Custer to a fault

[tbw]

How much fault should Custer share in what happened at the LBH? Should he still be crucified today for any mistakes he might have made back then? Lets take a look at a few of these issues and lets see how wide a lens or how narrow the shutter speed needs to be to quickly understand this.

Recon? Custer wasn't successful at his fight, thus he had no plan, thus he must not have done the appropriate recon to make his actions successful. But what they usually charge Custer for was to much recon, in fact all the way down that right bank to, or even beyond ford "d". And apparently that wasn't supposed to have been part of any plan, the only one he kept to himself and held locked tight inside his head, because supposedly, according to the only expert on this subject, Reno, he was supposed to support his action with the whole outfit not go gallivanting off on some self serving scouting mission as far down the river as it took. Of course this doesn't jibe either with the next theory that he never communicated anything to his subordinates. Imagine that! He shouldn't have told Reno that he should have expected any kind of support because it goes against the convention that Custer never communicated anything to his subordinates. So the next question arises, did he, or did he not communicate this message to Reno? And if he did what plan was put in motion by the very transmission of that all important message to Reno? Oops, I forgot, there wasn't any plan, this according to both Reno and Benteen. Of course if they didn't know what the plan was how in the world would they know if any part of that plan was in peril of imminent disaster? Whats interesting here is that modern day soothsayers, witch doctors and closet sages say that Custer didn't tell them and they didn't know so why should anyone bitch? What's also interesting is these same oracles of wisdom also send Custer way down that stream over the tops of those ridges that look down upon the Indian encampment not over 10 to 15 minutes after Reno departs him. Custer knows, he knows how big that village is at that point, he knows how many warriors are there at that point and he knows if they resist, wherever they are, that his little band of troopers are toast, but he keeps going anyway. There's just something wrong with that photo snap shot, something terribly wrong. And what is wrong in the first place is sending them over the tops of those bluffs which they never did do. And in the 2nd, assuming Custer, once he saw that village that soon, not over 10 to 15 minutes after departing Reno, wouldn't have done something different than he did. And what do those witch doctors, soothsayers and closet sages says he does? Well he goes on ahead 4 miles further, and for some unexplained reason leaves Keogh behind him while he goes onward on his further scouting mission. All this presumably so that he could somehow support Reno, we mustn't forget that one. And just how would he have explained all of this to his subordinates after a successful battle. Oh I know, we all look at it as a massacre, but, how would he have explained these maneuvers to an adoring public, to an eager nation and its leaders awaiting news of how it had all gone down in glory. How much of it would have included the words, "support Reno"? How much of it would have included the words, "recon" or similar words to the same effect? And just how would one explain leaving a battalion behind you, supposedly to cover your rear, when there was no need to have do so at that time? And the words "attack", "pitch in", how many times would those have been used in a successful fight?

The problem is that we today tend to put Custer on the defensive to early. The problem is he wasn't on a recon mission anywhere, but was on a move to contact to a specific point led by none other than Mitch Bouyer. This move to contact today is little understood. The same people who say, 'he was in to much of a hurry" and/or 'he attacked prematurely' also in the same breath say, that he 'was to slow in getting to the point of attack', that he was in essence, 'to little to late'. Do they know? Do they even have a clue? Nope. They make Custer look like an absolute fool who didn't have the mental capacity to lead a whole regiment. And why is that? Because they refuse the see the truth in preference to the double standards they impose and do believe about him in absence of any truth and only wishful thinking.

