Post by tbw on Dec 25, 2009 10:02:14 GMT -5
Separarting The Facts from The Myths
The famous cracker box incident is usually the profound beginning where Custer immediately attacks the Indian camp. This incident by the way happened before the regiment attained the so called divide, some 12 miles from the LBH river. This "immediate attack" then is spun into an hours long campaign where Benteen is sent off on a wild goose chase Valley Hunting ad infinitum, in a self expressed “senseless“ adventure; Reno is sent off to charge - light brigade style with six shooters on an Indian village of thousands, and Custer was foolish enough to go charging off all alone and was, according to the experts never seen again; and some who usually further charge gross incompetence because Custer didn't listen to his Scouts further blame him for his own demise for splitting the regiment and going too far from his support.
F.F. Girard an interpreter, a "resident in Indian country for 31 years"1 had been assigned to the Indian scouts on the 25th. Here is what Major Reno had to say about receiving information from that source. In response to a question posed at the court, he replied... "He had no right to make any communication with me, officially, I mean....Of course if he had any information to convey to me, I should have listened to him, but I would not have believed it." Of course it was Major Reno who also stated at the Reno Court of Inquiry that "Custer had no plan", an unproven assertion Benteen also claimed. Reno even going so far as not believing that his order to attack that morning was not part of that plan, but was as he put it, "the beginning of the fight”. Now I usually am not one to answer a question with a question. However, I think this one answers itself. If he knew what he was supposed to be doing; was, as he expressed it, “the beginning of the fight,”: How would Reno have known that, if it wasn’t part of Custer’s plan? After all, Custer did order it didn’t he? Taking these two subordinates statements together as one - one does have to wonder, not just the honor in Major Reno's statements, but the problems associated long before that campaign ever began. If there ever was an intelligence gathering scout problem it paled in comparison to the seemingly underlying infantile disability of Custer’s junior officers that was to follow. And this was ever so highlighted by the Ree's themselves at the Tepee about a mile from the LBH, where they refused in a misunderstanding to go forward. For it was here, where Custer then replaced them with Reno‘s battalion. The some 25 Ree Indian Scouts had been ordered to “follow” some fleeing hostile Indians about a half mile away: Custer then replaced them for not acting swiftly, with Reno's battalion, which was then ordered moments after the Ree’s misunderstood refusal, to “attack the village” - according to Reno - instead of merely “following” some Indians as the Scouts had been ordered to do. Even the suggestion that Custer waded in too deep past his support, without proper reconnaissance here pales in comparison with Reno’s blunder! For even to this day; no one supposedly knows exactly what Reno’s orders were! And it is in this light in which Custer is judged.
What most researchers, authors and LBH battle enthusiasts don’t realize is, is that during this period of time, the minutes between ordering Reno forward and minutes later, just after Reno’s departure with his orders: That it was a time filled with scouting reports. For it was during this time that Lt.’s Hare and Varnum returned with vital information concerning the village and the Indians they had observed. Girard the 31 year veteran in Indian territory shouted his seemingly infamous message: And Custer’s interaction with his Indian scouts and guides as numerous as the white scouting reports. It is here; where seemingly, Custer looses thought process control of the situation and makes disastrous mistakes according to those who blame him for such things as: “going too far from support”, “ordering Reno to ’attack’ without support“, and “not keeping his regiment together“. And all of this is based upon one single fact, that: “Custer did or did not Listen to His Scouts.” It seems like Custer can’t win this one, can he? For no matter whether or not he “listened to his scouts”, the end result seems to be the same: From the looks of it Custer went too far away from his support. From the looks of it he ordered Reno to attack all alone and tried to attack himself at Medicine Tail Ford and was repulsed. From the looks of it, in hindsight, it looks like he should have kept his regiment together. .
The purpose of this exercise? If you favor Custer, you blame it on the scouts for faulty information, thus Custer listened to his scouts. If you are against Custer, you blame it on to him, Custer didn’t listen to his scouts. The truth of it is, it could only be one way, not both, yet no one apparently thinks that Lt. Hare’s report nor Varnums had anything to do with Custer’s decisions, nor for that matter F.F. Girards earth shattering sighting of the fleeing Indians or the village, which may or may not have been one and the same.
Village size:
The Indians didn't have an effective way of communicating spatial references, time and distance information at the time. I will let the official record speak for itself. Hear it from the soldiers and civilians who participated in the battle, for it is the only true way of ever knowing where that village lay and its immense size. For the Indians at that time, never understood our cultural conception of time and space, nor for that matter which direction was which, again a cultural difference, not something to be frowned upon, but something that just was.
From the RCOI:
Lt. George Wallace: "The village as passed over afterwards was over three miles long and varying in width from a few hundred yards to a half mile in width from a few hundred yards to a half mile where the tepees had stood. (Seeing the Indian village in defile before him as they moved away on the night of the 26th.) They were moving over country that was almost level. We estimated the village to be two and a half to three miles long and a half a mile wide."
Capt. Moylan: "I think it was certainly three miles, if not more, from end to end as I saw it afterwards. It's average width would be two or three hundred yards. It was a very large village. the Indians estimating it at eighteen hundred lodges...there were also four hundred wikiups." He too described the moving village on the night of the 26th: "It was certainly two and a half or three miles long and it extended on the plain in front of our position across the river, covering nearly half of this plain, which was six miles across. The moving village was probably several hundred yards wide...I think from one quarter to one half a mile would cover the width..."
F.F. Girard: In direct reference to Cheyenne ford, made these statements at the Reno Inquiry, that place the end of the village well "below" (downstream) from this ford. "...As a general thing the Indians encamp in circles, in bands or families, and it was nearly all over the bottom or extended out to the foothills and down below this ford. A large portion of this village was below this ford." The ford that was referenced here, was where the soldiers had found a gray horse down by the river, and Girard as well as Benteen were very clear as to the place where this horse was found and it wasn't point "b", and by its very location was Cheyenne ford; as described by them and others..
Many other soldiers and civilians do weigh in on this issue of Village size and placement throughout the Reno Inquiry, and time and again the story is the same with few exceptions. The Indian side of this story is vastly incomplete without the soldiers who also fought there and were acutely aware of time-space and proper place. And I for one am not willing to call every soldier who testified at the Reno Inquiry a bona fide liar, especially about the size of an Indian village; that just doesn't make any sense. It is very apparent from all the testimony at the Reno Inquiry, that this Village began some 800 yards west of Reno's skirmish line and that it generally followed the rivers course, staying primarily upon the 2nd bench and ended some 3 to 3 and 1/2 miles downstream in a direct line from start to finish near where the present interstate crosses the river and then some. It's width at times being anywhere from a few hundred yards to about a 1/2 mile. To mistake size and extent of this village has a direct impact upon the effects of population - thus numbers of warriors; it also has a direct effect upon the next two subjects.
