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Post by joewiggs on Jun 2, 2012 20:18:58 GMT -5
You are only part right Tokeca Wanji. Reno's charge order is an order to attack. Breaking off a charge to form a skirmish line is a standard cavalry tactic. I see nothing wrong with what Reno did assuming there were all the NAs to his front that he claimed were there. I don't have Terry's written order in front of me, but towards the bottom there is a sentence that gives Custer the discretion to do he thinks he should do based upon the situation. That left things pretty much wide open for Custer. bc Well, all I know is that Wallace said Cooke told them to charge the village, Varnum also got that line and was ready to do exactly that when suddenly he looked behind and saw that Reno was setting up farther out for his attack. Wallace said they were told to "charge the village", Reno says a similar thing but says it in a way that sounds different, Reno said something to the effect of that he was sent to engage the indians or bring them to fight, possibly "charge after the indians". All of which would have different meanings than "charge the village" or "charge into the village" (gimme some slack if I misquote anyone). I think Terry's thing you're looking for might even be at the BEGINNING of the letter. But I ahven't looked it over in a while. Nonetheless I have seen it. It was in his orders to scout to the south though and I'm sure Custer would have faced some reprimands if any Indians had gotten past him in such a way had he not obeyed the order. While we're here (to everyone). I've been thinking about the "Benteen, Come on, Be Quick, Bring Packs ps Bring Packs" note. Since this was addressed to Benteen and not Reno, what would this mean? Was Benteen considered more in charge now? Was Reno not expected to come? Did Custer and his staff think Reno was already a goner? I agree with you 100% bc, breaking off the charge when confronted with the enemy in overwhelming numbers is sane and extremely plausible. My question is this, how many Indians actually confronted Reno? According to witnesses who were not soldiers (civilian scouts) for quite awhile the numbers were minimum. Eventually the number of warriors grew exceedingly numerous owning to an ineffective skirmish line and a commander who only wished to escape rather than fight. Would things have Been different if Reno was more like Custer? |
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Post by joewiggs on Jun 4, 2012 15:33:27 GMT -5
To be quite frank, I have found many glaring neon signs in the inquiry flashing a bright red to warn us that things are amiss. The officers' testimony was subdued, disconnected, and sometime out and out incorrect.
Wallace, the Engineer officer, had to known that Reno's battalion consisted of more than 112 men! Why the subterfuge? Such a small number of troops attacking a village of allegedly 9,000 Indians is, in itself, a preposterous idea calculated to make a mockery of Custer who would look all the more idiotic for ordering such an implausible tactic.
Another thing, in the era of this trial, social nuances were far different them than they are today. For example, a white woman who was forcibly raped by an Indian was considered to have suffered a "faith worse than death." What could this possibly mean? I'll tell you, it would have better that she died rather than surviving such an attack. Such a woman was ostracized from society, treated as a leper, and cast out!
Knowing this, Mr. Gilbert was allowed to denigrate the witness Girard by asking the question: "Have you any children by Indian women?" This question was sans any legal credibility nor relevance to the trial except to demean the witness because, unfortunately, the racism against the Indian was so horrific that a man who would stoop so low as to have intercourse for the purpose of having children was nothing more than an animal himself and, therefore, unworthy of civility and not to be given any credibility by the board whatsoever.
As incredible as the above appears to be it is absolutely reflective of white society at that particular time in history.
Gilbert went on to defame the very witnesses who were not afraid of military repercussions (failure to achieve future rank, being assigned to a outpost away from society, etc.) and whom told the truth.
If you doubt what I say, recall the board's response for justification of their finding. (paraphrase) "Well the officers would not tell us anything so we have no choice."
The officer class, the intelligentsia of that era, the untouchables in a world were class distinction was sacrosanct didn't say anything and the other witnesses, mere scouts, an Indian lover, mule packers, and an old and scared doctor certainly could not have their words taken over the words of an Officer and a Gentleman.
As Lee said in his closing, (paraphrase) "if we disavow the word of a man because of his birth right, we pervert the legal system."