What really makes Custer look foolish is in keeping with the wishful thinking that he was trying to somehow comply with what Reno told the COI, that he, Custer would somehow support Reno's action. And the first opportunity of that would quite naturally have come, only if he had gone over the tops of those bluffs, at ford "B". Had he gone around those bluffs, which both Curley and Martin make mention of, instead of over them, as it seems everyone is wont to do these days, he wouldn't have even known about what Reno was doing or whether or not he needed assistance. And with this they don't even give it a thought. Instead, they have him running to and fro atop those bluffs peering over its edge, stopping here and there to observe what was going on with Reno's action and then going to ford "b" to complete the wishful thinking he was somehow trying to support Reno's action. Really? You really think he was stupid enough to have done all of that? Now answer why? Answer anyone why he would have knowingly done this? All it did, as we all know today, and as he would have known then, and he would have, was send a billion Indians his way, like "ants out of an ant hill". He would have known that once he did that, there was absolutely no chance of any further offensive action by his unit, none, nada, zip. And knowing this, he went and did it anyway? That's pure BS. He didn't because he never new what was happening to Reno as he went down that right bank because he went around those bluffs, not over them and that's what those who rode with him said. And I'll take their word over some nit wit(s) who said they saw someone at nearly a mile away who looked like their hero who was just a wannabe the last person to see an iconic hero and draw attention to that fact for themselves. It wouldn't have been the first or the last time that would have happened. Ford "B" was just what Benteen said it was at the RCOI, and there was no action there. And if Custer was still in recon mode at that time, the man deserved what he did get, because if he went over the tops of those bluffs as everyone thinks he did. And if he then went to ford "b" as everyone seems to think he did, then he was the worst fool in the whole US army at the time, because any fool today, presented with that same scenario, wouldn't have went on to do that, and neither would have he. Why? Well according to the witch doctors he misread nearly every Indian sign in getting to the LBH. And even right up to the point before he mounted those bluffs to have a look see for himself he had as they still try to say today, "underestimated the Indian numbers and strength". Think about this. All the way this man underestimated it, he kept on missing this mark all the way, all the god damned way he kept getting it wrong from those signs. And then, THEN all of a sudden according to these closet guru's he mounts that ridge less than 10 to 15 minutes after leaving Reno and he then knows that he's made that mistake? And he does what? He does what? We're not talking about a half an hour later, not even an hour,10 to 15 minutes tops! Reno hasn't even gotten to the place where he dismounts to place his skirmish line for gods sakes. And Custer goes galavanting off downstream to strike "B" so that all those Indians will come after him and instantly and effectively stop any offensive action by his unit, yeah right, and if you believe that, I've got a bridge to nowhere to sell ya, dirt cheap.

Custer was in stealth mode in that move down the river, and that move had absolutely nothing to do with scouting. That had already been done by Varnum and the other scouts. If anyone is interested read those accounts again. They tell of the continuous flow of scouts, coming and going from Custer as he made his way forward, to think this wasn't happening is not just plain stupid on our part, but not giving the man credit for having half a brain to know what to do is more ignorant wishful thinking on our part than what he wasn't doing. He was rapidly moving to contact to a point downriver, a point Reno was well aware of in his official report. A point, in fact that had nothing to do with supporting Reno, again something even Reno at the time he wrote and signed that report knew. And don't kid yourself. If you'd think for a minute, or even a billionth of a second that Major Marcus Reno would put his pen mark to that report without first reading and understanding what it said before signing it, as important as it was, you'd be dead assed wrong because even then Major Marcus Reno was covering his behind and making damn sure of it, guaranteed.

[joewiggs]

In my opinion the most damaging mistake Custer made was buying into the widely accepted presumption that the Indians would run rather than make a stand and face the military. Now this false presumption was not only fatal, it became a double edge sword that placed the warriors in a can't lose situation.
Under normal circumstances, the Indians were loath to risk their family members in a battle and, therefore, would do anything to protect their loved ones;including running away!

In this battle, Custer deprived the warriors of that option by his highly successful clandestine approach to the village. While it is true that the Indian scouts were aware of soldiers in the general area, no Indian was aware of the closeness of the 7Th. When actual warning and certainty of soldiers did arrive, they were already on the very heels of the Indian scouts.

Perhaps in an effort to insure that he followed the basic premise of Terry's orders and to also make certain that he did not leave a "hot" trail, he sent Benteen to the left while he stayed on the obvious and recent "trail" of the village. The departure of Benteen, as it turned out, was a fatal error! Had Benteen remained with Custer or Reno, a sufficient amount of soldiers would have allowed a "withdrawal" and fall back to the pack train. With the leadership of Custer and Benteen, the survivors could have held the warriors off and thus, survived the battle.

Had Benteen followed orders and hurried to Custer's position as ordered, the possibility that that Custer's command could have been saved is a realistic one.

[stumblingbear]

I would like to add that maybe Custer was not cut to do anything else but fight battles and win accolades. It was not easy for him to speak publicly as his thoughts ran faster than his speech and he often lost his temper. All of this does not help in achieving success in the business world.

He must have know that the way of the Indian was coming to an end and this fight would be his last chance to restore some of the greatness of the past.

Other business adventures of his during the past years failed miserably. What was he to do? He had angered the President which could only limit his military future.

When we read of his being slightly melancholy during the search for the Indian camps was it concern for the future battle or concern for himself if he failed? I think it was the later.

[tbw]

May 20, 2012 16:40:39 GMT -5 stumblingbear said:

I would like to add that maybe Custer was not cut to do anything else but fight battles and win accolades. It was not easy for him to speak publicly as his thoughts ran faster than his speech and he often lost his temper. All of this does not help in achieving success in the business world.

He must have know that the way of the Indian was coming to an end and this fight would be his last chance to restore some of the greatness of the past.

Other business adventures of his during the past years failed miserably. What was he to do? He had angered the President which could only limit his military future.

