Battle of the Rosebud

[stumblingbear]

I have a question that has been on my mind for sometime because I have never been able to find an answer to this question.

On June 16, General Crook commanded a force of over 1,300 soldiers to battle the Sioux. About 8:30 on June 17 the Sioux surprised Crook and fought his men to a standstill before leaving.

"By the standards of Indian warfare it had been an extremely long and bloody engagement. Estimates of Indian casualties run as high as 102 killed and wounded. Crook could have pursued the Indians, but having expended 60% of his total ammunition (barely sufficient to keep the hostiles at bay), was persuaded to withdraw."

Red Sabbath Robert J. Kershaw

My question is this, why did Crook not inform Terry of his battle with the very same Indians all three commands were looking for. That information alone would have forced Terry to combine his troops to fight Indians who, obviously, were eager to fight and not run!?

Why was Crook not chastised for this mistake?

[joewiggs]

Like you, I don't have an answer to that question. I can only speculate. After the Civil War, the achievement of rank became nearly impossible due to the extreme decrease in military personnel which dramatically decreased all promotions. However, some of the same ambitious, glory seeking, and extroverted "leaders" of the Civil War were still around after wards. Everyone of whom desired to rise further up the scale of rank. With the "Southern Army" no longer in the field, an enemy of much lesser military prowess (Indians) had to serve their nefarious purposes. That the Indians who refused to give up their way of living would, eventually, be exterminated was a foregone conclusion. The way in which this would happen resulted in two unforeseen conclusion;the Indians won when they should have not won and More American soldiers died in the process than should have. .

Men like Crook, Custer, and others saw the "Indian problem" as the last chance to achieve notoriety and fame. Jealous of this fast fleeting opportunity, these men did not wish to share success with any other leader. Rather than truly working in concert with either, the military leaders only played lip service to the idea of a common goal while,in actuality, they were looking out for their own self interest.

I'm not suggesting that my personal conclusion to your question is the ultimate answer. What I am suggesting is that is the mis-communication and/or lack of communicating altogether between Sheridan and his generals was indescribably short to the point of gross neglect. The same can be said regarding the lack of any exchange of military intelligence between Sherman's Generals themselves!

[tbw]

Jul 20, 2013 19:18:10 GMT -5 stumblingbear said:

I have a question that has been on my mind for sometime because I have never been able to find an answer to this question.

On June 16, General Crook commanded a force of over 1,300 soldiers to battle the Sioux. About 8:30 on June 17 the Sioux surprised Crook and fought his men to a standstill before leaving.

"By the standards of Indian warfare it had been an extremely long and bloody engagement. Estimates of Indian casualties run as high as 102 killed and wounded. Crook could have pursued the Indians, but having expended 60% of his total ammunition (barely sufficient to keep the hostiles at bay), was persuaded to withdraw."

Red Sabbath Robert J. Kershaw

My question is this, why did Crook not inform Terry of his battle with the very same Indians all three commands were looking for. That information alone would have forced Terry to combine his troops to fight Indians who, obviously, were eager to fight and not run!?

Why was Crook not chastised for this mistake?

Early in June Gen'l. Crook's camp was on the northeastern slope of the Big Horn Mountains. This camp was on Goose Creek near what today is Sheridan, Wyoming. Now before someone lets this little tidbit of information blow over their heads, read it again and apply that to a map. You'll find that Sheridan Wyoming is only about 75 miles south of Custer's LBH battlefield. About 60 miles North of Sheridan lies a little village called Lodge Grass. At that point it is only about 16 miles to the LBH battlefield. And about another 15 miles east of there, as the crow flies, is the Rosebud battlefield Crook fought the same Indians Custer did about 9 days later. Keep this in mind as this narrative progresses.

