What was Custer's intentions/plans?

[tbw]

Custer's decisions over the years have been called into question, and based upon what little we have of the battle, on the surface many of those decisions lay at the very heart of what ultimately would happen to his own battalion. Did Custer's orders to Reno mean 'attack the village', 'attack the fleeing Indians the scout refused to chase', both or something else? And if it was something else how would such fore knowledge to attack figure into what ultimately happened to him and his own outfit? At the time he sent both Benteen and later Reno away on their missions did he know or think the Indians were running? Did he ever know Reno had been defeated? Did he know where Benteen was when he sent Martin with his message? Did Benteen know where Custer was when Martin was sent away with his message to him?

He first sent Benteen away, and about a half an hour later he sent Reno away, these orders to these commanders early in the conflict should have indicated some kind of plan. The exact orders to each of these subordinates has never been fully revealed and still lay at the heart of many a debate to this day. He fully sent about 1/2 of his regiment away on missions before he ever personally laid eyes on the village. He then proceeds downstream some 6 miles from where he and Reno departed each other. This also has been a constant source of misinformation. Again, it seems to indicate some kind of plan, a plan never fully disclosed to anyone but those involved in its execution.

While proceeding downstream many a person in Reno's outfit thinks they see Custer on the bluffs, but did they? The Ree scouts had been given an order earlier to chase the fleeing Indians down Reno Creek, but they stopped at a tepee and was taking off their white mans clothes because they didn't want to die in them. If the Ree's wore white mans clothing, then so to did the Crow guides. This clothing wasn't something taken off the back shelves of some cowboy emporium, they were soldier uniforms. And many of those Indian scouts and guides also wore buckskins, Mitch Bouyer being one of them. And many of those scouts and guides also rode the white mans horses, few rode their own, so it's a no-brainer who they were seeing atop those bluffs from about a mile or so away, the crow guides who hadn't taken off their white man's clothing. Its either this or Custer was dumber than most take him for, for going over the tops of those bluffs with his entire outfit and not just waving 'greetings to Reno and his men, but greetings and salutations to the entire 7 villages saying here we are 235 strong and we're going to kick your running behinds so hard, all 10,000 of you, be scared, be very very scared. Remember Custer sees all of this from near the pinnacle of those bluffs barely 15 minutes after he had sent Reno in. And he does what? He still heads north away from his regiment to God only knows where and do God only knows what, and he and his men all end up like scattered corn in less time than it takes Reno to retreat back to his hill.

To most the phrase "we will never know" is totally unacceptable. But at the core of this lays some very important information that isn't digested very well. Did Custer have enough information or even attempt to obtain it, WHEN he sent Benteen on his mission? AND. Did Custer have enough information WHEN he sent Reno on his mission? AND. When Custer finds out about that quote, Big Village, what did he do? Did he believe or even trust his own scouts and what they told him? Did any of the scouts or guides tell Custer anything about where those hostiles had camped, like where to ford? According to Curley, no, Custer didn't ask them anything about that country. Was he really blind as a bat here? Was his cardinal sin committed often and early to the extent that he underestimated his enemy, the village disposition, it big size, huge strength and counterattack ability?

Many look back with 20-20 hindsight and say, he should have kept his regiment together. He didn't, and no amount of hindsight hearsay want-to-be wishing would have changed the way Custer did what he did, the way he did it. So what exactly was Custer attacking, the infrastructure or the warriors or both as the opportunity arose?

At the heart of all of this there appears to have been some kind of a plan, surely by the orders given early on, sending off 1/2 of his Regiment before confirming what they were attacking. And his intentions seem unfulfilled by the best and the brightest when trying to trace Custer's exact footsteps after he sends Reno off and heads downstream, because dumb becomes dumber from such heights and for how long... until the words "Big Village" appear in his lingo and no one seems the least bit surprised that it was, except Custer.

[joewiggs]

I can not add a single word to your eloquent summation except to say, "What a fantastic job." I'd like to take this opportunity to offer my take on some of your thought provoking questions. I believe that Custer's original order was designed to make contact and bring to battle approximately 50 warriors or so who were fleeing toward, what was perceived to be, the location of the village. At this point in time, I believe, that Custer did not know the exact location of the village, merely the approximate environ;hence the order to Reno.

