village; the second column, under Lt. Col. Myers, was to move

down the Washita and to attack in the timber from above; Brevet

Col. Thompson, in command of the third column, was to attack from

the crest north of the village, while the fourth column was to

charge the village from the crest overlooking it on the left bank of

the Washita.


The hour at which the four columns were to charge

simultaneously, was the first dawn of day, and, notwithstanding the

fact that two of the columns were compelled to march several

miles to reach their positions, three of them made the attack so

near together as to make it appear like one charge, The other

column was only a few moments late. There never was a more

complete surprise. My men charged the village, and reached the

lodge before the Indians were aware of our presence. The moment

the charge was ordered, the band struck up "Garrey Owen," and,

with cheers that strongly reminded me of scenes during the war,

every trooper, led by his officer, rushed toward the village.


The Indians were caught napping for once, and the warriors

rushed from their lodges and posted themselves behind trees and

in the deep ravines, from which they began a most determined

defense. The lodges and all their contents were in our possession

within a few minutes after the charge was ordered; but the real

fighting, which has rarely, if ever, been equaled in Indian warfare,

began when attempting to clear out or kill the warriors posted in

ravines and underbrush; charge after charge was made, and most

gallantly too, but the Indians had resolved to sell their lives as

dearly as possible. After a desperate conflict of several hours, our

efforts were crowned with the most complete and gratifying

success.


The entire village, numbering forty-seven lodges of Black Kettle's

band of Cheyennes, two lodges of Arapahoes, and two lodges of

Sioux--fifty-one lodges in all, under command of their principal chief

Black Kettle--fell into our hands. By a strict and careful examination,

after the battle, the following figures give some of the fruits of our

victory:


The Indians left on the ground, and in our possession, the bodies

of 103 of their warriors, including Black Kettle himself, whose scalp

is now in the possession of one of our Osage guides. We captured,

in good condition, 875 horses, ponies and mules. 241 saddles,

some of very fine and costly workmanship; 523 buffalo robes, 210

axes, 140 hatchets, 35 revolvers, 47 rifles, 535 pounds of powder,

1,050 pounds of lead, 4,000 arrows, 90 bullet-molds, 35 bows and

quivers, 12 shields, 300 pounds of bullets, 775 lariats, 940 buckskin

saddle-bags, 470 blankets, 93 coats, 700 pounds of tobacco. In

addition, we captured all their winter supply of dried buffalo meat,

all their meal, flour, and other provisions, and, in fact, everything

they possessed, even driving the warriors from the village with

little or no clothing. We destroyed everything of value to the

Indians, and have now in our possession, as prisoners of war,

fifty-three squaws, and their children. Among the prisoners are the

survivors of Black Kettle's and the family of Little Rock. We also

secured two white children held captive by the Indians. One white

woman, who was in their possession, was murdered by her captors

the moment we attacked. A white boy held captive, about ten

years old, when about to be secured, was brutally murdered by a

squaw, who ripped out his entrails with a knife.


The Kiowas, under Satanta, and Arapahoes, under Little Raven,

were encamped six miles below Black Kettle's village, and the

warriors from these two villages came to attempt the rescue of the

Cheyennes. They attacked my command on all sides about noon,

hoping to recover the squaws and herds of the Cheyennes. In their

attack they displayed great boldness, and compelled me to use all

my force to repel them, but the counter-charge of the cavalry was

more than they could stand; by three o'clock we drove them in all

directions, pursuing them several miles. I then moved my entire

command in search of the village of the Kiowas and Arapahoes, but

after a march of eighty miles, discovered they had taken alarm at

the fate of the Cheyenne village, and had fled.



I was then three days march from where I had left my train of

supplies, and knew that wagons would not follow me, as the trail

had led me over a section of country so cut up by ravines and other

obstructions that cavalry could with difficulty move over it. The

supplies carried from the train on the persons of the men were

exhausted. My men, from loss of sleep, and hard service, were

wearied out; my horses were in the same condition for want of

forage. I therefore began the return march about 8 P. M., and found

my train of supplies at this point, it having only accomplished

sixteen miles since I left it. In the excitement of the fight, as well as

in self-defense, it so happened that some of the squaws and a few

children were killed and wounded. The latter I have brought with

me, and they have received all the needful attention the

circumstances of the case permit. Many of the squaws were

taken with arms in their hands, and several of my command are

known to have been wounded by them.


The desperate character of the combat may be inferred from the

fact that after the battle the bodies of thirty-eight dead warriors

were found in a small ravine near the village in which they had

posted themselves.


I now have to report the loss suffered by my own command. I

regret to mention among the killed, Major Joel H. Elliott and Capt.

