The Court Martial of General George A. Custer.

[tbw]

The Court Martial of General George A. Custer for his conduct at the LBH June 25th 1876.

I would like to say a few words before we go down this road. First of all, what I would like to do here is start a series of these kinds of presentations where we discuss, at length, and in depth, the case against George A. Custer. Not Major Reno. Not F. Benteen or for that matter any other person who was there that day. It, of course, can be expected that these individuals names will come up during the course of our investigations. They are however, immune from prosecution, blame or any other lambasting to make your points on this thread . In due time, I would also like to do the same thing for those individuals, so save your arguments, merits or demerits, for them there. Remember, what you present here can be and most assuredly will be used against you in the follow on trials in their cases. [Watch your own conduct here Councillor]. What I don't want to do is have to go through three or more of these at the same time. So I ask you not to make this thread about anyone else but the innocence or the guilt of one Gen. George A. Custer. With this strongly in mind, I present the opening remarks and any of yours for: The Case For or Against George A. Custer.

Pursuant to the establishment of the facts in this case. The charges are.

1. Conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline leading to rash behavior that led to the disaster at Little Bighorn in 1876.

a. Custer should have been devoting his time, energy, forces and resources to pursuing the Indians. First as directed by his superior officer and 2nd, after departing for the LBH, whereupon he exhibited the above stated rash judgement and behavior to the exclusion of any and all military reason, function or practice.

b. He sent both Major Reno and Capt. Benteen on missions, neither of which make any sense in relation to where he, Custer finally ended up. Benteen stated his orders as quote "senseless". Reno after haveing been told he would be supported, wasn't by any other command supported on the valley floor, where that support was needed. And in the face of incredible odds was forced to retreat to save his command. Clearly Custer's conduct didn't establish the size, strength or exact location or disposition of the enemy force they were about to attack before he gave Reno and Benteen their orders, whereupon he exhibited the above stated rash judgement and behavior to the exclusion of any and all military reason, function or practice.

2. He left the trail Gen. Terry instructed him to take for the LBH without proper authority from his superior. Clearly a matter of insubordination.

Next council please...

[joewiggs]

In response to the allegations of failing to follow the direction of a superior officer and, as counsel for the defendant, General G.A. Custer the following Plea is respectfully and humbly submitted: Not Guilty!

The defendant received a military assignment of prodigious proportion in that the location of the enemy was emphatically unknown to all army personnel. An approximate location of the quarry (Yellowstone near the Tongue River- by Major Reno reconnaissance) ascertained on June 19Th, revealed the last know location of the Sioux Camp.

Due to the proclivity of the hostiles to move their camps quickly and without notice, the last mentioned information was of no value to my client, as a means of contact, as he did not receive his orders from General Terry until the on the morning of June 22, 1876.

General Terry comprehended the necessity of developing and assigning a military column which was highly mobile, strong, and better provided for with scouts, to over take overtake the village wherever it might be presently. Once located such a unit would be in position to provoke fear and consternation among the Indian camp.

The aforementioned column would then, barring any unforeseen circumstances, strike the village unsupported, then drive said village toward a blocking station occupied by slower units who would be in a position to capture fleeing refugees.

In accordance with these objectives, General Terry allowed General Custer full discretion whilst recommending him a course to follow, while cautioning my client not to allow the Indians to escape eastward.

Unfortunately, General Terry's plan encountered some major surprises that would bring disaster which resulted in a series of acrimonious accusations and scapegoating by warping facts to suit partisan interests.

As to the second Count, Rash Judgment, the following plea is respectfully and humbly submitted: Not Guilty!

On June 24, massive signs and a plurality of Indian trails signified the apparent cohesion of several clans of Indians suitable enough in numbers to eradicate the much smaller and slower command of Terry and Gibbons although the exact location of this formidable Indian camp could not, as yet, be demised. These circumstances would dictate that an aggressive and earnest attempt to ascertain the specific location of the recalcitrant fugitives be accomplished as soon as possible. Please note, that Generals Sheridan, Sherman, Terry , and my clients were certain that either column could hold its own if confronted by the enemy, general Custer's even more so. Only after the fatal outcome of this battle did these same individuals opined otherwise.

After discovering a potential target area from an area known as the "Crow's Nest", further signs led toward a huge encampment in the general direction of an area presently known as the "Lone Tepee." From that location, my client committed his forces into a reconnaissance-In- Force movement to ensure that the general vicinity of the target would be dealt with as the exact location of the village was still unknown. It was believed that a pincer movement of one column striking left, another striking center, and the third striking right would, simultaneously, drive the vast majority of inhabitants toward the blocking position of General Terry-Gibbons.

Although this action,momentarily, reduced the fighting power of my client's force, to have maintained a united front while moving toward a position still unknown would have invited the Indians to flee, disperse, then re-converge at other locations as they are apt to do when ever being confronted by a strong force.

The failure of the units under the command of my client's subalterns to reunite and come to his aid is the solitary cause for the ultimate defeat of my client's command.