Ambush:
For as long as this battle has been debated this singular issue, Indian Ambush, perhaps best exemplifies its pitfalls the best. Two questions: a) If the Indians were as surprised, as most of the Indians said they were, then why didn't Reno's charge work? And before answering, see (b) because Custer's column at the time Reno dismounted to fight in the valley was at or past Weir Peak, so one answer depends on the other. b) We know that somewhere in the vicinity of - or on downstream from Weir Peak, Custer made his observation of the “empty village” and wondered where all the Indians were according to Tmptr. John Martin. Yet! Minutes later, approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, if not sooner, he engaged these same sleeping Indians and was wiped out to a man in about as much time as it took for a “hungry man to eat his dinner“ as one of the Indian participants stated! If these Indians were indeed asleep in their tepees at that time, how does one indeed explain the incredible victory over not just one battalion of Custer's command - but two? Think of this, these Sleeping Indians were not only capable of routing two of Custer's battalions, overrunning both and wiping one from the face of the earth; not only in the same amount of time, but at the same time!!!
Of course the best argument on this one are those who say that Custer never got across the river and/or was driven back from Medicine Tail Ford, and that the Indians were already on the east bank engaging Custer‘s men. Isn't it amazing that these Indians who had just been asleep, minutes if not seconds before; could have all have awakened, adorned themselves for battle, assessed the correct direction to go, and have arrived across the river before Custer's arrival, yet they were still surprised by the soldiers arrival? In World War II we remember & honor the Indians service as the Code Talkers, and rightly so. Here at the battle of the LBH, we also remember their service as the Sleep Walkers? Yet it is through no fault of their own that we have come to believe this.
Custer’s Strategy and Tactics:
How can anyone carry on a legitimate if not proper discussion about tactics or even strategy when not one man in Custer's whole command ever admitted that they knew what those supposed tactics were? Reno stated that Custer had "no plan." Benteen concurred with Reno that Custer had no plan, and belittled and berated Custer for the orders given him. All that is left over is assumption. So what does it look like? Indeed it seemed like Benteen was sent off on a wild goose chase, over hill and dale to the left of the trail. And indeed it did seem like Reno was ordered single handedly to attack a huge Indian village without immediate support or hope of relief any time soon. And indeed it did seem like Custer marched off 4 miles distant from any other command just to meet their death on those lonely hills by the monument later constructed in their honor. Knowing this, how could anyone confidently state: That it was the Indians who were surprised, it was these same sleeping Indians who counterattacked Reno and chased him across the river to the top of the bluffs? And then conclude that - Custer‘s strategy was or wasn‘t working? The conundrum of this is that to believe that his strategy and/or tactics failed, most today have him attacking at MTF for one reason or another. And the sightings bear out the timing, that if that was the place, then they indeed were retreating at the same time as Reno and his men were, just as Curley stated. But what doesn’t make sense, is if this MTF attack occurred, why didn’t Custer fall back to the safety of the regiment rather than go to Calhoun about a mile away, and state there as Curley said he did - that they would have to make a stand somewhere. Again Curley’s observations would have or should have told Custer all he needed to know, that there was way too many Indians to continue with his action at or upon the ford, and indeed, just as Curley thought, Custer did quarter back upon a ridge rather than pursue his path to the ford. Custer was too brilliant a tactician to have not realized when he was outnumbered, and obviously at that point, he did recognize the futility in meeting an overwhelming number of foe. At this point in the article I refer the reader to Major Rosser’s letter to Reno in Graham’s Custer Myth, where he states that Custer would have retreated back to the rest of the regiment had this been the case. And then there is that matter of whether or not they were asleep or attacking, surprised or not.
The only way this works is that there were two groups of Indians, attacking both Reno and Custer’s men simultaneously at the same moment in time and lord knows there surely wasn't, was there? What were those Sleep Walkers doing across the river long before Custer's arrival there? Weren't they supposed to be asleep and waiting to be surprised by Custer's arrival there? Apparently not! The Ambush now seems more probable because a significant number of Indians, impossible if not implausible to explain were indeed wide awake and across the river just waiting for Custer as his battalion came over the battlefield near Calhoun Hill! In clearly what should be stated or could be effectively described as, an ambush. "Standing Bear said. Bobtail Horse, who was right there, indicated without hesitation that they were all on the same side as Custer. Two years after the fight, Hump, Brave Wolf and Ice told 5th Infantry Lieutenant Oscar F. Long that the Indians crossed the river before Custer could possibly have forded. They had already gained a small hill on the North side of the Little Bighorn and placed themselves between Custer and the river."2 This sounds like an overwhelming number of non-Sleep Walking Indians who were just waiting to ambush Custer's battalion when they had gone what most expert claim was “too far from support“! Yet this attack according to those same experts happened at Medicine Tail Ford and not on down stream.
It is unfortunate that we must have these inane if not insane discussions about tactics. So much could have been avoided past, present and future had those who knew the truth, fessed up in a timely manner. I have no doubt Custer's strategy and tactics were sound, he was not the type of General to lead that number of men, some 600, give or take, into hostile country and not take great care to see to their safety and his. He had family there also which would have also placed an added burden to have taken extra caution not to have made great errors whether tactical or strategic. Add to this, the fact as some see it, (not I) that he was disobeying his directive from Terry, and that too would have placed a greater burden on the care of his soldiers than anything else. What his strategy and tactics were perhaps no one will ever know, because Benteen and Reno behind a banner of pride in the 7th Cavalry forever buried it along with Custer at the Little Big Horn. Their part in his “plans” in-execution and he and his men’s further execution led to the disaster that befell him and all those who died alongside him.
Reno's 'advance into the valley' was but a shadow of what he claimed it was to be. And Benteen's 'Advance to the Rear' was in direct disobedience to Custer’s orders - just as he himself said at the Reno Inquiry. Yet to this day Reno is still vilified for living in the shadows for years after the battle, and Benteen raised to the level of sainthood for disobeying his orders. And the most humbling fact is; neither told the truth about the strategy nor the tactics Custer employed. Reno lied about his order and then is vilified for not carrying that lied order through. Benteen admits to disobeying the orders Custer gave him, even openly criticizing them, and he is virtually given the Medal of Honor today for doing so simply because according to the men who survived, his action saved the men in Reno and Benteen’s battalions in the end. Does this still to this day justify his self proclaimed disobedience of Custer’s order, as it seemed to justify it then? Benteen would have you believe yes. But had he been where he was supposed to have been, when he was supposed to have been there, as Custer ordered, I am 100 percent sure that Custer and his men would have survived this battle, and the outcome would have been significantly different!