Louis McLane Hamilton, and nineteen enlisted men; the wounded

include three officers and eleven enlisted men--in all thirty-five. Of

the officers, Brevet Lieut.-Col. Barnitz, Capt. Seventh Cavalry, is

seriously, if not mortally wounded. Brevet Lieut.-Col. J. W. Custar

and Second Lieut. J. Z. March, Seventh Cavalry, are slightly

wounded. Brevet Lieut.-Col. F. W. Benteen had his horse shot under

him by a son of Black Kettle, whom he afterward killed. Col. Barnitz,

before receiving his wound, killed two warriors.


I cannot sufficiently commend the admirable conduct of the

officers and men. This command has marched constantly five days,

amidst terrible snowstorms, and over a rough country covered by

more than twelve inches of snow. Officers and men have slept in

the snow without tents. The night preceding the attack, officers

and men stood at their horse's heads for hours, awaiting the

moment of attack, and this, too, when the temperature was far

below the freezing point. They have endured every privation, and

fought with unsurpassed gallantry against a powerful and well

armed foe, and, from first to last, I have not heard a single murmur;

but on the contrary, the officers and men of the several squadrons

and companies seemed to vie with each other in their attention to

duty, and their patience and perseverance under difficulties. Every

officer, man, scout and Indian guide, did their full duty.


I only regret the loss of the gallant spirits who fell in the battle of

the Washita. Those whose loss we are called upon to deplore were

among our bravest and best. Respectfully subscribed.

G. A. Custer,
Lieut-Col. Seventh Cavalry,
Brevet Major-General U. S. A.

[tbw]

Part 3

In 1851 many of the plains Indian tribal leaders met with U.S. commissioners at Fort Laramie. What the United States government wanted was free access to Intian territory for forts, telegraph lines and roads. The tribes agreed tp give them what they requested, as long as they had the right to preserve their way of life by not giving up their rights to freely roam. camp and hunt on the same land. Several years prior to this, in 1848 gold had been discovered in California. And it was discovered again in Colorado Territory in 1858, 7 years after the treaty was signed. It was these discoveries that brought the gold miners ever westward in their search for wealth; and as with any industry, nearly everything else that supported, supplied or profited from it. Places like Denver & Virginia City quickly grew from shanty towns to blossoming good sized towns.

By 1860 the Civil War loomed on the horizon and slowed but didn't stop the westward flow of whites; and it wasn't going to stop their incursions into Indian Territory, in fact quite the opposite, a bill was introduced and passed in Congress called the Pre-emption bill.
This bill gave free land to settlers on Indian lands.

To assume that the treaty signed in 1851, or for that matter any other, would protect any of the miners, settlers or for that matter any white was a bit far fetched. The Indians became increasingly agitated over this ever flowing, non stop incursion into their lands.

When the Civil War broke out the US withdrew the federal troops from the west. It was left up to the governments of the States and Territories or local towns to hire militia to deal with the Indians. There was no love lost between these militias and the Indians and after the Sand Creek Massacre it led directly to open conflict and ever increasing raids by both sides; it was at this time that the Cheyenne and Lakota united to keep the whites out of the area around the Powder River. Things could only get worse as General Dodge ordered General Connor on his trip up the Bozeman into Powder River Country in the summer of 1865, which served to blow up the the keg of powder already alight.

From these series of events grew the Indian tactic of luring the soldiers from their defensive posts. Perhaps one of the best known was at Fort Phil Kearny, this where Crazy Horse lured the soldiers from the fort while a combined force of Sioux and Cheyenne were waiting to annihilate them.

Throughout the Plains Indian wars, the Plains Indians chose the area the battles would be fought. If sabre's were used they'd just split up into small groups and fade away to delay. They chose their battles which gave them greater numbers up close where their primary weapon, the bow and arrow would be deadly and effective. And in battles where they couldn't run away or didn't, like The Battle of Solomon fork, the LBH and the Fettererman
Massacre - they attacked and did it quickly and efficiently using those guerrilla tactics they had mastered so well.

The Winter Campaign of 1868

Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman:

"Were I or the department commanders to send guards to every point where they are clamored for, we would need alone on the plains a hundred thousand men, mostly of cavalry. Each spot of every road, and each little settlement along five thousand miles of frontier, wants its regiment of cavalry or infantry to protect it against the combined power of all the Indians, because of the bare possibility of their being attacked by the combined force of all the Indians."

The Plains Indians either smoked or dried their food to help preserve it. And as they traveled from one camp site to another it was more easier and convenient as a food source. Parfleches were used to store these dried foods throughout the winter months. Rendered fat from Buffalo meat was used as a way to preserve their meat for the long winter months.

