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Post by whitebull on Jun 23, 2013 17:21:48 GMT -5
I just got a hold of a book that went for some pretty good reading.
Especially this part for one:
"Dialouge in the ranks may have been incomprehensible to many. There were 379 immigrants from 25 different countries."
How were these folks were even able talk to each other is a mystery to me. To make matters worse, the Officers and the regular soldiers did not often talk to each other unless it was absolutely necessary.
So it seems that nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Now that can't be right. In "To Hell With Honor" Sgt. Kanipe said: Major Reno was to the left and abrest with General Custer and Captain Benteen was to the left of Major Reno. You could tell tha the plan was to strike the Indian camp at three places."
Somebody got the orders or the "word" to what was going on even if Reno didn't. Course it don't make sense that he did not know what was going on if the Sergeant knew.
The hole thing was a mess ready to go bad but it just don't make sense to belive that Reno never got any orders from Custer.
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Post by stumblingbear on Jun 28, 2013 7:35:58 GMT -5
I just got a hold of a book that went for some pretty good reading. Especially this part for one: "Dialouge in the ranks may have been incomprehensible to many. There were 379 immigrants from 25 different countries." How were these folks were even able talk to each other is a mystery to me. To make matters worse, the Officers and the regular soldiers did not often talk to each other unless it was absolutely necessary. So it seems that nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Now that can't be right. In "To Hell With Honor" Sgt. Kanipe said: Major Reno was to the left and abrest with General Custer and Captain Benteen was to the left of Major Reno. You could tell tha the plan was to strike the Indian camp at three places." Somebody got the orders or the "word" to what was going on even if Reno didn't. Course it don't make sense that he did not know what was going on if the Sergeant knew. The hole thing was a mess ready to go bad but it just don't make sense to belive that Reno never got any orders from Custer. I bet everyone pretty much knew about the orders. The problem is that at any given momemt you do what you think is best. Later, when everything calms down you are judged by everyone else. Suddenly, what you did then don't look so good now. Thats when amnesia begins to set in!  |
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Post by joewiggs on Jun 30, 2013 19:07:59 GMT -5
I just got a hold of a book that went for some pretty good reading. Especially this part for one: "Dialouge in the ranks may have been incomprehensible to many. There were 379 immigrants from 25 different countries." How were these folks were even able talk to each other is a mystery to me. To make matters worse, the Officers and the regular soldiers did not often talk to each other unless it was absolutely necessary. So it seems that nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Now that can't be right. In "To Hell With Honor" Sgt. Kanipe said: Major Reno was to the left and abrest with General Custer and Captain Benteen was to the left of Major Reno. You could tell tha the plan was to strike the Indian camp at three places." Somebody got the orders or the "word" to what was going on even if Reno didn't. Course it don't make sense that he did not know what was going on if the Sergeant knew. The hole thing was a mess ready to go bad but it just don't make sense to belive that Reno never got any orders from Custer. I bet everyone pretty much knew about the orders. The problem is that at any given momemt you do what you think is best. Later, when everything calms down you are judged by everyone else. Suddenly, what you did then don't look so good now. Thats when amnesia begins to set in! Exactly SB, I would imagine that Reno (at the time of his "charge") truly felt that such a decision was best for him and his command. Unfortunatelly, for everyone involved, there were other options available to Reno's command that may have reduced the number of fatalities he suffered tremendously;one of which was to not run!.I have always believed wholeheartedly in the following phrase: " We do not run because we are afraid, we become afraid because we run."A ressonable amount of fear will invaribly occur when men are set upon by circumstances of battle/enemy onslaught that causes great anxiety in their counsciousess which will directly influence their ability to stand, fight, or run!. However, when assaulted by an enemy who is strong, the immediate search and selection of various military options from wtihin the psyche of the command officer (resulting from leadership and training) will enable him to supply leadership and orders that may allow his men to counter "fear" with reasonable military options to fend off the aggresive stimuli resulting from the close proximity of the enemy. Howerver, when the fear of injury and death suoercedes a rational, prescribed military action to defuse the "threat" men tend to throw down their weapons and flee. As the men run, all options are reduced to a singletary objective:escape! Reno's "charge" was justified by the alleged overwhelming number of Indians he confronted. The credible truism of that era and now, that a concerted and disciplined line of fire will turn away any Indian (enemy) charge was momentarily forgotten with disastrous results in the haste to blame a dead man for the fatal outcome of the battle. Please Remember the tremendous efforts of a solitary platoon led by Lt. Godfrey which turned back the very same collection of brazen warriors that the combined efforts of Custer and Reno were unable to do. An action that took place when Edgerly, French, and Weir were hauling it Pell Mell from Weir Point while Godfrey's men held the pursuing warriors at bay. |
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Post by whitebull on Jun 30, 2013 19:11:32 GMT -5
Buy, help me to understand something here. Are you saying that Godfrey was able to do what everybody else couldn't do? How cum they didn't make Godrey a General!?