River Crossing Incidents & location:
I think it is fairly clear now that either the Indians were either totally surprised by Custer's attack or that they were not. And this is where this issue rests. If they were surprised and were as Custer said 'asleep in their tepees' when at, near or beyond Weir Peak, then Custer's approach to the river would have been downstream from point 'b', not at point 'b' as most today would have made it (source for not at point 'b'... Reno Inquiry and the above argument). The fords in question then for this activity would have been either Cheyenne ford or ford 'd'. If we are to believe the non-ambush theory then the further testimony of Two Moons provides proof of the opposite. "Warriors were across the river, some going upstream and some going downstream, trying to get on each side of the soldiers." What is compelling about his statement here is that soldiers from Reno's battalion did observe warriors on the east side going upstream during the valley fight, which not only corroborates Two Moons statements but gives more validity to the fact that an ambush was more likely the culprit than the Sleep Walkers he portrays in same discussion. And didn’t trumpeter Martin say that he had observed Custer’s men “ambushed”?
What I do find ludicrous is that most of the so called experts in the field today will tell you in regards to Custer being killed at the river, that it quite simply did not happen. But then will go on to state that when they arrived at Medicine Tail Ford, that Custer met an “alarmed village” and not a “sleeping one”. And yet being unreceptive to the possibility that Custer could have been wounded there at the river, instead of being killed: Especially when we know Custer was hit in the chest and White Man Runs Him’s statement confirmed that wound saying in effect that: he, White Man Runs Him “didn’t see Custer, but heard later that Custer was hit in the chest by a bullet and fell into the water"; is not confirmation that - that person died, or was killed right then and there in the river, else where would water possibly be found!? But a wound that would later be fatal makes any deniable comment ludicrous at best! And their assertions that Custer never made it to or across the river, when obviously such an action at that point in time was what was needed, once again points to Custer’s ignorance, or lack of preparation quite impossible to believe: For he did send 5 men from co. E ahead, a fact that many experts had to have known, but overlook. Just like they overlook the Indian stated fact that Custer may very well, and likely was "wounded" at that ford! Is this a pick and choose what you believe moment - between the Indian statements? Or were what they said, something else, somewhere else?
Crazy Horse’s Ravine:
There isn't a one of us that doesn't like to go against the odds. But this subject itself revolves around a somewhat reclusive person where more speculation than fact has been written or for that matter known about. Edward Godfrey recorded Gall as saying, “Crazy Horse went to the extreme north end of the camp.' He turned right and went up a very deep ravine and 'he came very close to the soldiers on the north side.” Godfrey by the way in response to the effective fighting force of that village, at the Reno Inquiry said, "...it would take at least 3,000 (warriors) to cover the ground I saw." And the ground he saw? "My company, along with several others, was detailed on the 27th, I think it was, to destroy the tepee poles and the camp material that was left in the village, and we could not begin to touch it."
The location of Crazy Horses approach has been shifted here and there over the years. Some try to say he went up Deep Ravine, others up Deep Coulee. Yet here in a clear statement Gall through Godfrey told us the truth. What those who believe different try to do is say that the Indians directions are different than the whites, that their North is really our East, etc. So to make sense out of all of this they adduce that it must have been the farthest east ford, thus Medicine Tail Ford that he used. What they forget in this instance is who was relating the story, Gall or Godfrey? No, North was and is still North and East was and is still East, and no we don’t need no more earth changing myths to explain one, Gall didn’t use one and as it appears neither did Edward Godfrey as he related it. In fact, any person who has ever been to the battlefield will tell you that there is "a very deep ravine" that extends westerly from where the monument stands! Anyone, black, white, Spanish, Russian, Chilean, Vietnamese, Indian, British, South African, Native American, and in the words of Benteen “ad infinitum” standing on Monument Hill can see that "deep ravine" and know that it is a "very deep ravine" where the road ascends! However; there is more than one! Just because someone decided to dub a steeply shallowing basin with a deeper ravine within, Deep Ravine, doesn't mean there aren't others, and therefore, just because someone mentions one by that same name, doesn't mean that it is that same one.
Custer’s Last Stand:
Richard Fox and his research has provided to the Custer story much more than what we have ever had in the past. His efforts should be applauded not rejected and as the modern term has been applied, “thrown under the bus.” That being said, it is very difficult to establish anything credible upon a non-pristine battle site. And this is a non-pristine battle site. Souvenir hunters, exhibitionist, and ceremonial enactments, buildings and the cemetery and the monument itself have all made an impact upon the battlefield that archaeology can never recover. Still we must take what we can, sort through the rest, and hope for the best. The problem with any research around the immediate area where Custer was killed is the disturbance of the soil and how deep some of that material was buried and/or removed. Many of the bones were buried beneath the monument and as was noted some 10 to 12 feet of soil was removed above for this this marker before its placement. This disturbance alone has caused irreparable damage to the battle site, not to mention the buildings and the cemetery, absolutely none of this could ever hoped be recovered! The other factors in this are the outlying areas just outside of the park boundaries, ie. the private lands that surround the park, including where the Indian village was. It is unknown how far Custer and his troopers may have advanced before being chased back to Monument Hill. Some have suggested as far as ford “d.” Critical studies, deep penetrating radar, metal detectors etc. from the park boundaries through private lands to those points need to be undertaken to fully understand and appreciate the extent of Custer's advance. And we wont know that until this is done.
What the warriors do agree upon is the length of this battle. And it is very short, not over 15 to 20 minutes in duration a fact most experts seemed reluctant to point out. Once again the ambush theory seems to raise its ugly head. And this specter cant be refused. Whether an ambush as such was plotted or whether it just fell by accident into the Indians hands, as a matter of fact, it happened. There was little time for organization on either side and from the cartridge cases mentioned at the Reno Inquiry we know that at the Calhoun sector the soldiers expended some 25 to 30 shells before loosing organizational cohesion. While it sounds like a lot, it isn't. A good professional soldier could load and accurately fire his carbine at a rate of 3 to 4 rounds a minute. Now start dividing the shell casings by the rounds per minute. That’s how long that battle lasted at Calhoun hill, from 8 to 10 minutes. And if that rate was slower, say, 1 every 1/2 minute? 15 minutes. This answer seems to closely match the 15 - 20 minutes that the Indians usually associated as the length of the entire battle there. Some say Calhoun hill was the first to fall, and if it was, and the battle did last 20 minutes and it fell on the 15th minute, then Custer and his little band on Monument Hill had but 0-5 minutes to say their prayers. This is called a stand? Whether or not one agrees with the archaeology or not, Richard Fox's findings are not far from the truth, in fact I would rather trust his findings than of the Indians who were warned not to say anything, and afraid to tell the truth because of reprisals. Many times, no, not all, but many times they told lies because of that fear, and this "last stand" grandstand pandering was one of them; and I might add, one that would never be told any other way because of obvious reasons, does starvation & freezing to death ring any bells(?), and no, not because it was the truth, quite the opposite: Because it was the lie they the "whites" at the time needed to hear the most.