Many tribes stashed food in underground pits. They would dig down deep and line the pit with logs and flat slabs of wood and bury it. One such stash was found near Sand Creek in Montana (about 10 miles upriver) after the LBH fight and was where the Indians had stashed their meat supply.

Traditionally, the Plains tribes lived in small bands during the winter months. For about five of the coldest months of the year they lived in one place. These winter camps were established in a protected areas where there was plentiful supply of fresh water, wild
game, timber and grass for the horses. By 1868 the bands had became larger and typically at that time they would gather many allied tribes together at these winter camps. These camps were strung out along the river bottoms not far from one another, each tribe keeping to its own, usually within several miles of the other.

When the grass supply ran out for their horses the Indians would chop down small trees of soft wood,- trees like, cottonwood, elm and maple. Their ponies would graze upon the bark and limbs of these trees, and in some reported instances, were known to have eaten the whole tree.

In the winter when the snow was deep, it was beneficial to camp in an area where buffalo and other wild game would come to water; because The snow storms drove herds of the plains into the river bottoms not far from where they were camped.

Its against this back drop of Indian life that Sherman planned his next move, one of which was The Washita campaign. If the Indian could be totally destroyed it offered its best chance in the winter months when the horses were weak and the Indians couldn't run and if they did and left their camp supplies behind, they would have no alternative but to surrender and go onto the reservations.

[tbw]

Concluding statements

Part 1

There are several questions that need to be asked at this point. One of which somewhat defies a rational explanation. And the best approach to this may be to ask the questions this way. What if either the Union or the Confederacy during the Civil War had found a weapon that made their opponents flee the battlefield every single time? Would such a weapon have been further produced and utilized to conclude the war earlier; or would they have deemed such a weapon of little to no use and obsolete? During the Plains Indian wars, the army seemed preoccupied with 'bringing the indians to battle'. The Indian tactics involved hit and run tactics that provided little in the way of satisfying their preoccupation; so when it came to the sabre's, a weapon more advanced than anything the Indians had, they ran from it. Instead of the army adapting and designing tactical uses where they could employ the sabre's usefullness on the battlefield, they instead deemed it of little to no use and obsolete. When the Indians broke into small groups and ran, as they did at the Battle of Solomon Fork, did it ever occur to them to use a reserve force to attack & secure the village while the main force kept the small groups preoccupied with the chase? Evidently some Napoleonic code of conduct about warfare still prevailed and it was more important to 'bring them to battle' by more honorable means than have them run from them and be duped in the process. Odd in a way, because if the Indians were given that same choice, there would have been no doubt which they would have chosen.

When one looks at the Battle of Solomon Fork, one thing seems to stand out the most. The Cavalry commander's choice of weapons and style of attack. When presented with the choices the Indians had given him, there was but three based upon what they had. 1) A pistol charge, which is what the Indians expected them to do. 2) A dismounted skirmish line, which in light of the Indians own, seemed preposterously inadequate to deal with the situation. The Indians could have easily became the attacker after they fired off their single shot carbines, and they still would have to have used their pistols, only in this case, on the defense. 3) The Sabre charge with the results as it turned out.

What the commander of Cavalry knew at the Battle of Solomon Forks was that had he charged the Indian mounted skirmish line, that his pistols would have had an effective range of 80 yards or less on the move; while the Indians would have enjoyed a stationary skirmish line shooting arrows at ranges of 100 to 150 yards effectively into his formation long before they ever arrived at a range close enouth to fire their revolvers.

When one takes away the use of sabre's and employes the dismounted skirmish line, what one gets from this battle is exactly what happened at the Little Big Horn, because the Cheyenne's, who Custer's battalion was primarily fighting that day, were the one's who devised their own versions of the mounted and even unmounted skirmish lines when defending their villages; and it all began at the Battle of Solomon Fork.

[tbw]

Conclusion

Part 2 The End

How many Indians would it have taken to lure the Cavalry into believeing that 'those Indians' were not sent out there as "Decoys' for a trap or ambush?

