cowards, skirmish lines & tactics

[tbw]

I think way to many people today view the skirmish lines that was used in the Civil War and by Custer's men as a bulwark of invincibility no matter who their foe was. Several things do seem to make these kinds of views susceptible to believing something that just wasn't true.

For a good review of those skirmish lines and their vulnerabilities see

The last battle of the Civil War: Palmetto Ranch

Pg 96+

&

Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: a political, social, and military ... By David Stephen Heidler, Jeanne T. Heidler, David J. Coles

Pg 1918

One thing that did play into the factors that could and did beat the skirmish lines wasn't just firepower, it was mobility. One of the eyewitnesses to Custer's demise, Foolish Elk described a tactic used by Crazy Horse using that mobility against Custer's skirmish lines. What he did to accomplish this demonstrated a leadership ability which none today think the natives had. In the latter stages of the Custer fight Crazy Horse led a charge hitting a portion head on of one of the skirmish lines there. All of a sudden the Indians split and immediately flanked that skirmish line from both sides which caused its entire destruction. The tactic effectively neutralized and at the same time robbed that skirmish line of
its concentrated firepower and decreased mobility to prevent in a timely manner its total destruction.

The other thing is; many today equate manpower with firepower and vice-versa. The main problem with this was that not every soldier will fight. S.L.A. Marshall concluded in his book, Men Against Fire, that up to 85%, and at least 70% of the men in company along a battle line will not fire. This was in WWII where the training and in many cases the experience should have been there, but wasn't. Only after WWII was these issues addressed. As they were never addressed successfully prior to WWII, one can only imagine the percentage of Custer's troops who didn't fire, but considering the new recruits into his outfit along with decreasing numbers of Civil War veterans, his once proud elite band of men who did what they did in 1868, wouldn't be able to withstand the firepower of the warriors if they didn't even fire their own weapons. The heart of this problem lay in the dispersed nature of troops on the line. And believe it or not, supervising dispersed troops is a lot more difficult than it was for a massed horde Indians.

S.L.A. Marshall "...when the companies were interviewed at a full assembly... we found that on an average not more than 15 percent of the men had actually fired at the enemy positions or personnel with rifles, carbines, grenades, bazookas, BARs, or machine guns during the course of an entire engagement..." Simply put, out of
about 100 men along a skirmish line of fire, only about 15 men would participate. I think that says volumes for Reno's and Custer's skirmish lines; and why so few warriors were reported as killed or wounded.

Marshall wasn't arguing that 80 percent of those not firing were cowards. They were often prepared to do other duties, such as carry ammunition, help with the wounded, carry messages, etc. Things that in many an instance would have put them in more danger than those few who were firing. And what it came down to was what Marshall termed, the “fear of killing rather than fear of being killed was the most common cause of battle failure in the individual.” Like at the LBH battle, these men were prepared to stay their ground and face death as readily as those who were firing, they just had overpowering inhibitions against killing another
human being, which their military training had not been able to overcome or adequately prepare them for, and in 1876, that training was woefully lacking.

[joewiggs]

It is my belief that a skirmish/firing line is only potent when the members are led and directed by commanders who are firm, diligent, and capable of obtaining the maximum participation of personnel.

Battle studies of World War ll concluded that up to 85% but, more commonly, 70% will not fire from the line. During the Korea War men who fired their weapons from the line increased to 55%. A direct result of enhanced training.

One problem with the "line" is that men tend to draw closer together. The closer the enemy advances the more the line tends to compress.

Men will always bunch unless they are consistently told by voice to stop! If leadership deteriorates, or is poor from the start, crowding increases as the enemy draws nearer.

Unfortunately Reno's leadership, or lack thereof, resulted in an extremely poor showing.

At a critical moment in time, Godfrey found himself in a terrible position when Weir, French, and others fled from Weir's Point when accosted by the empowered and inflamed warriors. Godfrey, with one troop, was able to force the warriors back and prevent the rest of the command from being overwhelmed.

In summation, Godfrey was able to do with one troop that Reno could not do with three.

In the era of this battle, the skirmish line was the most potent offensive weapon available.

[Cutter]

Yup, when watching war flicks with my father, he would always say " keep your interval".