Well, they did and they did!
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Post by tbw on Jun 4, 2012 19:23:14 GMT -5
To be quite frank, I have found many glaring neon signs in the inquiry flashing a bright red to warn us that things are amiss. The officers' testimony was subdued, disconnected, and sometime out and out incorrect. Wallace, the Engineer officer, had to known that Reno's battalion consisted of more than 112 men! Why the subterfuge? Such a small number of troops attacking a village of allegedly 9,000 Indians is, in itself, a preposterous idea calculated to make a mockery of Custer who would look all the more idiotic for ordering such an implausible tactic. Another thing, in the era of this trial, social nuances were far different them than they are today. For example, a white woman who was forcibly raped by an Indian was considered to have suffered a "faith worse than death." What could this possibly mean? I'll tell you, it would have better that she died rather than surviving such an attack. Such a woman was ostracized from society, treated as a leper, and cast out! Knowing this, Mr. Gilbert was allowed to denigrate the witness Girard by asking the question: "Have you any children by Indian women?" This question was sans any legal credibility nor relevance to the trial except to demean the witness because, unfortunately, the racism against the Indian was so horrific that a man who would stoop so low as to have intercourse for the purpose of having children was nothing more than an animal himself and, therefore, unworthy of civility and not to be given any credibility by the board whatsoever. As incredible as the above appears to be it is absolutely reflective of white society at that particular time in history. Gilbert went on to defame the very witnesses who were not afraid of military repercussions (failure to achieve future rank, being assigned to a outpost away from society, etc.) and whom told the truth. If you doubt what I say, recall the board's response for justification of their finding. (paraphrase) "Well the officers would not tell us anything so we have no choice." The officer class, the intelligentsia of that era, the untouchables in a world were class distinction was sacrosanct didn't say anything and the other witnesses, mere scouts, an Indian lover, mule packers, and an old and scared doctor certainly could not have their words taken over the words of an Officer and a Gentleman. As Lee said in his closing, (paraphrase) "if we disavow the word of a man because of his birth right, we pervert the legal system." Well, they did and they did! I'm certainly not one to defend Wallace. I think the man certainly had other priorities than to tell the truth. But there are things, like the number he and other reported, that might be taken out of the context of the question that was asked that produced the answer he and others responded with. If one takes 112 and divides that by 4 this number is an even 28, this number added back to the 112 totals 140. Was Wallace stating the effectual 'on the skirmish line' strength of Reno's battalion? This of course less the number of horseholders it would take to sufficiently hold and maintain their horses off the field of battle? The other part of your question has been addressed in other quarters that seems to place the burden of responsibility right in Custer's lap, just as you indicated. Why send a troop of 112 'on the skirmish line' effectual soldiers to take on 9,000 Indians? I think that number is grossley exaggerated. The most ever reported was by Benteen and he estimated that there was something like about 900 there in and around Reno's field when he arrived. Even Reno's own estimate was about half that number, around 500, so I think we'd have to examine this from those perspectives to really get to the heart of the matter. When one goes back into the records and digs you'll find that they typically sent troopers into situations where the odds weren't any worse than about 1 to 3, and that says alot of the situation Reno faced and also what Custer might have expected when he ordered him forward. The top number here of Indians Reno's men could have expected to have engaged and put out an effective volume of fire would have been around 350 warriors. So even Reno's own estimate [abt. odds of 1 to 4 1/2], even though lower than Benteens still made it impossible to engage them successfully and win, this according to Reno. Benteen's estimate of 900 gave the Indians odds of 8 to 1 over Reno's troopers, and there'd have been no way to have overcame that horde. So which is correct? To find out one need only look to Custer's own field. If the odds there would have been the same as Renos, 4 1/2 to 1, then Custer and his 225 men faced about 1000 warriors. And if Benteen's 8 - 1 odds then about 1800 warriors. Both of these estimates give us this: Total warriors on the field that day: Reno = 1500 Benteen = 2700 To be quite frank and honest here, one of the early estimates was right around 1800 warriors, and if we'd take into account that maybe about 300 of them didn't get into the battles that day, then Reno's estimate would come the closer of the two. So what exactly was Custer thinking when he sent Reno off and then split off and rode pell mell downstream about 5 to 6 miles to meet his own fate? Well for one thing, he either within minutes of sending Reno found out his mistake, as I've pointed out so many time, or he didn't. One requires seeing and being seen, the other requires stealth and not being seen. What