In addition, we shall present information that numerous witnesses committed perjury during the Reno Inquiry with the sole purpose to straddle men who could no longer speak with the damning responsibility for the failure of this venture.

It is our belief that numerous senior commanders of the Army induced witnesses at the Reno Inquiry to permeate the false impression that my client failed to give any directives/orders during this campaign, an allegation that is patently false and goes against the very grain of my client's personality and military bearing.

[whitebull]

I dunno, I just can't get into those conspiracy theories like the bullet that made a left turn before finally killing Kennedy, or those who believe that every senator or representative is on the take. what you say makes sense but I just can't let go of the fact that the board at the inquiry heard the soldiers testify but didn't say anything about that information being out of the normal.

Custer was know for being ready to jump into the fray without thinking about the circumstances. Don't get me wrong, I don't dislike the man. He was one hell of a soldier. But, why not keep all the columns together, charge the village, and be glad with what you got even if most of them get away?

Why push men and horses to the point of falling down just to be sure that nobody got away? I just believe that Custer was just a little too ready to jump the Indians and may have slipped up doing what he did.

[tbw]

The first witness is called to the stand: Fredrick Benteen

[Credits... From Benteen's JUly 4th 1876 letter. Nothing has been changed in his text. Additions were made for clarity and brackets were used there.]

Q. How many miles did you march the first day, the 22nd?

A. Custer, with the 7th Cavalry left the Steamer "Far West," Genl. Terry and Genl. Gibbon's command and moved up the Rosebud, marching 12 miles-

Q. And how many on the 23rd?

A. the next day we marched 35 miles up the same stream.

Q. And how many on the 24th?

A. The next day we marched 35 more miles up same stream and went into bivouac, remaining until 12 o'clock P. M.

Q. How far was it from there where your recieved your first orders?

A. We then marched until about daylight, making about 10 miles; about half past five we started again and after going 6 or 7 miles we halted and officers' call was sounded. We were asked how many men of the companies were with the Co. Packs and instructed that only six could remain with them-and the discourse wound up with-that we should see that the men were supplied with the quantity of ammunition as had been specified in orders and that the 1st Co. that reported itself in readiness should be the advance Co. I knew that my Co. was in the desired condition and it being near the point of assembly I went to it, assured myself of same, then announced to Genl. Custer that "H" Co. was ready; he replied the Advance is yours, Col. Benteen.

Q. How far was it from where you recieved those company orders to where you were given your battalion orders to march to the left?

A. We then moved four or five miles and halted between the slopes of two hills and the Regt. was divided into Battalions -- Reno getting Co's. "A. G. and M." I getting "D. H. K." From that point I was ordered with my Battn. to go over the immense hills to the left, in search of the valley, which was supposed to be very near by and to pitch into anything I came across-and to inform Custer at once if I found anything worthy of same.

Q. How far did you go before abandoning those orders?

A. Well, I suppose I went up and down those hills for 10 miles -- and still no valley anywhere in sight, the horses were fast giving out from steady climbing-and as my orders had been fulfilled I struck diagonally for the trail the command had marched on, getting to it just before the Pack train got there -- or on the trail just ahead of it.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I then marched rapidly and after about 6 or 7 miles came upon a burning tepee in which was the body of an indian on a scaffold, arrayed gorgeously. None of the command was in sight at this time.

Q. Please describe the terrain from the tepee there to the valley where Major Reno was. And tell us what you did then.

A. The ground from this [tepee] to the valley was descending but very rough. I kept up my trot and when I reached a point very near the ford which was crossed by Reno's Battn. I got my first sight of the Valley and river -- and Reno's command in full flight for the bluffs to the side I was then on. Of course I joined them at once.

Q. When you recieved the note from Martin how far were you from the village?

A. When I received it I was five or six miles from the village, perhaps more, and the packs at least that distance in my rear. I did not go back for the packs but kept on a stiff trot for the village.

Q. What did you see when you arrived there; where you first saw the village?

A. I saw an immense number of Indians on the plain, mounted of course and charging down on some dismounted men of Reno's command; the balance of R's command were mounted, and flying for dear life to the bluffs on the same side of river that I was.

Q. Where were you at the time?

A. at top of hill so that the valley could be seen

Q. Tell us, if you know, what Custers actions were there according to your knowledge and/or observations as you believed it happened.

A. Custer sent him [Reno] in there and promised to support him after Reno started in, Custer with his five Co's instead of crossing the ford went to the right around some high bluffs -- with the intention -- as is supposed -- of striking the rear of the village; from the bluff on which he got he had his first glimpse of the whole of it, and I can tell you 'twas an immense one. From that point Cooke sent the note to me by Martin, I suppose after the five Co's had closed up somewhat Custer started down for the village, all throats bursting themselves with cheering.. He had 3 or 4 miles to go before he got to a ford-as the Village was on the plain on opposite side to Custer's column. So, when he got over those 4 miles of rough country and reached the ford, the indians had availed themselves of the timely information given by the cheering -- as to the whereabouts and intentions of that column, and had arrangements completed to receive it.