When we read of his being slightly melancholy during the search for the Indian camps was it concern for the future battle or concern for himself if he failed? I think it was the later.

And this is why I always thought those snippets about him running for President could very well have been true. Certainly if Custer had been at the head of a crushing defeat of the NA's and had put them all back on the reservations, his poplularism would have sky rocketed, no doubt about it. And, where was he to go from there? The Indian problems in this country were on a fast wane, so much for being a General in an army that wasn't needed for fighting. No Indian problems, no frontier forts, no battles, spelled what in his mind? He had been fighting battles since the Civil War, and had been training for it long before that. And then, here, at this one battle, in a heartbeat it all would be over? I can understand his melancholy, the need for fighting and winning more battles and the accolades that went with them, but no more on the distant horizon?

I think there was pressure to put him into office. And a lot of that pressure would come with this win at the LBH and the accolades that went with that win was supposed to have propelled him into office. The melancholy might have been whether he really desired that or not. I'm not convinced it was for him, nor that he thought so. But we all know how persuasive and coercive political organizations could have been back then. Not that they all today are any better, they just do a better job of concealing it than they did back then, they have to. But that's a totally different subject.

So to tell you the truth, there might have been a tinge of truth to both effects. 1) Concern for the future battle, where success might have been something he really might not have been all that gung ho about, and 2) failure, in any event would have spelled doom for what might have been any kind of future in the armed services. We don't know, but this is one of those areas of speculation that I do think worthy of our time to explore.

[tbw]

May 20, 2012 10:17:21 GMT -5 joewiggs said:

In my opinion the most damaging mistake Custer made was buying into the widely accepted presumption that the Indians would run rather than make a stand and face the military. Now this false presumption was not only fatal, it became a double edge sword that placed the warriors in a can't lose situation.
Under normal circumstances, the Indians were loath to risk their family members in a battle and, therefore, would do anything to protect their loved ones;including running away!

In this battle, Custer deprived the warriors of that option by his highly successful clandestine approach to the village. While it is true that the Indian scouts were aware of soldiers in the general area, no Indian was aware of the closeness of the 7Th. When actual warning and certainty of soldiers did arrive, they were already on the very heels of the Indian scouts.

Perhaps in an effort to insure that he followed the basic premise of Terry's orders and to also make certain that he did not leave a "hot" trail, he sent Benteen to the left while he stayed on the obvious and recent "trail" of the village. The departure of Benteen, as it turned out, was a fatal error! Had Benteen remained with Custer or Reno, a sufficient amount of soldiers would have allowed a "withdrawal" and fall back to the pack train. With the leadership of Custer and Benteen, the survivors could have held the warriors off and thus, survived the battle.

Had Benteen followed orders and hurried to Custer's position as ordered, the possibility that that Custer's command could have been saved is a realistic one.

Joe,

I really think this one has to have a lot more thought put to it. And I've stated the following before, so its nothing new, but, here goes. What did Custer expect to find when he got to where the Indians were camped? I think everything he knew went against all convention of thought that they would all be packed together in about a 2 to 3 mile area. With this what would be the numbers invovled. He had had several estimates and those ranged from the 8-900 or so on up to Girards figures on the night before of a couple of thousand. The only experience he had with this was the Washita and there these camps were strung out up and down that river, most of those were in a bend in the river further away, several miles from Black Kettle's camp. Did he expect to hit each camp separately? Or did he really expect to find that "Big Village" he sent word back to Benteen that he had found? Run? The only way they could possibly have expected any of those camps to have run is if they weren't in a huge, one big camp formation. Its the only explanation to that running they were expecting. Crush one camp, move onto the next and so on. But Custer wasn't prepared for that aspect of that, and I think is evident in his message back to Benteen, "Benteen, come on, Big Village, be quick...", else why mention "big village" if they had been expecting one? The reason why that "big village" was a game changer and Custer knew it and was the reason he requested Benteen to "come on, be quick". Custer knew from the size of that village when he viewed it that they didn't have the time to pack up and escape, that's why the words of encouragement to his men when he said, "we've got them now..." They weren't going to run, there was just to many of them to try to get away, they had to stay, stand and fight and Custer knew that also at that very time that he said those words. He had in effect achieved the surprise that he was trying to achieve and was close enough to drive home that effect without their escape.

Now many people, far to many for my comfort try to blame Reno and Benteen at this point. But most of those that do blame them, blame them for all the wrong reasons. Were they at fault? In my opinion, Benteen was, but not for the commonly held reasons expressed anywhere else. The truth has been told, and way to many people bend that truth to their will instead of seeing it for what it really was. And as Scully and Mulder used to say, "The truth is out there somewhere". But its not a twilight zone thriller with all the bells and whistles, and it doesn't take an overactive imagination, or for that matter an ego the size of Manhattan or the project named for it to find it. This isn't rocket science, and it isn't kindergarden where everyone follows little Johnny in a pleasant little game of follow the leader, nor is it Sesame Street with The Grouch, Miss Piggy or The Count. It isn't, do the math. It is read every single word and absorb it, and, don't miss or dismiss a thing!