Did 28 troopers die in Deep Ravine?
Of course they didn’t, however, 22 did! Two compelling points.
A): Deep Ravine is a huge, long ravine, and it even extends outside of the present National Monument or Park boundary down by the river. Could or did these soldiers die outside of the park boundary down by the river in Deep Ravine? This question is compelling because of the recent discoveries made on private lands near here. Most experts on this issue like to place this Deep Ravine event and the soldiers connected with it at the end of the struggle. But here, at or near Cheyenne Ford, what is suggested is that some kind of stand near the river was attempted by the company E early in the Battle. And that upon their retreat from that ford nearly 1/2 of that company was killed in a ravine near the river, while the other 1/2 managed to escape before being overwhelmed near the SSL position.
B): There were and still are many other Deep Ravines around this area, (stand on Monument Hill and tell me which one isn‘t deep), just because a deep ravine was mentioned as their final resting place, doesn't mean that it was the Deep Ravine of legend and lore.
Captain, T.M. McDougall, 3(Examining Custer Battlefield or the route Gen. Custer took.) "I only went to where I presume the skirmish line was killed. About a hundred yards from the ford where I crossed." (He named this ford as "B", but because no soldiers, as far as we know, were ever buried within 100 yards of ford "B", could he have meant Cheyenne ford or Ford “d“? Either way, this 100 yards from any ford is no where near the South Skirmish Line or the supposed burial site of Company E’s SSL or for that matter Monument Hill, the Keogh position nor Calhoun Hill.) "Major Reno then ordered me to take my company and go to the village, and get implements to bury the dead. On returning he ordered me to bury E company," (E company being the ones killed in Deep Ravine, and were the ones according to Capt. McDougall, where "the skirmish line was killed." within a 100 yards from a ford and now we find that this same E company is), "the one I had formerly commanded for 5 years, and to identify the men as far as possible. I found most of them in a ravine... I did not see any bodies but of the one company in the ravine. (Here in this ravine marked "H" on the Maguire map)..."is where most of Company E were found to the best of my recollection, about half (22) were in the ravine and the other half (28) on a line (SSL) outside. I thought they fought the best they could and probably were attacked from both sides."
Captain F. Benteen, 4: He reports the number of dead in the ravine as 22. (There were bodies found in a ravine towards the river from where Gen. Custer was found. They were found) “probably within 50 to 75 yards (of the river.) If I am not mistaken there were 22 (bodies). They could not shoot out of the ravine and they certainly could did not go into it to shoot out of it. Those men (in the ravine) were killed, as I believe, by the Indians with stones and clubs in that ravine, they were unarmed. I think they were wounded men. The men had gone into the ravine, as the Indians say, possibly to hide. I did not examine them at all. I rode along the ravine and looked down. The bodies had been counted by others. I made no personal examination of them...There was a trail, I think, probably a hundred yards or so above (upstream from) that ravine.”..
Theodore Goldin in a Letter to Albert Johnson, 5: "I formed my opinion on what we saw when visiting the field on the 27th with Bradley and again on the 28th...we turned in at an opening following a well-marked trail of shod horses not very far from the southwest corner of the present fenced enclosure this brought us to the first group of several soldiers, now marked by headstones, and it was from this point we discovered the faint trail leading along the lower edge of the bluff to the point where we found the men and the horses of Smith's troop in what proved to be a cul-de-sac, and men and horses were piled up together, and the odor was such that we did not get down to them, but shoveled dirt from the top covering them in one big grave." Again he repeated this again in another letter 6, in an almost verbatim transcript: "We found the bodies of a number of men and horses of "E" troop. To all appearance they had angled off across the hillside, finally entering a narrow coulee...which proved to be a veritable cul-de-sac, ending with a high bank in front and on both sides of them. Here they were apparently shot down, men and horses together. It was impossible to reach them and we shoveled dirt from the overhanging bank to cover them."
Conclusion:
The Indians do have something to say about this battle, the most important was; what they didn’t have to say. And that is an easy comparison that most find discomforting to their fancy. And what I find fascinating about what they did say, was that Custer’s battle was amazingly brief and that no one can be absolutely sure that Custer and his men were not killed in the twinkling of an eye, when Crazy Horse charged up the deep ravine near the present road and swept over monument hill raising that huge cloud of dust that was observed by Reno and Benteen‘s men. This having occurred before the fall of Keogh and Calhoun. I am reminded here of an old saying, “And the first shall be the last, and the last shall be the first.”
Healthy discussion of the facts are never meant to be disrespectful of any person. And here, I do respect any person’s right to say what he believes, and place it into writing. To begin to understand what happened, one needs to get past the prejudice, cynicism, or hero worship of one individual or group. No one should pass judgment upon the patriotism of those who fought, whether soldier or Indian, for both were Americans fighting for principles which to this day are left unresolved: Just as the Civil War and the atrocities that happened there, we still are all Americans. And whether you are from the South or the North, East or West: Whether you heritage is White, black, Irish, German, Italian or Native American; all who fought on these battlefields were Americans. And no suppression, no ostracizing, no censorship will ever justify the need.
I do not personally criticize any one expert, whether amateur or professional here, nor do I wish to embarrass their intelligence. This battle will always be a work in progress, and perhaps no one can ever definitively say on a point by point basis, what was fact or fiction. For it is through error that we have learned the most. Not that I myself have not made poor errors in judgment, on the contrary, I too am only human, and subject to this as my age advances. Sometimes wisdom and intelligence is not measured by what we do know. Sometimes it’s what we don’t know, and admit that we don’t, that’s makes us wise. As they say, Knowledge is spoken, wisdom is silence.
ref.