Q. In your opinion and based upon your own observations, do you think any of Custer's men got into the village?


A. Whether the indians allowed Custer's column to cross at all, is a mooted question, but I am of the opinion that nearly if not all of the five companies got into the village -- but were driven out immediately -- flying in great disorder and crossing by two instead of the one ford by which they entered. "E" Co. going by the left and "F. I. and L." by the same one they crossed. What became of "C" Co. no one knows -- they must have charged there below the village, gotten away, or have been killed in the bluffs on the village side of stream -- as very few of "C" Co. horses are found. Jack Sturgis and Porter's clothes were found in the Village. After the indians had driven them across, it was a regular buffalo hunt for them and not a man escaped.

A Crow indian, one of our scouts who got in the village, reported that our men killed a great many of them -- quite as many, if not more, than was killed of ours. The indians during the night got to fighting among themselves and killed each other -- so the Crow said -- he also said as soon as he got possession of a Sioux blanket, not the slightest attention was paid to him. There was among them Cheyennes, Arrapahoes, Kiowa and representatives probably from every Agency on the Mo. River. A host of them there sure.

Q. Explain the move you and Reno made downstream towards Custer and why?

A. We halted for the packs to come up -- and then moved along the line of bluffs towards the direction Custer was supposed to have gone in. Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back. We then showed our full force on the hills with Guidons flying, that Custer might see us, but we could see nothing of him, couldn't hear much firing, but could see immense body of Indians coming to attack us from both sides of the river.


Q. You were forced back were you?

A. We withdrew to a saucer like hill, putting our horses and packs in the bottom of saucer and threw all of our force dismounted around this corral; the animals could be riddled from only one point but we had not men enough to extend our line to that -- so we could not get it-therefore the indians amused themselves by shooting at our stock, ditto, men -- but they, the men, could cover themselves. Both of my horses were wounded.

Q. They besieged you there, for how long?

A. Well they pounded at us all of what was left of the 1st day and the whole of the 2d day -- withdrawing their line with the withdrawal of their village, which was at dusk the 2d day.

Q. What were your casualties there?

A. Corporal Loll, Meador and Jones were killed; Sergt. Pahl, both of the Bishops, Phillips, Windolph, Black, Severs, Cooper, etc. wounded. I got a slight scratch on my right thumb.

Q. When did Gen. Terry's column arrive?

A. Genl. Terry, with Genl. Gibbon's command came up the morning of the 3d day, about 10 o'clock. Indians had all gone the night before.

Q. I believe you've made statements before indicating that you don't think Custer followed his orders from Terry. Why do you think this?

A. Had Custer carried out the orders he got from Genl. Terry, the commands would have formed a junction exactly at the village, and have captured the whole outfit of tepees, etc. and probably any quantity of squaws, pappooses, etc. but Custer disobeyed orders from the fact of not wanting any other command -- or body to have a finger in the pie-and thereby lost his life.

[tbw]

Benteen testimony continued...

(Credit, from the RCOI. Once again the words are Benteens. The only thing thats changed is where I use brackets.]

Q. Going back to when the orders were given for the formation of the battalions; why do you think that particular spot was chosen?

A. I suppose that place was selected so as to hide us from any Indians, were any in sight, or in that vicinity.

Q. About how much time elapsed between the time you left at 5 am that morning and when the officers call was called and your company was given the advance?

A. probably 4 hours.

Q. Describe where it was that you separated from Gen. Custer's column, what orders if any, did you receive at the time as to what you were to do, and where you were to go?

A. I have described the country; we were halted in a kind of valley surrounded by high hills; it was a series of rough bluffs.

My orders were to proceed out into a line of bluffs about 4 or 5 miles away, to pitch into anything I came across and to send back word to General Custer at once if I came across anything.

Q. Describe the direction [and] angle of separation TO the route you had been going when your column separated from that of General Custer?

A. It was about an angle of 45 degrees, which is a left oblique.

Q. Describe your route back and where you struck the trail?

A. The route was the same as going over, bearing to the right. At the same angle going back, at a right oblique.

Q. Describe the terrain from the point where you were sent from to where you were sent and please explain why you thought you had accomplished your mission by fulfilling your orders as you have previously stated?

A. The ground was very rugged and we had to go through defiles and around high bluffs to get to the point to which I had been sent, I went to the second line of bluffs and saw no valley; and I knew the Indians had too much sense to go to any place over such a country; that if they had to go to any point in that direction, they had a much better way to go. The last I saw of the column was the gray horse troop at a dead gallop. I had an idea that General Custer was mistaken as to there being no Indians in that vicinity.

Q. What made you believe Gen. Custer was mistaken about there being no Indians in that vicinity? Did you see signs of them or see something to make you believe he was wrong?