[bc]

Boston wrote:

Crush one camp, move onto the next and so on. But Custer wasn't prepared for that aspect of that, and I think is evident in his message back to Benteen, "Benteen, come on, Big Village, be quick...", else why mention "big village" if they had been expecting one? The reason why that "big village" was a game changer and Custer knew it and was the reason he requested Benteen to "come on, be quick". Custer knew from the size of that village when he viewed it that they didn't have the time to pack up and escape, that's why the words of encouragement to his men when he said, "we've got them now..." They weren't going to run, there was just to many of them to try to get away, they had to stay, stand and fight and Custer knew that also at that very time that he said those words. He had in effect achieved the surprise that he was trying to achieve and was close enough to drive home that effect without their escape.


I think you touched on something I haven't seen discussed before. That all the NA camps congregating together into one "Big Village" was something that had to be told to Benteen.

I view the movement down Reno Creek as a three prong attack/sweep with Benteen on the left. I think Custer saw a small encampment of a few tipis and maybe some cook fires from the Crow's nest and particularly the second trip to the CN. Plus all the trails went over the divide and down Reno Creek. Just prior to the divide there were trails that went to/came from the South. He had even sent scouts that way who found a tipi with dead NA(s?) with white scalps in it. The scalps were Crook's men but no one knew it as far as I know. He could not move down Reno Creek and leave NAs on his left flank who could come up and get the pack train. Therefore Custer had to send Benteen to the left to make sure it was clear.

Back to Boston's point, Custer probably assumed the NAs would not camp so close together as they did but instead would have some separation. So the "big village" included in the note would be some new news to Benteen.

I do know that Custer and others of the 7th cav were witness to large gatherings of NAs other than the Washita where there was some separation between camps. Usually these gatherings were for treaties or to collect their annual annuities near a fort. Troops would be there to oversee the ration distribution. There were some large gatherings in Kansas and Oklahoma. I'm not sure about up north as the reservations were spread out.

bc

[tbw]

May 22, 2012 21:01:16 GMT -5 bc said:

Boston wrote:

Crush one camp, move onto the next and so on. But Custer wasn't prepared for that aspect of that, and I think is evident in his message back to Benteen, "Benteen, come on, Big Village, be quick...", else why mention "big village" if they had been expecting one? The reason why that "big village" was a game changer and Custer knew it and was the reason he requested Benteen to "come on, be quick". Custer knew from the size of that village when he viewed it that they didn't have the time to pack up and escape, that's why the words of encouragement to his men when he said, "we've got them now..." They weren't going to run, there was just to many of them to try to get away, they had to stay, stand and fight and Custer knew that also at that very time that he said those words. He had in effect achieved the surprise that he was trying to achieve and was close enough to drive home that effect without their escape.


I think you touched on something I haven't seen discussed before. That all the NA camps congregating together into one "Big Village" was something that had to be told to Benteen.

I view the movement down Reno Creek as a three prong attack/sweep with Benteen on the left. I think Custer saw a small encampment of a few tipis and maybe some cook fires from the Crow's nest and particularly the second trip to the CN. Plus all the trails went over the divide and down Reno Creek. Just prior to the divide there were trails that went to/came from the South. He had even sent scouts that way who found a tipi with dead NA(s?) with white scalps in it. The scalps were Crook's men but no one knew it as far as I know. He could not move down Reno Creek and leave NAs on his left flank who could come up and get the pack train. Therefore Custer had to send Benteen to the left to make sure it was clear.

Back to Boston's point, Custer probably assumed the NAs would not camp so close together as they did but instead would have some separation. So the "big village" included in the note would be some new news to Benteen.

I do know that Custer and others of the 7th cav were witness to large gatherings of NAs other than the Washita where there was some separation between camps. Usually these gatherings were for treaties or to collect their annual annuities near a fort. Troops would be there to oversee the ration distribution. There were some large gatherings in Kansas and Oklahoma. I'm not sure about up north as the reservations were spread out.