1 Reno Court of Inquiry
2 Michno article in Wild West Magazine www.historynet.com/ten-myths-of-the-little-bighorn.htm/4
3 pg. 535 Reno Inquiry
4 pg. 418 RCOI
5 Benteen Goldin Letters, Jan. 15, 1930, pg.27
6 ibid, pg. 19, Oct, 27, 1928,
The famous cracker box incident is usually the profound beginning where Custer immediately attacks the Indian camp. This incident by the way happened before the regiment attained the so called divide, some 12 miles from the LBH river. This "immediate attack" then is spun into an hours long campaign where Benteen is sent off on a wild goose chase Valley Hunting ad infinitum, in a self expressed “senseless“ adventure; Reno is sent off to charge - light brigade style with six shooters on an Indian village of thousands, and Custer was foolish enough to go charging off all alone and was, according to the experts never seen again; and some who usually further charge gross incompetence because Custer didn't listen to his Scouts further blame him for his own demise for splitting the regiment and going too far from his support.
F.F. Girard an interpreter, a "resident in Indian country for 31 years"1 had been assigned to the Indian scouts on the 25th. Here is what Major Reno had to say about receiving information from that source. In response to a question posed at the court, he replied... "He had no right to make any communication with me, officially, I mean....Of course if he had any information to convey to me, I should have listened to him, but I would not have believed it." Of course it was Major Reno who also stated at the Reno Court of Inquiry that "Custer had no plan", an unproven assertion Benteen also claimed. Reno even going so far as not believing that his order to attack that morning was not part of that plan, but was as he put it, "the beginning of the fight”. Now I usually am not one to answer a question with a question. However, I think this one answers itself. If he knew what he was supposed to be doing; was, as he expressed it, “the beginning of the fight,”: How would Reno have known that, if it wasn’t part of Custer’s plan? After all, Custer did order it didn’t he? Taking these two subordinates statements together as one - one does have to wonder, not just the honor in Major Reno's statements, but the problems associated long before that campaign ever began. If there ever was an intelligence gathering scout problem it paled in comparison to the seemingly underlying infantile disability of Custer’s junior officers that was to follow. And this was ever so highlighted by the Ree's themselves at the Tepee about a mile from the LBH, where they refused in a misunderstanding to go forward. For it was here, where Custer then replaced them with Reno‘s battalion. The some 25 Ree Indian Scouts had been ordered to “follow” some fleeing hostile Indians about a half mile away: Custer then replaced them for not acting swiftly, with Reno's battalion, which was then ordered moments after the Ree’s misunderstood refusal, to “attack the village” - according to Reno - instead of merely “following” some Indians as the Scouts had been ordered to do. Even the suggestion that Custer waded in too deep past his support, without proper reconnaissance here pales in comparison with Reno’s blunder! For even to this day; no one supposedly knows exactly what Reno’s orders were! And it is in this light in which Custer is judged.
What most researchers, authors and LBH battle enthusiasts don’t realize is, is that during this period of time, the minutes between ordering Reno forward and minutes later, just after Reno’s departure with his orders: That it was a time filled with scouting reports. For it was during this time that Lt.’s Hare and Varnum returned with vital information concerning the village and the Indians they had observed. Girard the 31 year veteran in Indian territory shouted his seemingly infamous message: And Custer’s interaction with his Indian scouts and guides as numerous as the white scouting reports. It is here; where seemingly, Custer looses thought process control of the situation and makes disastrous mistakes according to those who blame him for such things as: “going too far from support”, “ordering Reno to ’attack’ without support“, and “not keeping his regiment together“. And all of this is based upon one single fact, that: “Custer did or did not Listen to His Scouts.” It seems like Custer can’t win this one, can he? For no matter whether or not he “listened to his scouts”, the end result seems to be the same: From the looks of it Custer went too far away from his support. From the looks of it he ordered Reno to attack all alone and tried to attack himself at Medicine Tail Ford and was repulsed. From the looks of it, in hindsight, it looks like he should have kept his regiment together. .
The purpose of this exercise? If you favor Custer, you blame it on the scouts for faulty information, thus Custer listened to his scouts. If you are against Custer, you blame it on to him, Custer didn’t listen to his scouts. The truth of it is, it could only be one way, not both, yet no one apparently thinks that Lt. Hare’s report nor Varnums had anything to do with Custer’s decisions, nor for that matter F.F. Girards earth shattering sighting of the fleeing Indians or the village, which may or may not have been one and the same.
Village size:
The Indians didn't have an effective way of communicating spatial references, time and distance information at the time. I will let the official record speak for itself. Hear it from the soldiers and civilians who participated in the battle, for it is the only true way of ever knowing where that village lay and its immense size. For the Indians at that time, never understood our cultural conception of time and space, nor for that matter which direction was which, again a cultural difference, not something to be frowned upon, but something that just was.
From the RCOI:
Lt. George Wallace: "The village as passed over afterwards was over three miles long and varying in width from a few hundred yards to a half mile in width from a few hundred yards to a half mile where the tepees had stood. (Seeing the Indian village in defile before him as they moved away on the night of the 26th.) They were moving over country that was almost level. We estimated the village to be two and a half to three miles long and a half a mile wide."
Capt. Moylan: "I think it was certainly three miles, if not more, from end to end as I saw it afterwards. It's average width would be two or three hundred yards. It was a very large village. the Indians estimating it at eighteen hundred lodges...there were also four hundred wikiups." He too described the moving village on the night of the 26th: "It was certainly two and a half or three miles long and it extended on the plain in front of our position across the river, covering nearly half of this plain, which was six miles across. The moving village was probably several hundred yards wide...I think from one quarter to one half a mile would cover the width..."
F.F. Girard: In direct reference to Cheyenne ford, made these statements at the Reno Inquiry, that place the end of the village well "below" (downstream) from this ford. "...As a general thing the Indians encamp in circles, in bands or families, and it was nearly all over the bottom or extended out to the foothills and down below this ford. A large portion of this village was below this ford." The ford that was referenced here, was where the soldiers had found a gray horse down by the river, and Girard as well as Benteen were very clear as to the place where this horse was found and it wasn't point "b", and by its very location was Cheyenne ford; as described by them and others..
Many other soldiers and civilians do weigh in on this issue of Village size and placement throughout the Reno Inquiry, and time and again the story is the same with few exceptions. The Indian side of this story is vastly incomplete without the soldiers who also fought there and were acutely aware of time-space and proper place. And I for one am not willing to call every soldier who testified at the Reno Inquiry a bona fide liar, especially about the size of an Indian village; that just doesn't make any sense. It is very apparent from all the testimony at the Reno Inquiry, that this Village began some 800 yards west of Reno's skirmish line and that it generally followed the rivers course, staying primarily upon the 2nd bench and ended some 3 to 3 and 1/2 miles downstream in a direct line from start to finish near where the present interstate crosses the river and then some. It's width at times being anywhere from a few hundred yards to about a 1/2 mile. To mistake size and extent of this village has a direct impact upon the effects of population - thus numbers of warriors; it also has a direct effect upon the next two subjects.