A. there were no Indians there and no valleys, I thought my duty was to go back to the trail and join the command.

Q. You were valley hunting were you?

A. Valley hunting ad infinitum.

Q. Why? Did you have orders to hunt valleys rather than Indians?

A. I was sent off to hunt up some Indians. My orders were to proceed out into a line of bluffs about 4 or 5 miles away, to pitch into anything I came across and to send back word to General Custer at once if I came across anything. I had gone about a mile when I received instructions through the Chief Trumpeter of the regiment; - if I found nothing before reaching the first line of bluffs, to go on to the second line with the same instructions. I had gone, I suppose, a mile further, when I received orders through the Sergeant Maj. of the regiment, that if I saw nothing from the second line of bluffs, then to go on into the valley; and if there was nothing in the valley to go on to the next valley.

[tbw]

Benteen continued....

Q. State whether any reasonable construction of the orders you did receive, would be that you were to go "Valley hunting ad infinitum" with reference to your separation from his column?

A. I might have gone on 28 miles in a stralght line without finding a valley, still I was to go to the firbt valley., and if I did not find any Indians there, I was to go to the next valley.

Q. Would that be a reasonable interpretation of that order?

A Those were the exact orders. No interpretation at all. I at least had to go to the second valley. I don't know what, stream is next west of that.

Q; As to what your orders were, you stated "Valley hunting ad infinitun".. Do you mean that was the order or the conclusion of your own mind?

A. That is the way I would like to have it. That is the way I understood it. I understood it as rather a senseless order . We were on the main trail of the Indians; there were plenty of them on that trail; we had passed through immense villages the preceding days, and it was scarcely worth while hunting up any more, We know there were 8 or 10000 Indians on the trail we were on.

Q. Please repeat the order which General Custer gave you when you left with your column to go to tfie left.

A. He told me, pointing to a line of bluffs, to go to that line of bluffs; or at first to send an officer with 5 or 6 men to ride rapidly to that line of bluffs. I was to follow with the battalion; he was simply the advance guard, and if I came across anything before I got to that line of bluffs, to pitch into them and send word back to him at once; then an order came to me by the Chief Trumpeter that if I found nothing at the first line of bluffs, to go to the second line, and I was supposed to carry out the pitching in business and the reporting to him; then the Sergt. 14aj,. brought the order about valley hunting; to go to the first valley and if there were no Indians in the first valley, to go on to the second valley. I su-pposed the "reporting" and "pitching in" were sequences.

Q. Could either yourself or General Custer at that time have known what was behind that line of bluffs without sending someone to ascertain?

A. Hie could have found out by following the trail he was on.

Q. Was there any limitation, verbal or written, in regard to the distance you should go in the direction you were sent?

A. No limitations only as to the valleys.

Q. That limitation was to consist in finding the second valley which you did not find?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You stated that you went to the 2nd line of bluffs, but not to the 2nd valley, which you said you didn't see. State whether or not in bearing to the right to strike the main trail from those bluffs whether or not you complied with the instructions he had given you?

A. I was scarcely in compliance.

Q. Did you consider it a violation of his instructions?

A. I must say I did.

[tbw]

Benteen continued...

Q. Do you think General Custer formed [any] plan of attack on that day; if so, what grounds have you for thinking so?

A, I think after he sent Major Reno across to charge the Indians, his intentions were to get in the rear of the village and attack them from the left. His plan of attack was therefore known only to himself and not to Major Reno, for he must naturally expect his assistance to come from
the rear and not from the front.

Q. What I was trying to get at, was, from the route taken by the different columns and the route taken by your own whether or not [Gen. Custer] would come in ultimately the same way. And because of this, was it not true from the nature of your instructions, that you were going to the left, and if you found any Indians to drive them down that way.

A. I was to pitch into them and let him know: and then I expected him to come back to me. And if I had found them the distance would have been so great that we would have been wiped out before he could get to us.

If there had been any plan of battle, enough of that plan would have been communicated to me, so that I would have known what to do under certain circumstances, Not having done that, I do not believe there was any plan. In Gen. Custer's mind there was a belief that there were no Indians nor any village.

Q. Was or was not the orders [Custer issued you] evidence to your mind that whichever command
found the Indians or the hostile Village, the entire command was as far as practicable to cooperate in engaging or attacking the Indians?
A. As a matter of course.

Q. When two columns such as yours and General Custerqs are in quest of Indians, would it not be the duty of the one which found the Indians to notify the other?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did you not receive such notification from General Custer at the hands of Trumpeter Marttin?

A, I received an order to "Come on - be quick, big village -- bring packs,- Bring packs'. He then had found - I wish to say - before that order reached me, that, I believe that General Custer and his whole command were dead.

Q. From the order sent to you at that time, to be quick and bring the packs, was it not manifest that he expected you would be within commUnicating distance of the packtrain?

A. I suppose he had found what he had sent me out to find as you premnise, and wanted me quickly as possible, and I got there as quickly is I could. I could not possibly tell what he may have thought. If it is a guess, I can guess, but how close I will be I don't know.