bc

bc

These orders sent by Cooke were about the most misunderstood piece of BS ever put to paper. But we have to sort all that out and try to figure out why. It really was a hurried piece of work. There wasn't much thought in its care to see that the right instruction was transmitted to Benteen. And that is something that Custer just would not have done. Witness those two Sergeants who were sent within moments of Benteen departing Custer on his mission. Anyone looking at what was in those messages would say that Custer was micromanaging Benteen's actions, either that or he didn't trust Benteen to make the right ones with regard to the mission that had been given him. The two lay in stark contrast to the reality behind the motives. As much micromanaging as Benteen needed and not recieving the same at such a critical time, when time itself would have been at a premium, yields what indications that Custer dropped the ball here, or was it something or someone else? Short of sending back Keogh's battalion to fetch him, which Custer wasn't going to do, the note itself as well as the messenger was about as worthless to Benteen as the paper money was to the Indians that day, and Benteen said as much at the COI. So when you see Cooke's chicken scratch attempt at conveying what appeared to be the General's orders, it comes out in a flurry of telegraphic dots and dashes as if Benteen was on the other end of some kind of telephone pole awaiting the dots and dashes just so that he could ignore them. The first three stanza's of that message sing an old familiar song to everyone, but indeed, what did it say to Benteen? Or was he just waiting for the refrain as an excuse not to hear those singing with the chorus? I haven't had any doubts what was trying to be conveyed to Benteen in that message, and I've had little if any doubt that Benteen also knew what "come on" meant, what "big village" meant or for that matter, what "be quick" meant. We've had some stone jockeys trying to tell us for years what it was supposed to mean, and they're still astradle that boulder, still kicking it with no place to go. It's high time we let Benteen tell us what those words mean, even though the bastard will try to weasel out of it each and every time. They could have only meant one thing on that day back in 1876, and not just any day, that day!

[tbw]

Was there any evidence to suggest the hostiles were only trying to escape in one direction or for that matter any direction? The only evidence I've ever read was they were trying to get the old men, women and children into safe areas away from where the fight could develop. Through all the confusion there were accounts of some of the women trying to take down the tepee's, and I believe it was in one of Two Moon's accounts where he told them not to do that. There never was any evidence to suggest the Indians were on the run away from their camp. This sign was an important element in what little we know Custer said at the time. That they would go down, make a crossing, finish up here and go home to their station. What he saw didn't discourage him as has been stated all along, but one thing no one ever concentrates on is that message sent back to Benteen at that time. And it requires one to think not just in a linear thought process here, but the "surround" process John Gray described all to well. And to get at the truth of this little riddle, one does have to think outside the conventional box here, so to speak.

There are those today who will fight tooth and toe nail to send Custer over those bluffs right after he departs from Reno. But to do so places the burden of command and fault then directly upon Gen. George A. Custer's shoulders and no one else's. But, there wasn't one man who survived Custer's ride down that right bank that placed him up there at that time, not one of them ever stated it. And the reason is fairly clear, he didn't go there. The proof is in his words, orders and what he did. And all of that tells us that he didn't mount Reno Hill or go anywhere near its summit.

If he had gone there, think about this. There hasn't ever been a person who ever went there and looked down upon that whole valley and observed the cars, the horses that wander the area and even the people who walk the ground, be it from Sharpshooter, Weir or any of the high places, that doesn't walk away shaking their head in utter disbelief. It would be from there, if anywhere in that area where Custer could have observed that "big village", and is perhaps why it is so attractive. What defies belief is that game changer, "big village" message he sent back to Benteen. If the game had been changed, as he knew it had when he sent that message, then why go further downstream? What would have been the need to have done so? There is proof of dust and little to be seen, some would claim. But I don't know any sane commander in their right mind that would ride into a dust storm not knowing what was there. Dust? I doubt very much it would have been a factor, but there are those enthralled with the notion, but, it still makes more unknowns down there than it reveals at the time of observation. Custer's own words, orders and what he does, defies the dust theory, and yet is another one of those theories, like 'over the bluffs' that make him look stupider as stupid does. But there was a hallmark of when here. When Custer sent that message back with Martin to Benteen, he knew those Indians weren't running.

Watch what happens as he advances further into that dust storm, further into the maelstrom of stampeding ants that defies all logic.

Those with the 'over the bluffs' theory will state that Benteen is somehow part of a plan at that point. A plan that neither Benteen himself or Reno ever said there was. Because "when" and "where" Benteen arrives to save the day, and once he does, that great bastion of plodding methodical pre civil war tactical idiocy though will surely save the day. He'll see Custer in trouble, or he'll see what's going on with Custer's men and he'll add his force to Custers to create the added extra impetus to overrun a 1000 extra Indians. Yup, he'll do with 3 companies what Custer with 5 couldn't. And his 3 added in will overrun thousands, or tens of thousands. Somewhere I've heard that argument before and it didn't wash then either.