Custer did not order Reno to attack the village at this point although some students feel this to be so. At this point, the general location of the village is still 7 miles away. A "charge" order of a village still some seven miles distance is ludicrous as the mounts would be exhausted and numerous troopers would, conceivably, fall from their mounts before arriving at their target point. At the least, the "charge" formation would be disrupted and dispersed hardly resembling any "line." However, Custer, already learning toward the fearsome probability discovery, is concerned about these warriors fleeing toward the village and warning the inhabitants.

The General, at this point, intends to follow Reno in the wake of his movement. In doing so, he moves toward what appears to be a military objective, while gathering additional,vital information in the process. When Custer (unexpectedly) discoverers a large Indian trail, shortly after arriving at the,"flat", he then makes an immediate and fatal decision to turn "right" in pursuit, thus, increasing the distance between himself and Reno;driven by the desire to allow a minimum of Indians to escape. This decision, in my opinion, dooms him.

Regarding Benteen, I feel that Martini knew his general location by simply observing the tell-tale dust cloud that emanated from his command. Custer knew it as well that is why the written order was address,specifically, to Benteen!
it behooves us to not forget that in the arid, dry, and marching movement of hundreds of mounts, units could be easily observed from specific elevations!

Prior to this incident, Kanipe was sent back to the pack-train to hurry it on. Just prior to departing, Tom Custer yells back to the exiting Sergeant, "If you see Benteen....!" In a matter of minutes, critical information goes from "if you see" to specific identification of Benteen;written order!

If Benteen was unsure, he need only ask for Custer's whereabouts from Martini which he declined to do!

Only later, when all went awry and "blame" was essential to covering the truth of the affair did Custer's orders become vague and nonsensical.

[crazycanuck]

Jigs,if as you say that everyone could see Benteens dust why wasn't Kanipe sent by Tom Custer to Benteen as well as the pack train ? True Kanipe sees Benteen first but according to your post Tom Custer says "if you see". How could you not see Benteen according to your dust theory? Wouldn't you want the pack and Benteen coming forth. Benteen knows Custers to the North as there are no Indians to the South . Could of Benteen come straight across to Custer after Kanipe message to help Custer. I suppose he could but he went to the river first and then the Reno affair. So I'm not to sure if the dust theory holds up. It might.

[crazycanuck]

Anybody if you could, why didn't a valuable Seargent like Kanipe try to return after seeing Benteen and the pack train ? Martin was asked to come back if he could ,so I assume a valuable Seargent like Kanipe would be asked as well.

[tbw]

CC

I think too much about this battle is surmised and not well thought out. I'll give you credit on the dust issue here because I think it's one of those things that is overblown. Custer at one point, early in the morning hours sent Cooke back to order the columns off of the trail because they were making to much dust. The trail, as I understand it, was of a variable width, but up to a 1/2 mile to a mile wide in some places. As the Indians followed the buffalo trails, for the most part, as they traveled through that area from the divide down to where the first tepee was, (about 5 to 6 miles), they would have had to have crossed those deep ravines emanating off of the tops of that mountain to their right as they traveled. This would have forced them to bunch up, they the trail most likely narrowed through this part of their travel. This is important because the width of that Indian trail should be ascertained to get at the meaning of "what dust where?" Once Custer had given those orders it's very doubtful that any of the companies or the pack train ever again traveled on that Indian trail for the duration of their separate journeys to the LBH.

I personally don't think they would have stirred up much dust traveling over untrod grasslands. And as Benteen and those who rode with him stated an overall gait of a trot, I don't see how they could possibly have stirred up any dust at all.

If Custer observed Benteen and his men it had to have been from the heights before descending out of sight. And if Custer could have observed Benteen from said heights, the reverse is also true, the question at this point is 'where" for both battalions were they?

[tbw]

Kanipe has been much maligned of late about his supposed involvement in his ride back. Some prefer to say that he never made that ride, thus inferring that he was a deserter or some other thing to bring dishonor to him. I discount nothing or no one's statements, that is the history of this battle, and to change what they said into someone else's assumption is just to far of a stretch for me to believe.

I can and do give Kanipe credit for his ride. But, it has to be understood from the circumstances under which he was sent, not supposed, known. And most don't reason this to well either. The message itself and the way it is consistently stated by Kanipe over the years is proof enough for me that he made the ride.