most here don't do is see with their own eyes and believe what was said instead of what someone else says today. Within 15 minutes Custer would have been at the pinnacle of the bluffs overlooking the valley, this long before Reno ever dismounted. And the proof in that is Varnum's own sighting of elements of the White Horse Troop near point two just below Weir Peak as Reno was setting up his skirmish line. This is one of those testimonies that just wont go away because the timeframe works to perfection with Custer's reported gait down that right bank and matches with Reno's own speed as he made his way down the left bank. Now if Custer went over those bluffs, why didn't he see the danger? Think about this. Here he would have been at the pinnacle of the bluffs long before Reno ever set up his skirmish line, here gazing over the thousands of tepees and not seeing one Indian, not one pony etc. where Reno and his men did? At best there was something like about 600 to 700 tepee's there, and a quick survey of it told Custer all he needed to know. That there was too many of them for the forces he was currently sending them to battle so he sends for immediate help and support from Benteen, who really wasn't that far behind him. The problem with this supposed sighting is first, TIME and 2nd, PLACE. Too early (as in Reno hill etc.) and he could correct the situation, too late (as in anywhere beyond Weir Peak) and he'd have to deal with it the best way he could. Way too many today want him, need him, have to have him go over those bluffs, but when they try to place him there in the context as it was understood by Varnum's sighting of those few elements of the White Horse Troop, and it looks like the man either didn't care, wasn't scared and was truely one of those devil may care cavaliers in buckskins they made him out to be. Truth be told. there would have been no way Custer would have done what he did knowing what he should have known once he topped those bluffs that damn early. Think about this, here's Custer up there way too early and he's saying, "We've got them now, we'll finish up here and go home to our station" and Reno is saying not minutes if seconds later that he had determined it was impossible to continue the charge because of the same number of Indians Custer should have easily seen from the bluffs and to have known the same damn thing and he only see's encouraging signs? What? Those same Indians Reno was facing starting to flank his butt on both sides before Custer left Weir Peak, just as every trooper stated? The other thing here is the average number of tepees in each camp circle which would have numbered, on the average, somewhere in the 100 tepee range per circle. This estimate alone would have told Custer his troopers in total would face anywhere from 1500 to 2000 warriors and he does what, from where, and when? The man wasn't ignorant, stupid or glory crazed enough to keep going, but according to those early sightings from the bluffs, according to those that prefer that trail, that's what people want him to do? Either they're nuts or Custer was, they prefer to think he was, either that or that blasted dust storm prevented him from seeing anything from up there. But they forget, these sighting go two ways, not just Reno's men saw them up there, somewhere, at some time, but the Indians did too! Roll that dust into a ball and see if it'll float in the LBH. Custer didn't know all of this, because he didn't see it, and it wasn't reported to him until it was too late when he and his men topped the hill and looked down upon the village which was less than a half a mile from the LBH river, the one and only time that he did see it. And now for the "impossible" Joe mentioned. Custer topped the bluffs, Reno hasn't set up his skirmish line yet. Custer see's the some 600 to 700 tepees and knows that there is anywhere from 1500 to 2000 warriors there. And what does he do? He calls for Benteen's 124 men? Why? Custer had about 225, which according to the 1 to 3 odds meant that he and his men should have been able to have fended off about 675 warriors. We know there was at least 1000 warriors on him over on his end of the field, this according to Reno's figures. If he had been reinforced by Benteen, he would have had something like about 350 troopers there. This number at that same 1 to 3 odds gave him just enough men to fend off about 1000 Indians. Do you think he knew what he needed to do the job? And Benteen? They might have tried to conceal the number of Indians they really thought were there, but when presented with the facts as best as we can glean from their statements and testimony, it can be demonstrated, with reasonable estimates of effectiveness what Custer was trying to do. Who, when and where is what matters here, and still to this day it is ignored in preference to believing what he wasn't trying to accomplish from the earliest moments. Had that time been granted, which it wasn't, because the place wasn't where it has always been interpreted to have been, then the outcome would have been different. That it wasn't different demonstrates a lack of understanding and interpretation beyond belief. |
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Post by joewiggs on Jun 5, 2012 14:35:52 GMT -5
I agree with you and wish to apology for not using quotation marks for the estimate of "9,000" where appropriate. Like you I think that number is grossly exaggerated and, if I'm not mistaken, Wallace was one the witnesses who alleged the number were so ludicrously high!