Q About how far from the ford A did you receive your order from Lieut. Cook?

A. About two miles.

Q. How far from the ford A did you receive your first orders from Gen.Custer?

A. Having gone to the left and come back again, it is hard to say; I suppose it was about 15 miles in a direct line.

Q. About how far from that tepee where you found the dead Warrior was it where Gen. Custer gave you the order to diverge with your battalion?

A, About eleven miles.

q. How soon did you pass from the sight of the column after you received your orders?

A. Probably three quarters of an hour.

Q. How far towards the tepee do you suppose the column had advanced when you lost sight of it?

A. The only company I saw was the gray horse company, and they were on a fast gallop. They could have gone down there in an hour and three quarters or two hours at the farthest.

Q. In reference to the distance, how far do you suppose the command of General Custer was from the tepee at the time you lost sight of the column?

A. I could not tell it might have been 5 or 6 miles or more.

Q. You were not in sight at the time the column reached the tepee?

A. I could not see that column, and I think it was impossible for them to see me.

Q. Was any order afterwards sent to you to join Major Reno or to assist him?

A. Never.

Q. The order sent to you was to join Gen. Custer and assist him?

A. By Trumpeter M4artin was the only one I got.

[tbw]

Benteen Cont...

Q. As you had proceeded to the left and Major Reno had kept rather straight ahead, would he not know that you were still to his rear, and would doubtless be following the same trail when you joined it? From the route taken by your own battalion and the route taken by the other columns would he have any reason to believe the contrary?

A. No; nor would he have any reason to believe that. I scarcely knew what I had to do, and how could Major Reno have known? He had no right to expect any assistance whatever from me.

Q. you stated that your departure to the right was in your judgment a departure from the instructions you received from General Custer, I wish you in justice to yourself, to state whether that was not the direction in which you afterwards found Major Reno.

A. I did not find the first valley and therefore did not go to the second; but returned to the trail because I thought I would be needed there. I had ascertained more about that country than General Custer and his Adjutant knew.

Q. Was or was not the orders [Custer issued you] evidence to your mind that whichever command found the Indians or the hostile Village, the entire command was as far as practicable to cooperate in engaging or attacking the Indians?

A. As a matter of course.

Q. When two columns such as yours and General Custerqs are in quest of Indians, would it not be the duty of the one which found the Indians to notify the other?

A. Certainly.

Q. Your departure from the instructions you received [to go into the 2nd valley] was in your returning to the place where you met Major Reno, and from which General Custer could expect your supoort?

A. My idea was, there was more for me to do on the trail; that there was fighting going on or would be going on on the trail, and that I had better go back and help them. I thought that I had gone far enough and that I would be needed on the trail.

Q. You testified before that "If there had been any plan of battle, enough of that plan would have been communicated to me, so that I would have known what to do under certain circumstances, Not having done that, I do not believe there was any plan. In Gen. Custer's mind there was a belief that there were no Indians nor any village." Could General Custer at the time he gave you the order to move to the left have known enough about the formation of the country to have given you special instructions so as to regulate every movement?

A. No, sir, I think not; and I don't think he thought it necessary.

Q. That matter was left discretionary with you in a great measure?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did not Major Reno know that you had gone to the left with your column in the direction you nave described?

A. He did; but he did not know what orders I had.

Q. State whether it is customary for a commanding officer, in sending off any part of hiS command in detachments for any special purpose, to communicate to the other officers of the command the purpose for which that detachment of the command was sent?

A. If those commands are to cooperate, I should think it was very important.

Q. Had Major Reno at that time been assigned to any particulnr command to your knowledge?

A, Not that I know of.

Q. Then it vwould not, as I understand from your testimony, be necessary that he should be then informed what orders were given to you, not being himself placed in command of a separate detachment?

A. I don t know that it would.

Q. Do you know what was the size of Major Reno's command?

A. When I left I did not know he had one.

Q. The division had not been made into battalions for Major Reno?

A, No. sir; I don't think he knew it at the time I left. When I passed he asked where I was going. I said I was going to the left with instructions to pitch into anything I came across.

Q. State for what reason you returned from the direction you had been sent?
A. Because I thought I would be needed at the ridge.

Q. You acted on your own judgment in returning to the point where you met Major Reno?

A, Entirely.

Q. How far were you separated from Major Reno at the time you reached the greatest distance in the direction you were moving?

A. Possibly 15 miles.

Q. Was any order afterwards sent to you to join Major Reno or to assist him?

A. Never.

[tbw]

Benteen cont...

Q. State whether or not a movement could not have been made down the stream in the direction it was supposed General Custer had gone, or might be found, imediately upon your arrival there.

A. Yes sir, it could have been made; but we would all have been there yet.

Q. Could that movement hbve been made there at once by the entire command as far down as you afterwards went?

A. Yes sir, but we could have gone no further, we were driven back.

Q. How long would it have taken you to have joined MaJor Reno's command and brought the pack train with you, from the time you were in the vicinity of the crossing?