And of course Custer does something totally unexpected and out of character, he tells those directly under his command what is happening and what will happen. Must have been that bullet to his chest or was it his brain that made him open up at that time, huh? "Ahhhh... yeah Keogh, I think I can ride. I'm gonna take these here two companies and go over yonder while you and the other 3 companies hold the back door open from these ornery 50 or so Indians that has been nipping at us. And you Keogh hold that back door open for trusty ole Benteen, he'll be sure to come by and by." Ummmm... somehow I think someone got it wrong here. Why would you have overkill on a rear guard? Especially if someone else what going to push on to attack somewhere else with less a force than the rear guard was? And since when did Custer ever trust Benteen to do anything he was requested to do without severe micromanagement? Stupid is as stupid does, I guess.

And somewhere near Calhoun they stop, that's because Curley was the one that said so, not because of any greater research that placed it in a context for better understanding than what we've got today. Yup, they're up there, not many Indians around and no bullets a flying at them. OH.... wait, what was it Curley also stated? That the Indians were on "both sides of them and many more coming up from the rear as they retreated from the ford" - to paraphrase. Gee, I guess they all went back to their tepee's for a commercial interruption break or something, because if the same source is to be used and believed, they were still there and still firing and still causing casualties..."many of them"! There wasn't an ebb and flow movement here where those Indians stopped for a moment to take a piss, especially all of them at the same time. But no, of course not, Custer was in no trouble, nope, none at all. But again, that's not what Curley said at that time. He stated that Custer was going to look for a "place to make a stand". NOT go on to any idiotic ford, BUT find someplace to hold them off!!! Sounds to me like he was in a whole heap of trouble at the time. Stupid is as stupid does, I guess.

Of course all of this requires us to get inside Custer's head, ummm.... be the head shrink and know everything Custer was thinking. Ahhh... yeah right. What if Reno would have gotten into some kind of trouble? First and foremost, would it have mattered to Custer who was well over 3 miles in a straight line through the hostile village to him? 2nd, would he have really expected his subordinates to quit the field? And if they did, what assumptions would he have had in association with the terrain he knew nothing about, he went around the bluffs, not over them. Would Custer have known where either of those two were, or what they would have done?

Lastly the motive to go to ford "B". Why go there? I guess he didn't get enough of an eyeful from the tops of the bluffs. He had to go there to see if any of them would put a bullet in his chest, or what, his head, this according to Curley while he was attempting to cross that stream. And then, as any commander with half a brain would tell you, he retreats and takes half of the Indian nation with him as he retreats to Calhoun hill. Again, the epitome of stupid is as stupid does. And there are those who want you to seriously consider it.

[joewiggs]

May 22, 2012 21:01:16 GMT -5 bc said:

Boston wrote:

Crush one camp, move onto the next and so on. But Custer wasn't prepared for that aspect of that, and I think is evident in his message back to Benteen, "Benteen, come on, Big Village, be quick...", else why mention "big village" if they had been expecting one? The reason why that "big village" was a game changer and Custer knew it and was the reason he requested Benteen to "come on, be quick". Custer knew from the size of that village when he viewed it that they didn't have the time to pack up and escape, that's why the words of encouragement to his men when he said, "we've got them now..." They weren't going to run, there was just to many of them to try to get away, they had to stay, stand and fight and Custer knew that also at that very time that he said those words. He had in effect achieved the surprise that he was trying to achieve and was close enough to drive home that effect without their escape.

Excellent perspective bc, I would add only one factor to augment your stance. I also believe that prior to actually seeing the village and its environs Custer could not be sure that he was not facing a similar situation as he did at the Washita;villages strung out for miles!

From Weir's Point and/or Sharpshooter's ridge he realized that it was one humongous village and support would be needed immediately! Hence the written village. "Come On! Big village!

[whitebull]

Should we not add the U.S. government as a culprit for all that went wrong? The blame would include the so called Indian manager's that cheated the Indians of good food replacing it with bad.

How about government policies that stole the Black Hills after giving them to the Indians forever. The way I see it Custer, and everyone else involved, were just puppets doing what they were ordered to do!

We can judge how the soldiers fought, well or good, until the cows come home but that won't solve nothing. it just brings up more questions.

[strange]

Black Hills were originally Crow land, it was a slap in their face to hand it over to the Sioux in the first place.

[whitebull]

Thank you Strange, I never knew that!

[tbw]

May 25, 2012 12:13:13 GMT -5 whitebull said:

Should we not add the U.S. government as a culprit for all that went wrong? The blame would include the so called Indian manager's that cheated the Indians of good food replacing it with bad.

How about government policies that stole the Black Hills after giving them to the Indians forever. The way I see it Custer, and everyone else involved, were just puppets doing what they were ordered to do!

We can judge how the soldiers fought, well or good, until the cows come home but that won't solve nothing. it just brings up more questions.