The purpose of such numbers 112 and 9,000 was simply to show that Reno's task/order to charge the village was impossible to accomplish. The smaller the front number and the larger the back number (so the equation goes) is a formula intended to resolve any question that Reno had no chance to survive other than to cease the charge, go into skirmish, then flee to the hills.
Lets say that each warrior had one wife, and three children, the sum total of inhabitants of this camp becomes 45,000 people! That's not a camp but a city! Imagine the hygiene difficulties and grazing land for such an amount of people and, the 55,000 horses required to mount so many people? Yet, people today read this "estimation" of Indian inhabitants and mounts without a second glance or thought.
Keep in mind my figuring does not include mother-in-laws, father-in-laws, cousins, brothers, sisters mothers or fathers. That a graduate of West Point could find the unmitigated gall to make such an estimation is unbelievable to me!
Personally, I'm beginning to go along with Russel Means who claims there were no more than 800 warriors in the battle. His estimate is far more reasonable than Wallace!
I realize that it is a difficult pill to swallow but we must not forget the "contemporaneous mindset" of that historical era. Custer, Terry, Sherman, Sheridan, and Cook believed earnestly that the Indians would not "stand" against a Calvary charge. Historically, they had not until this incident. This fact does not condone Custer's game plan but, it does help us to understand why he did what he did.
When Reno charged down the valley floor his approach caused panic, fear, and mass confusion as "112" thundered toward them. Yes, some warriors in the area responded to this threat. The majority of then, initially, did not. Reno's fear of what he "thought" he saw produced his order for a skirmish line. The very second he did so, the warriors regrouped and all hell broke loose.
Would I recommend such an attack? Absolutely not! However, if Reno had not completely flunked out, the timely arrival of Benteen, consolidation of both commands, then a speedy response to Custer's position may have have prevented the entire slaughter of Custer and his men. Unfortunately we will never know because neither Benteen or Reno made an attempt to find Custer until it was too late to do so!
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Post by tbw on Jun 5, 2012 16:24:30 GMT -5
I agree with you and wish to apology for not using quotation marks for the estimate of "9,000" where appropriate. Like you I think that number is grossly exaggerated and, if I'm not mistaken, Wallace was one the witnesses who alleged the number were so ludicrously high! The purpose of such numbers 112 and 9,000 was simply to show that Reno's task/order to charge the village was impossible to accomplish. The smaller the front number and the larger the back number (so the equation goes) is a formula intended to resolve any question that Reno had no chance to survive other than to cease the charge, go into skirmish, then flee to the hills. Lets say that each warrior had one wife, and three children, the sum total of inhabitants of this camp becomes 45,000 people! That's not a camp but a city! Imagine the hygiene difficulties and grazing land for such an amount of people and, the 55,000 horses required to mount so many people? Yet, people today read this "estimation" of Indian inhabitants and mounts without a second glance or thought. Keep in mind my figuring does not include mother-in-laws, father-in-laws, cousins, brothers, sisters mothers or fathers. That a graduate of West Point could find the unmitigated gall to make such an estimation is unbelievable to me! Personally, I'm beginning to go along with Russel Means who claims there were no more than 800 warriors in the battle. His estimate is far more reasonable than Wallace! I realize that it is a difficult pill to swallow but we must not forget the "contemporaneous mindset" of that historical era. Custer, Terry, Sherman, Sheridan, and Cook believed earnestly that the Indians would not "stand" against a Calvary charge. Historically, they had not until this incident. This fact does not condone Custer's game plan but, it does help us to understand why he did what he did. When Reno charged down the valley floor his approach caused panic, fear, and mass confusion as "112" thundered toward them. Yes, some warriors in the area responded to this threat. The majority of then, initially, did not. Reno's fear of what he "thought" he saw produced his order for a skirmish line. The very second he did so, the warriors regrouped and all hell broke loose. Would I recommend such an attack? Absolutely not! However, if Reno had not completely flunked out, the timely arrival of Benteen, consolidation of both commands, then a speedy response to Custer's position may