A. From where I received orders to bring the packs, I suppose I would have had to wait an hour and a quarter for them to come up. I certainly could not have exxpedited the matter by going back for them, as a sergeant had already been sent for them.

Q. What was the distance from there to Major Reno s position?

A. From that tepee to Ford "A" was about four miles and a half; and from the ford "A" to where Major Reno was, was about two miles.

q. Where would you have made your halt?

A. Just where I was. About half way frorm the tepee to Ford "A".

Q. At that point where you met Trumpeter Martin, can you state how far it was from the Little Big Horn River?

A. It was about 2 miles from where Maj. Reno first crossed.

Q. How far was it from that tepee?

A. It was about 2 miles from the tepee that I met Martin.

4. Did you then know whose trail you, were following?

A. I did not.

Q. Explain to us again why you abandoned your orders on your move to the left.

A. I had an idea that General Custer was mistaken as to there being no Indians in that vicinity and, as there were no Indians there and no valleys, I thought my duty was to go back to the trail and join the command.

Q. Describe your route back and where you struck the trail?

A. The route was the same as going over, bearing to the right. At the same angle going back, at a right oblique, I struck the trail about a mile ahead of the pack train. I saw it coming on the trail. I then followed the trail to a kind of morass. My horses had not been watered since about six or eight o'clock the evening before,, and I formed them around that morass and watered them. As I moved out from that place, two mules from the pack train rushed into the morass and were stuck in the mud. I then went on, I suppose about 7 miles, when I came to a burning tepee. I rode around it; I am not sure whether I dismounted or not; I know it contained the dead body of a warrior. A mile or so from that tepee, I met a Sergeant coming back with instructions to the commanding officer. I thought, was about 7 miles back and he could take the order back as I had nothing to do with that; that Captain McDougall was in charge of the pack train and would attend to the order. About a mile or so after that, I met Trumpeter Martin who brought a written order,

Q. How far did you go before abandoning those orders?

A. Well, I suppose I went up and down those hills for 10 miles.

Q. How far from the ford A did you receive your first orders from Gen.Custer?

A. Having gone to the left and come back again, it is hard to say; I suppose it was about 15 miles in a direct line.

Q. About how far from that tepee where you found the dead Warrior was it where Gen. Custer gave you the order to diverge with your battalion?

A, About eleven miles.

[tbw]

Benteen cont...

Q. State how far the pack train was back, at the time you received the order through Trumpeter Martin.

A. I think it was about 7 miles,

Q. How far were you at that time from the place you watered your horses at the morass?

A. That is where I thought the pack train was still, I think it was 7 miles from the burning tepee to the morass, and I supposed that the packs were still at the morass stuck in the mud, I have no doubt 20 or 30 more mules went head over heels into that morass.

Q. It was your impression they had remained there while you went that distance?

A. I thought so; and as it turned out, I was pretty nearly correct.

Q. Can you state posiLtively as to about where the advance of the pack train was when you met Maj. Reno?

A. I can state positively it was not in sight; and to the best of my belief it was 4 miles and a half from the burning tepee to Major Reno's position on the hill. The pack train was not in sight and therefore more than 4 miles away.

Q, When Trumpeter Martin met you, you said he was moving at a jog trot how far had you observed his gait?

A. I did not know who it Wa5 until he came to me. I don't know that he jog trotted all the way.

Q. How far away did you observe him?

A. That is hard to tell, probably a mile and a half. That was an irregular broken country. I could see him on the ridges and then he would go down and I could not see him.

Q. As far as you saw him was that the habitual gait he was going?

A. I think it was, I will accredit him with it at least.

[joewiggs]

Feb 19, 2012 19:11:46 GMT -5 whitebull said:

I dunno, I just can't get into those conspiracy theories like the bullet that made a left turn before finally killing Kennedy, or those who believe that every senator or representative is on the take. what you say makes sense but I just can't let go of the fact that the board at the inquiry heard the soldiers testify but didn't say anything about that information being out of the normal.

Custer was know for being ready to jump into the fray without thinking about the circumstances. Don't get me wrong, I don't dislike the man. He was one hell of a soldier. But, why not keep all the columns together, charge the village, and be glad with what you got even if most of them get away?

Why push men and horses to the point of falling down just to be sure that nobody got away? I just believe that Custer was just a little too ready to jump the Indians and may have slipped up doing what he did.

Would your hesitation be somewhat relieved if it could be shown that Custer did not push the horses any more that what was considered the "norm" for that era?

would you also consider the fact that the exact position of the village was unknown to Custer until he reached Sharpshooter Ridge and Weir Point and, that any recognizance prior to those locations had to be performed in a broad front until such time the location could be certified?

lastly, please consider the possibility that a substantial portion of the Reno testimony was designed to make Custer look like the "village idiot", by its authors, simply to save the "'reputation" of the officers who participated in the battle and the Army!

[joewiggs]

The statements given by this witness need be perused to discern the distinct possibility that said statements were intended to cast dispersion upon my client (Gen. Custer)regarding orders issued by him to the witness.