Maybe, but I think it involves a bit of knowledge that doesn't deny every single thing ever stated in that battle. It takes a great deal of understanding and patience with all the evidence. Many an author has made this battle into less than what it was, and some have made it into more than what it was. And that for me is what wont solve anything, listening to their theories without thinking on your own.

For me, It's rare these days to sit down and actually read any book from cover to cover. And it is even rarer for me to sit down and read a LBH book without getting so thoroughly disgusted that I throw it in some corner of the basement I'll not see again in quite some time. In fact my wife will find it and put it somewhere else, where I don't know where, while cleaning, before I ever see it again. And the reasons for this are clear. It's what I know and what I believe. Even more rare are those resource books that interest me. I don't do modern makeovers, I just don't. There are to many chances for the author to insert his belief into it to make it of any value to me. While the author states his opinion, and his perfect right to do so, there's no evidence anywhere that exclusively gives his evidence more weight than another, and more likely its more idiocy than something that could inspire or motivate others to think like he does. Certainly not me.

All through the literary history of the LBH the authors have their theories and these theories heavily influence what they write. They either have tried to fit their theory into what they think happened, or, they try to fit what they think happened into their theory. Sometimes if not most of the time it is a hodge podge of both as it can't be just one way without trying the other - no matter what they say. And anyone who thinks different is either self delusional about their evidence being proof positive or is sleep walking. Either way they're not making sense if they proclaim one method superior to the other, or that they practice one in preference to the other, think looney bin here.

Just one example of theories and what happened was the rumors about Custer's men committing suicide. And quite naturally, as all things human you have hard core believers on both sides of this issue. Some see it as absolute nonsense and others see it as a distinct possibility. So what did happen. Who really knows? I will say, as I've always said that no evidence no matter how anyone wants to trivialize it, need be thrown away. Could they have done it? Sure. There were reports of the troopers being in fear for the lives. There was a certain ignorance associated with what happened, and I'm quite sure there was quite a bit of insubordination going on on Custer's field. Put that all together and say "not a chance" and I think you're looking at someone who seriously needs psychological help, and soon! And with this, not all of them died there on that battlefield with their boots on. Several might have and probably did escape only later to die of their wounds some where else. What proof do I have that if might have occurred? Benteen's "scattered corn" remarks about Custer's battlefield comes to mind. And also his remarks that the officers didn't die with their company's. I think the fear factor we'll never know for sure. And I don't doubt for a moment when the Indians that fought them there said that that battle didn't last much longer than a half an hour (tent pole shadow image, hungry man eating his dinner), if even that. To compare, look at what happened on Reno's valley field. Look how many were separated from their units during the fight. Military discipline in 1876 was vastly different than it was for later modern wars, so to compare them on the same basis of facts aren't worthy of mention here. What is, is that word fear and what it does in any battle, it is the ever present real and present danger that threatens their very lives, and one had to have been there, and understood those fears to understand why they did what they did. I think Benteen understood that fear, and I think he knew why those officers didn't die with their men. And he may very well have understood why they would have killed each other in preference to being scalped alive and left to die in the misery and horrible pain of neglecting to finish the job. At least a punji stake did its job as equally well, and as I've indicated before, you had to have lived it, to understood it.

[stumblingbear]

T.B.W., you made me realize the fear that these men must have felt when faced with certain death. What do you do? What can you do? Run and hope to escape? Beg to not be killed? Plead for mercy.? What do you do when you are about to die and you don't want to die. You just want to go home!

What do you feel just before you die?

[tbw]

May 26, 2012 20:50:07 GMT -5 stumblingbear said:

T.B.W., you made me realize the fear that these men must have felt when faced with certain death. What do you do? What can you do? Run and hope to escape? Beg to not be killed? Plead for mercy.? What do you do when you are about to die and you don't want to die. You just want to go home!

What do you feel just before you die?

GOOD MORNING VIETNAM!

Adrian Kronhauer here....

In the news today...

War is hell, and only those who have been in it should be qualified to answer that. However, many of them forget what it was like to feel that fear, know that fear and understand it, explore it, admit it and tell about it, insight lost to many a battle. They prefer instead to let their ego's run a-rife with unearned homage to themselves.

....

The LBH happened 11 years after the Civil War (1865) and 22 before the Spanish American War (1898). Any jigoistic, matter of fact feel given to it by anyone other than history's roost would define that as propaganda.

...