have have prevented the entire slaughter of Custer and his men. Unfortunately we will never know because neither Benteen or Reno made an attempt to find Custer until it was too late to do so! There would be some that would argue that the mission wasn't about saving Custer. Of that i'm not sure about. As most missions go where multiple teams are invested in performing their duties, when an element, say one of those teams is beset by unforseen circumstances, such that it would wipe out that entire team, upon which a major portion of the effort was invested, would it not be prudent to try to spare them that sacrifice if no other alternative was available upon which to use that sacrifice to better serve that mission and win? In this case neither was done. I think here of those circumstances which presented themselves in the Ia Drang valley in 1965 Vietnam. And that wasn't the only instance of it during that entire conflict. Khe Sanh being yet another and more to follow than can be shaken a stick at by exact example not just in that conflict, but too many another as well. So is it a relevent discussion? I think it is. And it most certainly should have been the issue at the COI. But, there was one stumbling block, both Reno and Benteen's testimony about their orders and about 'the plan', and the percieved whereabouts of any of those three commands at any point in time. And this is why we have so many attempts at trying to find the answers in the time-motion studies that some do today. Confusing? I long ago tried my own time-motion studies, and I must say I learned much from the attempt. Anyone who tries it must, and I simply must insist, MUST not read into the geological/geographical features that were merely descriptive by the participants more than what they said. There is, and was, a myriad of possibilities as to where their descriptions were. And to make it a for certain place, that is today identified with just one of many descriptive areas, making only one that someone said it was, as that for certain place, is not just wrong, it has badly skewed not just where it was, but what actually happened. From this then we've got: 1) Custer didn't attack anywhere. 2) Custer didn't have a clue as to what actions to take, offensively or defensively. 3) Custer didn't support Reno at any time. 4) Custer and his men died on ground that wasn't defensible. 5) Custer split his command and then even further subdivided his own in the face of heavy odds. 6) Custer sent Keogh with about 2/3rds of the command back and away from the action for what some say was a defensive back door. 7) Custer goes over the bluffs supposedly looking for a place to cross in full view of the entire village, thus ensuring the swarming ant theory instead of the mole hill theory. 8) Custer sent Reno to attack and he failed. 9) Custer Sent Benteen and he failed in all orders given him. And I needn't go further. It appears Custer was as fruity as a nut cake, twice as batty and didn't have a clue. Right? From all of this anyone could make up their own moronic theory and give it validity by throwing just about any current name descriptive of the Rock Martin's horse took a dump on as the one and only place where it had to have occurred, this just because so and so said so. Really? Just how damn batty is that? Yet such idiocy goes on and on as established fact when not one person ever verified that place as the one that still reeks of horse shit and then even not give it a 2nd thought. Whats wrong with the above? Custer's ignorance or Reno and Benteen's failure's? It wasn't what Custer observed that killed him, its what he didn't see that did. Custer's rate of speed down that right bank was, believe it or not, too damn fast, because not even the crows, who kept watch from the bluffs, had the time to catch up to him and his column to tell him until it was too late. The series of events that came after that is telling. Both of those notes, from Martin and kanipe tell that story a lot better than anyone to date has. And there was no room for error, no room for not doing as his subordinates were instructed. There was a point of no return. And there was a point when "come on...be quick" in light of the "big village", as reported, would overwhelm and did. There comes a point when sheer numbers rules the field, and those odds have been established throughout military history as numbers in excess of 4 to 1. |
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Post by joewiggs on Jun 7, 2012 12:21:01 GMT -5
I agree wholeheartedly that, eventually, sheer numbers ruled the day and brought about the demise of Custer's command. I also agree that time lines fail to reveal the root causes of the battle as known battle movements are difficult to determine and human error can be as difficult to judge effectively enough to infer specific blame for what did or did not happen.