At this time, the defense wishes to present evidence that contradicts portions of the above testimony. Numerous other statements made by the witness will be addressed at a later disposition.

Regarding the actual distance and purpose of the "scout" by the witness the defense proffers the following:

The witnesses' battalion left the divide halt at 12:12 PM, the same time as my client and Major Reno but, the witness diverged to the left to make a reconnaissance of the land for purposes of information gathering.

This off-trail scout presents a problem to the Court as the witness resorted to statements, which we believe to be, extremely detrimental to my client and, detrimental toward establishing the true purpose of said scout. Under cross-examination the witness became utterly irrational regarding the orders referring to them "senseless" mere "valley hunting ad infinitum."

The witness further stated that to return to Custer's trail was a "violation of orders" that would have taken him "to Fort Benton." In short, the witness implied that my client was sending him on a stupid and endless combat mission.

We have sense discovered written testimony which counters this perception dramatically that was authored by a Lt. Gibson who accompanied the witness on this "scout" and, who sums up the purpose of the mission thusly:

"Benteen's battalion was sent to the left about five miles to see if the Indians trying to escape up the valley of the Little Big Horn, after which we were to hurry and rejoin the command as soon as possible."
(personal letter written 7/4/76)

I would also, at this time, submit an information gathering purpose of this scout written by the witness (Benteen) himself in his official report dated 7/4/76.

"The directions I received from Gen. Custer were to move with my command to the left, to send well-mounted officers with about six men, who would ride rapidly to a line of bluffs about five miles to our left and front with instructions to report to me, if anything of Indians could be seen from that point. I was to follow the movements of this detachment as rapidly as possible. Lt. Gibson was the officer selected."

As o the actual distance traveled by the witness and his command, during this fact seeking mission, I would ask the Court to allow me to proffer the following.

As the witness diverged to the left, he traveled nearly west into a country that was neither cliffs nor bad lands, but easier sagebrush hills. He climbed several ridges that separated minor branches of Reno creek, but Lt. Gibson obtained no view of the upper Little Big Horn Valley.

The battalion then descended into the next small valley, that of upper No-Name Creek, which courses northwest to join Reno Creek The off-trail had now covered 3/4 miles to reach No-Name Creek at this point, about 4 miles above its mouth. Lt. Gibson's group continued for an additional 1/2 mile.

The witness moved down the widening right side of No-Name Creek for 4 miles to reach and cross Reno creek, where he picked up Custer's trail about 1/4 mile above the mouth of No-Name Creek, thus completing his off-trail in a total of 7 3/4 miles. the distance to this point covered by Custer's trail was 6 3/4 miles, revealing that Benteen had traveled only 1 extra mile.

In summation, I wish to submit the additional fact that two successive couriers were sent to the witness(by my client)with "instructions", a salient fact which further disrupts the inferred perception that the witness was totally unaware of what his mission was to be and, in addition, thoroughly refutes the incredible assertion that no orders, whatsoever, were received by the witness.

[tbw]

We have dispensed with summarizing the whole testimony at the end of all the questioning at the end of the courts deliberations. A decision that was mutually agreed upon before we began. Instead, as agreed, after all questioning of the witness has been completed, as of that time - realizing the witness can be recalled at a later time, the summary of each witness can be summarized after giving their testimony. Therefore:

With all due respect Councillor the time testified to by Capt. Benteen does not reflect your summation. Briefly I will ask the witness to clarify some of your points of contention, and you may redirect and or cross examine the witness or call another witness of your choice if you so wish to establish the issues you have mentioned. Given the fact that from where they halted on the evening of the 24 [Busby], and the distance to the LBH from there being about 25 miles comprising the whole distance, it can easily be discerned from Capt. Benteen's testimony at the time, as yet to be established with any certainty, was not as you stated, 12:12.

================

Q. Start on the 24th and tell us how far you marched and what you did that evening.

A. The next day ( June 24th) we marched 35 more miles up same stream and went into bivouac, remaining until 12 o'clock P. M.

Q. How far did you march from there, and state the time if you can?

A. On the 25th of June we marched till about 3 o'clock; we marched until about daylight (civil twilight), making about 10 miles; bivouaced without orders to unpack the mules or unsaddle the horses, and on the next morning when we moved from there I got no orders. The command moved and I followed the rest.

Q. What time did you start the march that morning; and where describe the distance and the time and any orders Custer might have issued.

A. about half past five we started again and after going 6 or 7 miles we halted and officers' call was sounded. [Concerning the orders] They were made probably 4 hours after we marched. I think at the first halt.

Q. How far was it from where you received those company orders to where you were given your battalion orders to march to the left?

A. We then moved four or five miles and halted between the slopes of two hills and the Regt. was divided into Battalions.