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Post by stumblingbear on Jul 1, 2013 7:41:05 GMT -5
I think that Joe is saying that Godfrey picked one way of handling his particular situation while the others chose another option.
In other words, people react in different ways in differenct circumstances. Then people, like us, argue about who was right or wrong!
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Post by joewiggs on Jul 2, 2013 20:20:03 GMT -5
Thanks SB, your analysis is on the money! ;D
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Post by joewiggs on Jul 5, 2013 19:46:50 GMT -5
I just got a hold of a book that went for some pretty good reading. Especially this part for one: "Dialouge in the ranks may have been incomprehensible to many. There were 379 immigrants from 25 different countries." How were these folks were even able talk to each other is a mystery to me. To make matters worse, the Officers and the regular soldiers did not often talk to each other unless it was absolutely necessary. So it seems that nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Now that can't be right. In "To Hell With Honor" Sgt. Kanipe said: Major Reno was to the left and abrest with General Custer and Captain Benteen was to the left of Major Reno. You could tell tha the plan was to strike the Indian camp at three places." Somebody got the orders or the "word" to what was going on even if Reno didn't. Course it don't make sense that he did not know what was going on if the Sergeant knew. The hole thing was a mess ready to go bad but it just don't make sense to belive that Reno never got any orders from Custer. WB, you forgot to mention whice book you got your first quote from. Very interesting! We know that Reno did receive orders, he just did no believe himself capable of carrying out the orders as received. later, he chose to deny all references to orders (other than the well know basic reference to said order: to charge!) in hopes of separating himself from the embarrasing outcome. |
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Post by joewiggs on Aug 1, 2013 18:42:21 GMT -5
Major James S. Brisbin wrote a letter to General E. S. Godfrey after Godfrey wrote an article for the CENTURY magazine on January, 1982. It proposes to correct an intricate portion of Terry's orders to Custer:
"You should proceed up Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads (Terry had already referred to the trail Reno followed.)
Should it be found, as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found, to turn toward the Little Big Horn, he thinks (that is, the Departmental Commander-Terry thinks) that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue river, and then (:then" underscored in Brisbane's version) turn toward the Little Big Horn, feeling constantly,however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians, to the south or southeast, by by passing around.your left flank. It is desired that you conform as nearly as possible to these instructions, and that you do not depart from them unless you see absolute necessity for doing so.
(The 'absolute necessity' mentioned here meant following the Indians.)
E.A. Brininstool, Troopers with Custer, P.280
In 'The Battle of the Greasey Grass/Little Bighorn we find the verbiage of Terry's orders explicitly addressing the blacken portion listed above:
"It is of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement. and were it not impossible to do so the department Commander (Terry) places to much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them."
Page 44
The critical difference between the two orders are:
Brisbin -
A. Custer was not to deviate unless absolutely necessary
B. Brisbin knowingly altered the actual report to suit his purpose;the defense of Terry.
Actual orders -
A. conform unless you see sufficient for departing from them.
B. It was critical to follow and capture the Indians and not allow them to escape. Unfortunately, no one had a clue that the Indians would stand. Their doing so changed the rules of the game now demanded a scapegoat be offered up.
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Post by stumblingbear on Aug 2, 2013 14:24:49 GMT -5
Major James S. Brisbin wrote a letter to General E. S. Godfrey after Godfrey wrote an article for the CENTURY magazine on January, 1982. It proposes to correct an intricate portion of Terry's orders to Custer: "You should proceed up Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads (Terry had already referred to the trail Reno followed.) Should it be found, as it appears to be almost certain that it will be found, to turn toward the Little Big Horn, he thinks (that is, the Departmental Commander-Terry thinks) that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue river, and then (:then" underscored in Brisbane's version) turn toward the Little Big Horn, feeling constantly,however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians, to the south or southeast, by by passing around.your left flank. It is desired that you conform as nearly as possible to these instructions, and that you do not depart from them unless you see absolute necessity for doing so.(The 'absolute necessity' mentioned here meant following the Indians.) E.A. Brininstool, Troopers with Custer, P.280 In 'The Battle of the Greasey Grass/Little Bighorn we find the verbiage of Terry's orders explicitly addressing the blacken portion listed above: "It is of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement. and were it not impossible to do so the department Commander (Terry) places to much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them."Page 44 The critical difference between the two orders are: Brisbin - A. Custer was not to deviate unless absolutely necessary B. Brisbin knowingly altered the actual report to suit his purpose;the defense of Terry. Actual orders - A. conform unless you see sufficient for departing from them. B. It was critical to follow and capture the Indians and not allow them to escape. Unfortunately, no one had a clue that the Indians would stand. Their doing so changed the rules of the game now demanded a scapegoat be offered up. I can't speak for any other member but, I can speak for myself. When persons who lived at the same time this battle happened can't get it straight, it certainly makes the job difficult for people of our generation. Joe, your advise to "read everything you can find" is correct. Only by comparing notes can we get some idea as to why may have happened during Custer's battle. I believe that as early as the very week the battle occurred people began taking sides, muddying the facts with wild guesses and,generally, making a mess of things! Fox , in his, did a complex but reasonable explanation about soldiers "bunching" while under combat. Something that basically means that the command structure has fallen apart when "bunching" happens. In such a case men may act strangely and give up or as the Indians said, "act drunk." fox backed his theories with battle statistics from the civil War until the Korean war. Why is it then that his book is not quoted much? I'm beginning to see clearly that once people make up their minds about what happened they make fun of all other theories. I'm so glad to be a part of this forum where such a thing does not happen! |
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Post by joewiggs on Aug 2, 2013 15:10:34 GMT -5
SB, you are coming to a general conclusion that is very much a factual one. People are terribly resistant toward ideologies that contradict philosophies that have grown to accept over a period time of study and/or experience.