Ambush:
For as long as this battle has been debated this singular issue, Indian Ambush, perhaps best exemplifies its pitfalls the best. Two questions: a) If the Indians were as surprised, as most of the Indians said they were, then why didn't Reno's charge work? And before answering, see (b) because Custer's column at the time Reno dismounted to fight in the valley was at or past Weir Peak, so one answer depends on the other. b) We know that somewhere in the vicinity of - or on downstream from Weir Peak, Custer made his observation of the “empty village” and wondered where all the Indians were according to Tmptr. John Martin. Yet! Minutes later, approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, if not sooner, he engaged these same sleeping Indians and was wiped out to a man in about as much time as it took for a “hungry man to eat his dinner“ as one of the Indian participants stated! If these Indians were indeed asleep in their tepees at that time, how does one indeed explain the incredible victory over not just one battalion of Custer's command - but two? Think of this, these Sleeping Indians were not only capable of routing two of Custer's battalions, overrunning both and wiping one from the face of the earth; not only in the same amount of time, but at the same time!!!
Of course the best argument on this one are those who say that Custer never got across the river and/or was driven back from Medicine Tail Ford, and that the Indians were already on the east bank engaging Custer‘s men. Isn't it amazing that these Indians who had just been asleep, minutes if not seconds before; could have all have awakened, adorned themselves for battle, assessed the correct direction to go, and have arrived across the river before Custer's arrival, yet they were still surprised by the soldiers arrival? In World War II we remember & honor the Indians service as the Code Talkers, and rightly so. Here at the battle of the LBH, we also remember their service as the Sleep Walkers? Yet it is through no fault of their own that we have come to believe this.
Custer’s Strategy and Tactics:
How can anyone carry on a legitimate if not proper discussion about tactics or even strategy when not one man in Custer's whole command ever admitted that they knew what those supposed tactics were? Reno stated that Custer had "no plan." Benteen concurred with Reno that Custer had no plan, and belittled and berated Custer for the orders given him. All that is left over is assumption. So what does it look like? Indeed it seemed like Benteen was sent off on a wild goose chase, over hill and dale to the left of the trail. And indeed it did seem like Reno was ordered single handedly to attack a huge Indian village without immediate support or hope of relief any time soon. And indeed it did seem like Custer marched off 4 miles distant from any other command just to meet their death on those lonely hills by the monument later constructed in their honor. Knowing this, how could anyone confidently state: That it was the Indians who were surprised, it was these same sleeping Indians who counterattacked Reno and chased him across the river to the top of the bluffs? And then conclude that - Custer‘s strategy was or wasn‘t working? The conundrum of this is that to believe that his strategy and/or tactics failed, most today have him attacking at MTF for one reason or another. And the sightings bear out the timing, that if that was the place, then they indeed were retreating at the same time as Reno and his men were, just as Curley stated. But what doesn’t make sense, is if this MTF attack occurred, why didn’t Custer fall back to the safety of the regiment rather than go to Calhoun about a mile away, and state there as Curley said he did - that they would have to make a stand somewhere. Again Curley’s observations would have or should have told Custer all he needed to know, that there was way too many Indians to continue with his action at or upon the ford, and indeed, just as Curley thought, Custer did quarter back upon a ridge rather than pursue his path to the ford. Custer was too brilliant a tactician to have not realized when he was outnumbered, and obviously at that point, he did recognize the futility in meeting an overwhelming number of foe. At this point in the article I refer the reader to Major Rosser’s letter to Reno in Graham’s Custer Myth, where he states that Custer would have retreated back to the rest of the regiment had this been the case. And then there is that matter of whether or not they were asleep or attacking, surprised or not.
The only way this works is that there were two groups of Indians, attacking both Reno and Custer’s men simultaneously at the same moment in time and lord knows there surely wasn't, was there? What were those Sleep Walkers doing across the river long before Custer's arrival there? Weren't they supposed to be asleep and waiting to be surprised by Custer's arrival there? Apparently not! The Ambush now seems more probable because a significant number of Indians, impossible if not implausible to explain were indeed wide awake and across the river just waiting for Custer as his battalion came over the battlefield near Calhoun Hill! In clearly what should be stated or could be effectively described as, an ambush. "Standing Bear said. Bobtail Horse, who was right there, indicated without hesitation that they were all on the same side as Custer. Two years after the fight, Hump, Brave Wolf and Ice told 5th Infantry Lieutenant Oscar F. Long that the Indians crossed the river before Custer could possibly have forded. They had already gained a small hill on the North side of the Little Bighorn and placed themselves between Custer and the river."2 This sounds like an overwhelming number of non-Sleep Walking Indians who were just waiting to ambush Custer's battalion when they had gone what most expert claim was “too far from support“! Yet this attack according to those same experts happened at Medicine Tail Ford and not on down stream.
It is unfortunate that we must have these inane if not insane discussions about tactics. So much could have been avoided past, present and future had those who knew the truth, fessed up in a timely manner. I have no doubt Custer's strategy and tactics were sound, he was not the type of General to lead that number of men, some 600, give or take, into hostile country and not take great care to see to their safety and his. He had family there also which would have also placed an added burden to have taken extra caution not to have made great errors whether tactical or strategic. Add to this, the fact as some see it, (not I) that he was disobeying his directive from Terry, and that too would have placed a greater burden on the care of his soldiers than anything else. What his strategy and tactics were perhaps no one will ever know, because Benteen and Reno behind a banner of pride in the 7th Cavalry forever buried it along with Custer at the Little Big Horn. Their part in his “plans” in-execution and he and his men’s further execution led to the disaster that befell him and all those who died alongside him.
Reno's 'advance into the valley' was but a shadow of what he claimed it was to be. And Benteen's 'Advance to the Rear' was in direct disobedience to Custer’s orders - just as he himself said at the Reno Inquiry. Yet to this day Reno is still vilified for living in the shadows for years after the battle, and Benteen raised to the level of sainthood for disobeying his orders. And the most humbling fact is; neither told the truth about the strategy nor the tactics Custer employed. Reno lied about his order and then is vilified for not carrying that lied order through. Benteen admits to disobeying the orders Custer gave him, even openly criticizing them, and he is virtually given the Medal of Honor today for doing so simply because according to the men who survived, his action saved the men in Reno and Benteen’s battalions in the end. Does this still to this day justify his self proclaimed disobedience of Custer’s order, as it seemed to justify it then? Benteen would have you believe yes. But had he been where he was supposed to have been, when he was supposed to have been there, as Custer ordered, I am 100 percent sure that Custer and his men would have survived this battle, and the outcome would have been significantly different!