Now to your question. I don't think in my perusing of the records that Kanipe was ever given the choice that Martin was. IE. He was never ever told to return. Nor did he ever make such a claim. All we have left is what someone could suppose. But that difference, to me is a big one, and one that is often overlooked in favor of discrediting him as a viable courier. What it boils down to is 'time', 'place', and 'motive' for such a message to have been ordered the way it was with the noted differences between in style and substance between his own message and Martins.

[crazycanuck]

Who would of won the battle of LBH ?
1. If the Indians had only bows and arrows and Custer with what he had ?(Custer)
2. If the Indians had only bows and arrows,war clubs and Springfields and all Custers men had repeaters and colts.(Custer)

[tbw]

Sept 9, 2011 7:47:13 GMT -5 crazycanuck said:

Who would of won the battle of LBH ?
1. If the Indians had only bows and arrows and Custer with what he had ?(Custer)
2. If the Indians had only bows and arrows,war clubs and Springfields and all Custers men had repeaters and colts.(Custer)

Possibly. I think whatever Custer had he would have done the same thing as he did. If he and his men had wore breechcloths and rode bareback to the LBH and had had only bow, arrows and knives he would have done the same thing as he did. It just was in his nature. From "The Battle of the Washita: the Sheridan-Custer Indian campaign of 1867-69 By Stan Hoig pg 2"

"Custer's forte was daring charges against the enemy and long, fast marches that allowed him to suddenly appear where he was not at all expected to be. he was by nature an irrepressible romantic who saw himself and the service in cavalier terms. he was constantly exhibiting a flare for the dramatic in his habits and dress, letting his hair grow long during the war on a wager that he would not cut it until the war was won. An officer from Gen. Meade's staff saw Custer lead a charge at Culpeper Station and wrote home to describe the young general as looking like a "circus rider gone mad."

As for the repeaters. In 1863 at the battle of Brandy Station Custer, then a Colonel, made one of his first known cavalry charges. This charge was of a long distance and up hill (Fleetwood hill) - well over a mile in length, that the horses quickly tired and he had moved beyond support where this operation quickly turned into a stampede rout with great loss of life. One week later at Aldie, Custer again tried to make one of his stupendous charges that he would later become famous for. Here Custer aimed for the Center of the Confederate line. Though the distance covered was less than at Brandy Station, he moved without support and again his men took a horrible pounding with great loss of life. Custer didn't have repeaters at either battle, would it have made any difference? I guess I should note that in a letter Custer wrote to Spencer Arms that when his entire command could be outfitted with Spencers, he would not hesitate to engage the enemy when outnumbered by almost 2 to 1. Not exactly the odds he encountered at the LBH river, but then such faith without them and well placed in the trapdoor carbines means what?

Couple the above with the following and I think one gets the pree's as Benteen called them, of exactly what was going to happen and did happen at the LBH. The War Department back then counted every bean ever put in a can to feed their troops, afraid that they would be charged to much for a bean out of place. If there was to be 45 beans in the can, then 46 was unacceptable because it would cost them to much in the long run. It was the same with ammunition. They just couldn't see the tactical implications of a weapon that seemed to waste ammunition if the soldier was given the opportunity. The other thing was the price of those weapons. During the Civil War they could buy first quality muskets for about $18 dollars, why pay $40 for a gun that would waste ammunition? Hardly seemed frugal to them and wasn't. This bean counting continued on up to and through the battle of the LBH, they favoring saving money at the expense of the troops. And in this case alone, it can be said they, the War Department, would be charged with their deaths for not realizing the difference sooner.

[crazycanuck]

Thanks TB. Damn government can't live with them and you can't live without them... hmmm just a minute maybe we could live without them...anarchy anyone ?

[crazycanuck]

Boston Custer noticed Matini's horse wounded .What kind of Indian resisatnce was around Martini on his ride back to Benteen. Indian Snipers ?

[crazycanuck]

I wonder why Custer didn't lead a patented Civil War charge across ford B. If he was 22 years of age do you think he would of ? Would it work?