Debra Buchholtz in her book, writes the following in a preamble to Benteen's Official Report written by him on July, 4, 1876:
"Like Reno, Benteen uses his official report to head off potential criticism. In it he describes his frustrating reconnaissance of the bluffs to the south in such sterile language as to convey what,in his mind, was its obvious futility. he also defends himself against charges that he had failed to comply with orders contained in the not delivered by Trumpeter martin by observing that the trumpeter had told him that the Indians had "skedaddled." He further defends his decision to remain with Reno's command rather than fetch the pack train (and, by implication, continue on with it to Custer's position as ordered) by asserting that the significant action was taking place at Reno's position."
Never have I come across a more significant, comprehensive, and probable explanation for Benteen's actions than the above in all my years of research.
Benteen was a very courage but, obstinate soldier. Convinced that Custer was shutting him out of the "action" he resorted to obvious disclaimers of pure fantasy upon realizing that his failure to carry out his orders could place him a very precarious position.
Originally granted the honorary position of Lead Out, he was (in his mind) robbed of the glory and given an assignment of clean up. it is critical to understand that every soldier involved in this battle was convinced that the village would run!
It was only after the battle, when all military plans fell apart, men were killed, and responsibility for failure was to be pronounced did the obstinate major realize that he had very much committed BOO-BOO!
Did Benteen have idea as to Custer's location when approached by Martin?Martin told him and pointed "over the ridge" but Benteen did not move in that direction.
How far did Benteen travel in search of the "valley?"Not 10 miles (in official report) and certainly not all the way to Fort Benton as he testified at the Inquiry but, a little over a mile..
Why did he not deliver the ammo to Custer as ordered?
Once he arrived on Reno's Hill the astute major realized that Reno's men had lost all of their fight and so prevalent was the ethereal morass that it affected his men as well.
Why is it possible that Martin did not inform the Major that the Indians had "skedaddled."Martin had no clue as to the condition of the camp nor the Indians because he departed prior to the attack. Not only did he not see Indians running but, he saw them waving blankets and shooting their weapons. furthermore, the word "skedddled" is a term that, most likely not be familiar to an Italian not familiar with English aphorisms;Benteen, of course, would be very familiar with the word and used it on previous occasions.
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Post by stumblingbear on Aug 2, 2013 15:21:23 GMT -5
I see the direction you are leading and I agree, a lot of incidents-hundreds of them-joined up and created the outcome of this battle. There were human mistakes, bad luck, racial pride, a strong will to fight, a weaker will to fight back, and etc., etc., etc. When it was all over, everyone (on the soldier's side) knew that things did not go well, that many questions would be asked, and blame placed. I'm not saying that the Reno Inquiry was a total conspiracy as do some others. Each one of those officers knew what testimony would fly and which testimony would sink like a bowling ball. I'm reading more and more about this battle and while I'm learning a lot I sometimes feel that there's just to much to digest!  |
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Post by whitebull on Aug 2, 2013 19:46:37 GMT -5
I see the direction you are leading and I agree, a lot of incidents-hundreds of them-joined up and created the outcome of this battle. There were human mistakes, bad luck, racial pride, a strong will to fight, a weaker will to fight back, and etc., etc., etc. When it was all over, everyone (on the soldier's side) knew that things did not go well, that many questions would be asked, and blame placed. I'm not saying that the Reno Inquiry was a total conspiracy as do some others. Each one of those officers knew what testimony would fly and which testimony would sink like a bowling ball. I'm reading more and more about this battle and while I'm learning a lot I sometimes feel that there's just to much to digest! Hey, I'm reading more to! I'm going to post more ans voice my choice a lot more. We sure got the time to do it. Where in the hell is everybody else!  You other folks get to jabbing with the rest of us! Sabe! |
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