River Crossing Incidents & location:
I think it is fairly clear now that either the Indians were either totally surprised by Custer's attack or that they were not. And this is where this issue rests. If they were surprised and were as Custer said 'asleep in their tepees' when at, near or beyond Weir Peak, then Custer's approach to the river would have been downstream from point 'b', not at point 'b' as most today would have made it (source for not at point 'b'... Reno Inquiry and the above argument). The fords in question then for this activity would have been either Cheyenne ford or ford 'd'. If we are to believe the non-ambush theory then the further testimony of Two Moons provides proof of the opposite. "Warriors were across the river, some going upstream and some going downstream, trying to get on each side of the soldiers." What is compelling about his statement here is that soldiers from Reno's battalion did observe warriors on the east side going upstream during the valley fight, which not only corroborates Two Moons statements but gives more validity to the fact that an ambush was more likely the culprit than the Sleep Walkers he portrays in same discussion. And didn’t trumpeter Martin say that he had observed Custer’s men “ambushed”?
What I do find ludicrous is that most of the so called experts in the field today will tell you in regards to Custer being killed at the river, that it quite simply did not happen. But then will go on to state that when they arrived at Medicine Tail Ford, that Custer met an “alarmed village” and not a “sleeping one”. And yet being unreceptive to the possibility that Custer could have been wounded there at the river, instead of being killed: Especially when we know Custer was hit in the chest and White Man Runs Him’s statement confirmed that wound saying in effect that: he, White Man Runs Him “didn’t see Custer, but heard later that Custer was hit in the chest by a bullet and fell into the water"; is not confirmation that - that person died, or was killed right then and there in the river, else where would water possibly be found!? But a wound that would later be fatal makes any deniable comment ludicrous at best! And their assertions that Custer never made it to or across the river, when obviously such an action at that point in time was what was needed, once again points to Custer’s ignorance, or lack of preparation quite impossible to believe: For he did send 5 men from co. E ahead, a fact that many experts had to have known, but overlook. Just like they overlook the Indian stated fact that Custer may very well, and likely was "wounded" at that ford! Is this a pick and choose what you believe moment - between the Indian statements? Or were what they said, something else, somewhere else?
Crazy Horse’s Ravine:
There isn't a one of us that doesn't like to go against the odds. But this subject itself revolves around a somewhat reclusive person where more speculation than fact has been written or for that matter known about. Edward Godfrey recorded Gall as saying, “Crazy Horse went to the extreme north end of the camp.' He turned right and went up a very deep ravine and 'he came very close to the soldiers on the north side.” Godfrey by the way in response to the effective fighting force of that village, at the Reno Inquiry said, "...it would take at least 3,000 (warriors) to cover the ground I saw." And the ground he saw? "My company, along with several others, was detailed on the 27th, I think it was, to destroy the tepee poles and the camp material that was left in the village, and we could not begin to touch it."
The location of Crazy Horses approach has been shifted here and there over the years. Some try to say he went up Deep Ravine, others up Deep Coulee. Yet here in a clear statement Gall through Godfrey told us the truth. What those who believe different try to do is say that the Indians directions are different than the whites, that their North is really our East, etc. So to make sense out of all of this they adduce that it must have been the farthest east ford, thus Medicine Tail Ford that he used. What they forget in this instance is who was relating the story, Gall or Godfrey? No, North was and is still North and East was and is still East, and no we don’t need no more earth changing myths to explain one, Gall didn’t use one and as it appears neither did Edward Godfrey as he related it. In fact, any person who has ever been to the battlefield will tell you that there is "a very deep ravine" that extends westerly from where the monument stands! Anyone, black, white, Spanish, Russian, Chilean, Vietnamese, Indian, British, South African, Native American, and in the words of Benteen “ad infinitum” standing on Monument Hill can see that "deep ravine" and know that it is a "very deep ravine" where the road ascends! However; there is more than one! Just because someone decided to dub a steeply shallowing basin with a deeper ravine within, Deep Ravine, doesn't mean there aren't others, and therefore, just because someone mentions one by that same name, doesn't mean that it is that same one.
Custer’s Last Stand:
Richard Fox and his research has provided to the Custer story much more than what we have ever had in the past. His efforts should be applauded not rejected and as the modern term has been applied, “thrown under the bus.” That being said, it is very difficult to establish anything credible upon a non-pristine battle site. And this is a non-pristine battle site. Souvenir hunters, exhibitionist, and ceremonial enactments, buildings and the cemetery and the monument itself have all made an impact upon the battlefield that archaeology can never recover. Still we must take what we can, sort through the rest, and hope for the best. The problem with any research around the immediate area where Custer was killed is the disturbance of the soil and how deep some of that material was buried and/or removed. Many of the bones were buried beneath the monument and as was noted some 10 to 12 feet of soil was removed above for this this marker before its placement. This disturbance alone has caused irreparable damage to the battle site, not to mention the buildings and the cemetery, absolutely none of this could ever hoped be recovered! The other factors in this are the outlying areas just outside of the park boundaries, ie. the private lands that surround the park, including where the Indian village was. It is unknown how far Custer and his troopers may have advanced before being chased back to Monument Hill. Some have suggested as far as ford “d.” Critical studies, deep penetrating radar, metal detectors etc. from the park boundaries through private lands to those points need to be undertaken to fully understand and appreciate the extent of Custer's advance. And we wont know that until this is done.
What the warriors do agree upon is the length of this battle. And it is very short, not over 15 to 20 minutes in duration a fact most experts seemed reluctant to point out. Once again the ambush theory seems to raise its ugly head. And this specter cant be refused. Whether an ambush as such was plotted or whether it just fell by accident into the Indians hands, as a matter of fact, it happened. There was little time for organization on either side and from the cartridge cases mentioned at the Reno Inquiry we know that at the Calhoun sector the soldiers expended some 25 to 30 shells before loosing organizational cohesion. While it sounds like a lot, it isn't. A good professional soldier could load and accurately fire his carbine at a rate of 3 to 4 rounds a minute. Now start dividing the shell casings by the rounds per minute. That’s how long that battle lasted at Calhoun hill, from 8 to 10 minutes. And if that rate was slower, say, 1 every 1/2 minute? 15 minutes. This answer seems to closely match the 15 - 20 minutes that the Indians usually associated as the length of the entire battle there. Some say Calhoun hill was the first to fall, and if it was, and the battle did last 20 minutes and it fell on the 15th minute, then Custer and his little band on Monument Hill had but 0-5 minutes to say their prayers. This is called a stand? Whether or not one agrees with the archaeology or not, Richard Fox's findings are not far from the truth, in fact I would rather trust his findings than of the Indians who were warned not to say anything, and afraid to tell the truth because of reprisals. Many times, no, not all, but many times they told lies because of that fear, and this "last stand" grandstand pandering was one of them; and I might add, one that would never be told any other way because of obvious reasons, does starvation & freezing to death ring any bells(?), and no, not because it was the truth, quite the opposite: Because it was the lie they the "whites" at the time needed to hear the most.