Given the fact that from where they halted on the evening of the 24 [Busby], and the distance to the LBH from there being about 25 miles comprising the whole distance, it can easily be discerned from Capt. Benteen's testimony that the time, as yet to be established with any certainty, and as testifed to by Capt. Benteen was not as you stated, 12:12. And at best would be somewhere in the vicinity of 9:00 am at that first halt. According to Capt. Benteens own testimony, as he himself stated it. They marched about 10 miles from about 12 midnight to 3 am on the 25th, where they bivouaced for about 2 hours. From there they resumed their march at about 5 am going 6 to 7 miles in about 4 hours, where at about 9 am, he was given his first orders. No time has been testifed to about where he was given his battalion orders "4 to 5 miles" after that time, nor when the march was resumed.

As agreed to prior to this court, we would take each witnesses statements, in turn, and discuss in summary only what had been established in testimony up to that point at the assumed end of their statements. If you would like to, at this time call Lt. Gibson to the stand to question him about these, and other matters, or question Capt. Benteen, you still have opportunity to do so, and is something I think you should do as you have misrepresented what Benteen's mission as you have described it, was, and is not what he himself testified to. At best it fails to meet his own description of what that mission was for. Not just in time and duration, he stated about 10 miles, you misrepresented his testimony and cut that distance in half and in other instances less than this mileage. This is something he has not testified to. Again, if you would like to cross examine Capt. Benteen to establish a 5 mile or any thing, more or less than the 10 mile distance Capt. Benteen testified to, you of course are free to do so, otherwise this and other allegations made by you are to be stricken from record. However, if you would like to question another witness on this and other matters, you are, at this time, free to call them to the stand and question them or even continue to cross examine Capt. Benteen. This as has been agreed to in convention, principle and form before this court began.

As for the language used by Capt. Benteen to convey his thoughts on these matters. How would you suppose he should have said the orders he recieved didn't make sense to him? If the limitation of how far he should have gone was into the 2nd valley and no further than that, had any action but what he did do put the mission in jeopardy, then he would have been disobeying his orders. In point of fact, he did state that he didn't go into the 2nd valley, but by inference stated that he turned around on the bluffs, thus disobeying those orders. When further questioned about this here are his statements:

Q. What I was trying to get at, was, from the route taken by the different columns and the route taken by your own whether or not [Gen. Custer] would come in ultimately the same way. And because of this, was it not true from the nature of your instructions, that you were going to the left, and if you found any Indians to drive them down that way.

A. I was to pitch into them and let him know: and then I expected him to come back to me. And if I had found them the distance would have been so great that we would have been wiped out before he could get to us.

Further he stated in relation to this:

Q. You testified before that "If there had been any plan of battle, enough of that plan would have been communicated to me, so that I would have known what to do under certain circumstances, Not having done that, I do not believe there was any plan. In Gen. Custer's mind there was a belief that there were no Indians nor any village." Could General Custer at the time he gave you the order to move to the left have known enough about the formation of the country to have given you special instructions so as to regulate every movement?

A. No, sir, I think not; and I don't think he thought it necessary.

Q. That matter was left discretionary with you in a great measure?

A. Yes, sir.

His turning around and going back to the trail was then a discretionary decision on his part and as he admitted a violation of his orders to continue into the 2nd valley. That he was, as he put it "valley hunting ad infinitum" was to a very large part not just what he was doing in accordance with the orders he received, but that limitation didn't make any sense to him. The inference I'm getting is that he didn't see any village nor any Indians from his perch atop the bluffs into that 2nd valley, and had he not been so restricted by the "2nd valley order" he could have and should have continued on his mission way beyond the 2nd valley. That's what didn't make any sense to him.

As for the direction Councillor, it's admirable on your part to suggest a direction absolute, but Benteen never did mention an absolute direction he traveled, such as North, East etc. All he has testified to was a direction he referred to as "left". This has been taken to mean, left of the trail they were on and in concert with the direction in general they were traveling at the time. Even that isn't a foregone conclusion according to Benteen's testimony. If you can develop further by cross examining the witness, I wish you to take the time now to do so.

[joewiggs]

With apologies to the Board, I wish to take this moment to proffer a humble and sincere explanation for the obvious but, innocent misrepresentation by council. The "scout" referred to by myself was not intended to be nor was it designed to recapitulate the movements of Custer's entire command that began on June 22 which arrived on the left bank of the Rosebud and began with a departure time of 12:00 as was truthfully testified to by the witness, Benteen.

My reference was to the reconnaissance/scout of the witness (Benteen) and the three companies under his command that occurred on the 25TH. at 12:12 hours as testified to my the witness Lt. Wallace.

The clarification of this critical readjustment of dates and times should, I hope, create a collaboration of facts - augmented by the personal correspondence of Benteen and Gibson - that will clearly define an attempt by the witness (Benteen) to present an incorrect and misleading summation of his acts and obligations while performing this critical assignment authored by his commander, Gen. Custer.

I hope the Board will accept my heart felt apology for this misstep and acknowledge the critical necessity for clarification of this issue to ensure that the truth of the matter weigh stupendously in the minds of the esteem members of the board.