The answer appears to have been about 40 to 50. At the Fetterman massacre it was reported that Fetterman had taken after some 40 Indians who didn't appear to be decoys. At the Little Big Horn, it was reported that there were some 40 to 50 Indians that had been set out there to lure Reno and his men into the trap the Sioux had prepared for him and his men. Which brings us to another question that begs asking. According to most reports there were about "50 or more" Indians in Wolf Tooth's band of Indians that Custer's battalion supposedly engaged while on their journey downstream after Reno's departure. Were Wolf Tooth's band yet another band of decoys set out there? In either event, whether by intent or not, the effect would have been or was the same. The question at this point then is; how many men would Custer have sent after Wolf Tooth's band of Indians; knowing that the Cavalry would not send any more after them in pursuit than what was needed to deal with what they could see? The number of men in both Fetterman's and Reno's examples were about a battalion sized element that gave the cavalry overall odds of about 2 to 1 against the decoys. Had Custer sent any men after them, it would not have been anything less than a battalion in size, ie. about "100 or more" men. This raises serious questions about whether or not Custer did engage Wolf Tooth's band, or for that matter, whether or not Wolf Tooth's band was even anywhere close enough to draw off that many men. The When's and Where's would have to play into any equation, and more importantly and of greater significance; whether such sighting of Wolf Tooth's band by Custer was before or after his personal knowledge and own sighting of the "Big Village" that lay before him. What further plays into this vast equation is whether or not, at the time of possible sigthing of Wolf Tooth's band; was whether or not Custer could afford to send off '1o0 or more' men in pursuit of them and leave only 125 in an attempt to overtake and subdue the vast village he had, or perhaps more than likely, had not seen. And last but certainly not the least, exactly what Wolf Tooth's band, if they were even there, was doing or attempting to do.

Once battle was joined and the skirmish lines formed, there had to be a consistent, constant and steady outpouring of lead from the RIFLES of the men on those skirmish lines. Sure RANGE mattered because the army knew from experience that the Indians preferred the 'up close and personal' attack where they could employ their own primary weapons. Their longest ranged weapon was the bow and arrow and it was only effective out to about 100 to 150 yeards. As long as the Cavalry was firing their rifles at targets farther away than the arrows maximum effectiveness and doing it constantly, consitantly and steady enough to keep the Indians at bay the soldiers had a chance at survival. If they fired or in the case at the LBH, perhaps, had to fire a lot of rounds very quickly, they would use up their ammunition for their carbines very quickly and would have to resort to using their pistols. The rates of fire for effective use, durability and conservatism would have been in the 3 to 4 round per minute range, anything over that; and they would have used up their ammunition in less time than it would have taken to have resupplied them. Even at 3 rounds fired per minute they would have used up all their ammo (100 rounds) in about 35 minutes and at 4 rounds per minute, 25 minutes. Once all their rifle ammo was gone they had to alternative but to draw their revolvers for protection. But at that point it was all over but the shouts and yells of the warriors because the maximum effective range of the cavalry's pistols would only have been in the 80 yard range. At this range, the Indians would have closed to within a hundred yards or so; and would have been able to have effectively used their bows and arrows to finish off any soldier(s) trying to fire their pea shooters at a range where it would have been impossible to have predicted how high to aim for the shot to effectively do them any good.

The circle now closes, as it must necessarily be realized that the pack train or for that matter Benteen, could not have been farther behind Custer, or for that matter Reno than a half hours time to effectively and efficiently to have either 1) reinforced either Reno or for that matter Custer or 2) resupplied either Custer or Reno when they needed it; a fact that Custer knew all to well. One would suppose that Grays timing down Reno Creed was designed with this in mind, simply because it would have been fool-hearty to have outpaced one's critical and only logistics by more time than it would have taken to effectively and efficiently expedited such missions.

The last issue is of course the trapdoor carbines. All that was really needed was a weapon that would fend off at a decent range and effectiveness the Indians bow and arrow attacks. Such a weapon existed. It was a weapon Custer and others had used during the Civil war. its maximum effective range was about 200 yards and it was a repeater that fired 7 shots before reloading. But its no use to mention even its name here, for it wasn't even a serious contender by the ordinance office as it would "waste ammunition". The ways of warfare were swiftly changing and such cost saving measures would forever place the gravestones on Custer battlefield as a perpetual reminder of such ignorance. Perhaps another ancient conservative prose is most befitting and proper to end;

"Oh passerby go tell the Spartans here we lie Obedient to their word."

Or perhaps, just perhaps, Custer's own last known translated words best fits and compliments:

"Benteen, Come on, Big Village, Be Quick, Bring packs
PS bring pacs"

[joewiggs]

Fantastic job! I would like to take this opportunity to emphasis a very salient point epitomize by your statement, "There had to be consistent, constant, and steady outpouring of lead!"

Somehow, someway this outpouring "of lead" was stifled. Whether such an occurrence was the result of panic, rifle mechanism break down or terrain which was conducive toward enemy penetration due to concealment is the question. A combination of all three being as likely as not.

Another point, way was a breakout not attempted? Perhaps to much faith in assistance that failed to appear.