We will never know for a certainty what really happened but, it may be possible to determine "nuances" social and political, that could have influenced the reporting by witnesses about what truthfully did occur.
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Post by tbw on Jun 7, 2012 17:52:02 GMT -5
I agree wholeheartedly that, eventually, sheer numbers ruled the day and brought about the demise of Custer's command. I also agree that time lines fail to reveal the root causes of the battle as known battle movements are difficult to determine and human error can be as difficult to judge effectively enough to infer specific blame for what did or did not happen. We will never know for a certainty what really happened but, it may be possible to determine "nuances" social and political, that could have influenced the reporting by witnesses about what truthfully did occur. I think you're correct. There is no way a complete timeline will ever help anyone to understand this battle any better. What Gray did was something no one else had ever tried, and for that he will forever be remembered in LBH history as someone who changed the conversation, and the way that battle was viewed. Short times, those times between events do have an impact upon what was possible and what wasn't, and that's where his greatest contribution has helped those who follow in his footsteps to understand those events better. But even then the possibility of error is just to great to make anything more comprehensive an attempt in futility. Nice to read, just as any old garage sale dime novel. |
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Post by joewiggs on Feb 3, 2013 19:05:51 GMT -5
Reno's Inquiry was a proper judicial format or it was a farce, or it was in the middle of both extremes. its up to the view to decide. Everyone knows how I feel about the inquiry I suppose. ;D
Anyhow, during the inquiry Mr. Gilbert felt it necessary to impugn Dr. Porter's testimony so he asked the good Doctors if he had been frightened during the battle. Being an honest man, he replied that he was a bit discomforted;who wouldn't be.
In his following summation, Mr. Gilbert said the following:
"During the limits of his duty, I greatly respect him, but if he has the gift courage, he did not it with him at all times on the 25Th. of June."
This was spoken of a man who slavishly tended the wounded and dying while bullets flew around him like a thousand angry hornets, striking horses and anything else in the general area.
Understandably, Mr. Gilbert had to denigrate every witness who did not speak glowing of Reno and/or was a civilian.
In the social caste system of that era, civilians were considered to be inferior to members of the officer class regardless of their position.
I understand Gilbert's tactics. What I don't understand is why he was not reprimanded by the board for such a boorish attack upon courageous humanitarian, Dr. Porter.
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Post by joewiggs on Feb 10, 2013 19:42:43 GMT -5
The following is an interesting letter written by private John Donahue that was sent to the Bismark Daily Tribune that literally rocked my socks off. You see, this letter reported military plans given to the 7Th. Cavalry by Custer to his men prior to his demise on Last Stand Hill. I found this letter utterly surprising because according to Reno and Benteen Custer issued no plans. Now, isn't that strange? However:
"Major Reno you will charge down the valley and keep everything before you:Captain Benteen will take the extreme left. I will take the extreme right myself with five companies. (General Custer here described the point that that Major Reno should strike the camp supported by Captain Benteen and his three companies.) I will strike them on the opposite point and we will crush them between us."
Unfortunately for Custer and his men, Reno prematurely fled and Benteen departed the southern approach of the valley and returned to Custer's trail which, eventually, placed him in support of Reno on Reno's Hill.
When the two commands, Reno's and Benteen's, met they chose to remain in relatively safety upon the hill rather than risk being annihilated by the Indians. Although they clearly heard the firing from Custer's position (who else could it have been?) they remained where they were and created a detestable story that Custer had fled the battlefield.