Did 28 troopers die in Deep Ravine?
Of course they didn’t, however, 22 did! Two compelling points.
A): Deep Ravine is a huge, long ravine, and it even extends outside of the present National Monument or Park boundary down by the river. Could or did these soldiers die outside of the park boundary down by the river in Deep Ravine? This question is compelling because of the recent discoveries made on private lands near here. Most experts on this issue like to place this Deep Ravine event and the soldiers connected with it at the end of the struggle. But here, at or near Cheyenne Ford, what is suggested is that some kind of stand near the river was attempted by the company E early in the Battle. And that upon their retreat from that ford nearly 1/2 of that company was killed in a ravine near the river, while the other 1/2 managed to escape before being overwhelmed near the SSL position.
B): There were and still are many other Deep Ravines around this area, (stand on Monument Hill and tell me which one isn‘t deep), just because a deep ravine was mentioned as their final resting place, doesn't mean that it was the Deep Ravine of legend and lore.
Captain, T.M. McDougall, 3(Examining Custer Battlefield or the route Gen. Custer took.) "I only went to where I presume the skirmish line was killed. About a hundred yards from the ford where I crossed." (He named this ford as "B", but because no soldiers, as far as we know, were ever buried within 100 yards of ford "B", could he have meant Cheyenne ford or Ford “d“? Either way, this 100 yards from any ford is no where near the South Skirmish Line or the supposed burial site of Company E’s SSL or for that matter Monument Hill, the Keogh position nor Calhoun Hill.) "Major Reno then ordered me to take my company and go to the village, and get implements to bury the dead. On returning he ordered me to bury E company," (E company being the ones killed in Deep Ravine, and were the ones according to Capt. McDougall, where "the skirmish line was killed." within a 100 yards from a ford and now we find that this same E company is), "the one I had formerly commanded for 5 years, and to identify the men as far as possible. I found most of them in a ravine... I did not see any bodies but of the one company in the ravine. (Here in this ravine marked "H" on the Maguire map)..."is where most of Company E were found to the best of my recollection, about half (22) were in the ravine and the other half (28) on a line (SSL) outside. I thought they fought the best they could and probably were attacked from both sides."
Captain F. Benteen, 4: He reports the number of dead in the ravine as 22. (There were bodies found in a ravine towards the river from where Gen. Custer was found. They were found) “probably within 50 to 75 yards (of the river.) If I am not mistaken there were 22 (bodies). They could not shoot out of the ravine and they certainly could did not go into it to shoot out of it. Those men (in the ravine) were killed, as I believe, by the Indians with stones and clubs in that ravine, they were unarmed. I think they were wounded men. The men had gone into the ravine, as the Indians say, possibly to hide. I did not examine them at all. I rode along the ravine and looked down. The bodies had been counted by others. I made no personal examination of them...There was a trail, I think, probably a hundred yards or so above (upstream from) that ravine.”..
Theodore Goldin in a Letter to Albert Johnson, 5: "I formed my opinion on what we saw when visiting the field on the 27th with Bradley and again on the 28th...we turned in at an opening following a well-marked trail of shod horses not very far from the southwest corner of the present fenced enclosure this brought us to the first group of several soldiers, now marked by headstones, and it was from this point we discovered the faint trail leading along the lower edge of the bluff to the point where we found the men and the horses of Smith's troop in what proved to be a cul-de-sac, and men and horses were piled up together, and the odor was such that we did not get down to them, but shoveled dirt from the top covering them in one big grave." Again he repeated this again in another letter 6, in an almost verbatim transcript: "We found the bodies of a number of men and horses of "E" troop. To all appearance they had angled off across the hillside, finally entering a narrow coulee...which proved to be a veritable cul-de-sac, ending with a high bank in front and on both sides of them. Here they were apparently shot down, men and horses together. It was impossible to reach them and we shoveled dirt from the overhanging bank to cover them."
Conclusion:
The Indians do have something to say about this battle, the most important was; what they didn’t have to say. And that is an easy comparison that most find discomforting to their fancy. And what I find fascinating about what they did say, was that Custer’s battle was amazingly brief and that no one can be absolutely sure that Custer and his men were not killed in the twinkling of an eye, when Crazy Horse charged up the deep ravine near the present road and swept over monument hill raising that huge cloud of dust that was observed by Reno and Benteen‘s men. This having occurred before the fall of Keogh and Calhoun. I am reminded here of an old saying, “And the first shall be the last, and the last shall be the first.”
Healthy discussion of the facts are never meant to be disrespectful of any person. And here, I do respect any person’s right to say what he believes, and place it into writing. To begin to understand what happened, one needs to get past the prejudice, cynicism, or hero worship of one individual or group. No one should pass judgment upon the patriotism of those who fought, whether soldier or Indian, for both were Americans fighting for principles which to this day are left unresolved: Just as the Civil War and the atrocities that happened there, we still are all Americans. And whether you are from the South or the North, East or West: Whether you heritage is White, black, Irish, German, Italian or Native American; all who fought on these battlefields were Americans. And no suppression, no ostracizing, no censorship will ever justify the need.
I do not personally criticize any one expert, whether amateur or professional here, nor do I wish to embarrass their intelligence. This battle will always be a work in progress, and perhaps no one can ever definitively say on a point by point basis, what was fact or fiction. For it is through error that we have learned the most. Not that I myself have not made poor errors in judgment, on the contrary, I too am only human, and subject to this as my age advances. Sometimes wisdom and intelligence is not measured by what we do know. Sometimes it’s what we don’t know, and admit that we don’t, that’s makes us wise. As they say, Knowledge is spoken, wisdom is silence.
ref.
1 Reno Court of Inquiry
2 Michno article in Wild West Magazine www.historynet.com/ten-myths-of-the-little-bighorn.htm/4
3 pg. 535 Reno Inquiry
4 pg. 418 RCOI
5 Benteen Goldin Letters, Jan. 15, 1930, pg.27
6 ibid, pg. 19, Oct, 27, 1928,