[joewiggs]

Sept 6, 2011 7:58:51 GMT -5 crazycanuck said:

Jigs,if as you say that everyone could see Benteens dust why wasn't Kanipe sent by Tom Custer to Benteen as well as the pack train ? True Kanipe sees Benteen first but according to your post Tom Custer says "if you see". How could you not see Benteen according to your dust theory? Wouldn't you want the pack and Benteen coming forth. Benteen knows Custers to the North as there are no Indians to the South . Could of Benteen come straight across to Custer after Kanipe message to help Custer. I suppose he could but he went to the river first and then the Reno affair. So I'm not to sure if the dust theory holds up. It might.

GCC, logically speaking, we know that the initial, oral message delivered by kanipe was specifically directed to the pack train, ergo, the general location of the train must have been identified;else why send a message?

Secondly, the original notification was followed by a second, handwritten directive specifically directed to Benteen instead of the pack train! The obvious conclusion here is that new information had been obtained by Custer which would necessitate a change in directives.

Observations were made possible by periodic "sightings" from various elevations in the vicinity. On level ground, Custer would have been unable to see the dust signs. This would make the Generals forays to the "elevations" necessary. These "trips" to achieve intelligence were part and parcel of a general forward movement which, of course, rendered prolong and continuous observations from elevations impossible.
Custer and his command stayed on the move.

The movement of the train preceded (by several miles) the conjunction with Benteen due to his orders for an "oblique left" at the command's separation point. After traveling a mile or so to the left and, feeling his assignment completed, Benteen turned right, proceeding north and, eventually, arriving at the morass just ahead of the train.

As the two, separate units drew close together, their combined movements were designated by thicker and more voluminous "dust clouds." Custer apparently observed this phenomenon, thus the final message addressed to Benteen.

That order unequivocally and specifically demanded that both units respond to Custer's location (which was known by Martini but was never asked for by Benteen) even if it meant loosing all packs other than ammunition packs.

[joewiggs]

Sept 8, 2011 8:38:11 GMT -5 crazycanuck said:

Anybody if you could, why didn't a valuable Seargent like Kanipe try to return after seeing Benteen and the pack train ? Martin was asked to come back if he could ,so I assume a valuable Seargent like Kanipe would be asked as well.

Your assumption makes sense but for a reason(s) unknown kanipe was not asked to return and Martini was. My guess is that Martini was a trumpeter assigned to Headquarters command. Unlike Reno, Custer realized and utilized the critical value of the trumpeter. Lt. Cooke, understanding such a rationale, would have desired Martini to return but, only if safe to do so.

Needless to say, a response to the above may be if Martini was so valuable why was he selected to go in the first place? I don't have a clue.

[joewiggs]

Sept 10, 2011 7:22:16 GMT -5 crazycanuck said:

Boston Custer noticed Matini's horse wounded .What kind of Indian resisatnce was around Martini on his ride back to Benteen. Indian Snipers ?

There is some evidence that small groups of warriors were scattered through out the environs of the battlefield and the approaches to same. The responses to these approaches were varied, of course, with some fleeing and others taking defensive positions. Martini could have, very easily, come into close contact with one of these many groups of Indians.

[tbw]

Sept 10, 2011 7:22:16 GMT -5 crazycanuck said:

Boston Custer noticed Matini's horse wounded .What kind of Indian resisatnce was around Martini on his ride back to Benteen. Indian Snipers ?

According to what Martin said, he would have met Boston in the first few hundred yards or so of his journey back to Benteen. At least thats the way it seems to read as he mentions the coulee they were in at the time and this was shortly after he was dispatched and before he arrived at the 'same hill' they, he and Custer regt. etal. had been on about 10 to 15 minute before, which according to his RCOI testimony was anywhere from 5-600 yards up to 3/4ths of a mile back. The shot to wound the horse would have had to have came shortly after his departure as I don't see Cooke sending him back on a wounded horse. Again according to Martin Boston notifies him of the wounded horse when he meets him a shorts time later. The shot that wounded then was produced in that time frame. Believeable? Don't know. But again according to Martin when he gets to back to the 'same hill' he glances back and observes Custer and battalion retreating from the ford due to an "ambush". So the time frame is, I think believable. The Indians also said that there were Indians following Custer as he rode towards the crossing, but Custer didn't pay any attention to them, it was possible that it was a shot from one of those Indians that produced the wound. Or from some other Indian who had stationed themselves on that side of the river.