Is there any member of this forum who believes that a man like Custer would run away? If so, please identify yourself.
PS: How could a "grunt" like the above private be privy to battle plans yet, command officers had no clue what plans Custer had formulated? Here's a hint, when you are direct supporters (2nd. & third in command) of the superior officer and the battle wounds up being a complete fiasco you better do one of two things;kill yourselves or get ready to be Court marshaled.
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Post by whitebull on Feb 12, 2013 16:08:27 GMT -5
You really proved a point for me. A "grunt" wouldn't know what the plans were so Donahue was probably blowing smoke!
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Post by stumblingbear on Feb 15, 2013 18:26:47 GMT -5
You are so right Whitebull, a "grunt" should not know what the big wigs have planned. What happened, I think, is that the movements of each company were so plain that even "grunts" could figure things out. Sgt. Martin in a interview with Col. G.A. Graham said much of the same thing that Donahue reported.
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Post by joewiggs on Feb 16, 2013 13:09:21 GMT -5
You really proved a point for me. A "grunt" wouldn't know what the plans were so Donahue was probably blowing smoke! WB, Reno and Benteen were the only two individuals who insisted that Custer had no plans, at least to my knowledge. Their rationale for doing so was relatively simple;you can not disobey an order if you never receive one! Get it! Benteen was to reached the Big Horn valley for two purposes:block fleeing Indians and support Reno. when he decided that the trail was to rough for Indians(?) he departed from his orders and returned to Custer's original trail. Reno was order to attack the village, he chose not to. Both men disobeyed orders and both were forced to cover-up this fact. When you have 180 mounted men charging one way, a 135 or so mounted men moving in another direction, and 210 mounted men or so going in another it does not take a genius to figure out what was going on;even you. The village location was known and an attempt to attack from three directions was initiated. |
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Post by stumblingbear on Feb 16, 2013 19:13:38 GMT -5
Twenty-fifth Day: Portion of Gilbert's defense.
"The wisdom of Reno's action is still further seen in the fact that as soon as he did dismount, Indians to the number of 400 or 500, as testified to by several officers appeared in his front from out of a ravine into his command must certainly have plunged if he had continued charging."The Indians that Mr. Gilbert is talking about where running away as fast as they could just as Custer and others figured they would. Reno's charge had started a panic among the Indians.
That panic came to a screeching halt when Reno and his men stopped charging for no reason to the Indians. Happily surprised, they changed their minds and went after Reno who must have, they thought, a new way of fighting.
As for the ravine with the Indians coming out, in the dust that everyone kicked up (Soldiers and warriors) it wold have been impossible for Reno to have seen that ravine. His decision to stop had nothing to do with the ravine. Before having knowledge about it, Reno halted. Gilbert took an act of providence and attributed to Reno's "wisdom".
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Post by joewiggs on Feb 18, 2013 19:41:48 GMT -5
SB, Reno ceased his attack, I believe, not for what he saw but what he envisioned;too many warriors! He later justified his actions by playing upon the sympathy of the public opinion which was led to believe that the number of warriors he encountered were overwhelming;they certainly were not.
When Reno bolted from the timber, only two men had been shot. The timbers perimeter had been abandoned by the soldiers who received no instructions and who were inundated with the sound of "charge", "we are going to charge", a disembodied sound that helped to instill panic among the troopers. Reno's leadership was null. He chose to leave a defensible position to reach a position of uncertainty; a place much harder to defend then the timber.
Ask yourself this question, why leave a military position known to you and defensible for a location unknown and whose defensive qualities are unknown? Panic!
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Post by whitebull on Feb 20, 2013 16:35:39 GMT -5
I guess I have to say I see your point. The hill was a lot more open than the timber and if the Indians hadn't pulled off when they did who knows what would have happen to Reno's men. Reno charged before ever getting to the hill that he wound up on so he could not have known what it was like for defense.
The rest of what you say may or may not have happened. Who knows for sure.
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