Each and every time a commander takes the field, they put their reputations on the line. This they do with the full realization of the safety of their men in their charge and all to often is forgot. More than one battle has hinged upon a risky decision or a turning point made by an on the spur of the moment decision. The outcome to be determined by either gutsy moves or bad decisions and sometimes indecision or by sheer luck. It would only take one very fateful decision to turn the tide of battle. But to see the truth, it would take a generation devoid of ethnic bias and preconception about their enemy, and that hasn't happened yet. This is no different than looking upon the Japanese as squinty eyed buck toothed primates in WWII. A prop taken from the vaults, dusted off and reproduced to initiate the uninitiated to fight them, kill them and not trust them, and still used by the ignorant for the same ignorant purposes today from age old reads not worthy of the effort. We don't get a true sense of how important each mans job was, or how grave the implications of that battle was for them. We don't get the sense of the pre battle jitters as they dutifully approached the village that gave all troopers the wary uneasiness that this mission might be their last. Or even the sense of what would either bring out the best or the worst in them once it began. And by the same analysis the village residents and what they were doing or feeling as the troopers began their final approach to destroy their village, their way of life and send them on to reservations. We have no sense of the buildup of suspense that must have happened, had to have happened when one discovered the others presence and how each participant reacted or felt.

Custer will always be remembered as the hero, but what most people do here is prefer not to animate him, make him that "action hero", riding, shooting and all the usual things real people do and say in a situations and events like that. They sheer away his usual props, the horse, the gun etc and make him act like the puppet on the string they want him to be. They make his actions and motions into a soap opera that works to their advantage, one that gives him to many opportunities to interact with the others when he didn't always have the luxury. And way to many rewrites come off with that soap opera feel to it and are no more convincing than the cheap tv versions where the star is surrounded by a first rate cast and he or she is mediocre at best. And no bc - C. Heston's character, his floozy, his son and the jap girl were all pure fictional characters. ;D

So much has been written about the LBH and its battle that one doesn't wonder why they haven't made a made for TV mini-series about it. With all the soap dope they have out there from about every so called expert, albeit soap style, I'm quite sure they could come up with a fanciful creation of everyone's pet theory all mixed up to make one spectacular reproduction about it. You know, where most of the budget would be spent on first rate cast of actors who are given a script of substandard material to work with. And I don't see no reason why they couldn't call it "In Harms way". It would be a masterpiece enough to float anyone's egocentrical boat. One where all the actors would be saddled with a convoluted story so idiotically directed and written that it would be unfair if not impossible to accurately judge the actors work. Of course Custer should look like he wishes he wasn't there, but is in a constant state of dreamland with that far-away look in his eye. Yeah, you know the one where by the Victorian standards of the day he's daydreaming constantly about libbie but they don't really explain that much in the series. And of course when the focus would move away from the fighting, as it often does in such thrillers, it would have much more to do with today's perceptions than yester-years reality with the sexual, oops no noogies for the soldiers there weren't no white women there. Still those early shots, those cut scenes with attitudes being more brought to the fore-play by today's standards than anything Victorian where the character's emotions would be exaggerated to unrealistic extremes and proportions. Of course the absurd and convenient resolution to the plot line would be too bizarre to be believed, it would have to be. They would have to use the fictional place names invented long after the battle to make any sense of it, and would have to downplay the battle as a nostalgic ending that it became. I mean it has all the hallmarks of a blockbuster remake here without the ships and sea. The daft Custer who gets into trouble by doing the right thing and then is later exonerated, perfect fill for waynewrights.

But I digress here. There'd be no insights into human nature - simple portrayals of characters who are strong and fit and bear no resemblance to the truth based upon the paleontology. Their'd be no examination of the moral dilemmas, the battles would be decidedly unrealistic portrayals and the actors coming off as ridiculous stern and boring wooden copies with embarassing cliche' written all over their dialogue as they often are. They'd have to trivialize the ending battle scenes as to the awful tragedy that really took place there. And no amount of acting, however good or bad wouldn't ever compensate for that reality and make the actors actions and dialogue an attempt in vain. And as they'd usually do, there'd be that banter, those wisecracks, the oft misplaced smiles or laughter, while we all know that of the horror and brutal reality that created one of the most tragic episodes in history. While real people in 1876 died, we instead would be watching the wood cut Custer and a nearby side kick smirk and say witty sayings instead of them really showing us the horrible shock and horror that really occurred back then. And as hero's go, whether then or now, Captain America would reign supreme in lieu of the truth. And like many a film mis-casting would of course take place, especially of the star, would he come off as a sailor trying to portray a cowboy or the other way around? And would it be someone who actually walked the walk, or would it be someone who spent their entire life talking the talk, and then thinking egocentrically smugley he knew the difference? Still there are those today who still don't get it, they still think in the theatrical sense to make money or fame off of it, and still try to get paid for it without given thought beyond their egotistical bias to see otherwise. Punji stakes were real. Arrow shafts were real. And the fear was real to, just as real as the person who wielded the knife to use it to maim rather than kill, no matter which part of the body was mutilated off of the dead or the living.