It was Gen. Sheridan who planned this entire fiasco, or operation if you prefer. What had been happening was the Indians had been leaving their reservations located on and around Fort Robinson Nebraska, again locate it on a map before proceeding, its not just a willy nilly out of the way place that needs to be read and not understood within this content and context of this narrative... and they, the hostiles, had they been doing this not only in a continual stream weekly and monthly, but on a daily basis as well. When they left these reservations they had to travel northwesterly some 350 miles or so to where Sitting Bull was to hold his version of the Ghost Dance along Ash Creek. But to get to him they had to do, and was doing, what Sheridan didn't want them to do, they had to go around Crook and his encampment along the Goose Creek to get to Sitting Bull. And they did this in the most advantageous way they could, through the Sacred Black Hills of South Dakota. So Sheridan in an attempt to corral the amoeba sized krill calls for the 5th cavalry regiment, stationed in Kansas, and orders them to Cheyenne Wyoming where they were to make a rapid march into the Black Hills and stop this infiltration around Crooks position.

What needs to be understood at this point it that the hostiles were between Crook and his station at Goose Creek, Sheridan Wyoming, situated on the NE corner of the Big Horn Mtn's and was the headwaters of the Tongue - and - Terry and Gibbon's column being at or near that same streams mouth (the Tongue), which virtually would have meant an instant death sentence for any wayward courier sent from one column to the other had it been attempted at that time.

The Indians had harassed Crook's outposts and disrupted his supply trains. And by June Crook had had enough and went out to find them and assess their strength, of course most likely on Sheridans orders, after all he'd been as blind as a bat so far anyway and about as effective as an army of Blue whales in the Pacific Ocean trying to seine every krill on the planet through his army's teeth.

While there are a few respected researchers and so called historians, such as Caroll and Connell who pretty much infer that Gen. Crook was somehow negligent in his duties in not informing the other commands, namely Terry, Gibbon, about his fight and subsequent retreat, it can now be seen that had such an attempt been directly tried it would have met with failure because the Indians were en-masse between those commands. I think we tend to forget they didn't have walkie talkies and only talking wires which were easily cut by the hostiles and the nearest about 300 miles away. The only message Crook sent was to Gen. Townsend at Fort Lincoln dated 23rd June, 1876. Included in this dispatch it was stated that his force, again not forget how many troops he had, had "withdrawn" and he had ordered additional company's of infantry to bolster his own and that he would, in all probability unless forced to do so, not make any movement until those reinforcements arrived. This same dispatch was forwarded to Gen. Terry but it arrived to late and to long after the LBH battles conclusion.

The reports don't favor Crook, but then again they never seem to absolve any frontier commander of modern perceived wrong doing, do they? His losses and the number of expended ammunition doesn't seem to favor any kind of reprieve for the man. I mean after all he'd fired how much ammo, something like 25,000 rounds, about 20 or so rounds per trooper involved in the Battle of the Rosebud, and then, they only caused something like 30 to 80 Cheyenne and Lakota casualties. Damn that sorry man's hide, right? Seems they weren't any more productive than Custer's own elite at marksmanship teams aloft battle ridge. And it's been stated by more than one researcher that this (the ammo, other logistics and the reinforcements) was the reason why Crook wasn't in any kind of position to support Custer any time after his own retreat and subsequent reinforcements.

And its been brought up before that if Terry didn't try to attempt to send a message to Crook informing him of the information from Reno's scout and the subsequent planning on the Far West, why should Crook have not tried to do the same after his failed battle on the Rosebud, neither did so why belabor the point? Its because of the conclusions drawn. It would not have been 'acting separately' and 'a waste of time', that's for sure as it was barely a days ride for any courier attempting it. And its about saving lives, and that's not a waste of anyone's time, at any time, then, now or far into the future.

So once again any definite plans fall squarely into the lap of the overall commander, Gen. Sheridan. A plan which was by order given to Gibbon, Custer, Terry and Crooke. It was a joint plan of of combined operation and cooperation between the columns, which didn't include independent movement as will subsequently be fully explained and detailed. It was an operation where taking a chance on defeat by superiority of force by insufficient means wasn't being contemplated, anticipated or expected. It is here to be remembered the expected computations of warrior strength which heretofore had been figured between 4000 to 6000 fighting warriors and found true by the mile wide trail found by Reno's men on his scout and subsequent report back to Terry, Gibbon and not the least by Custer himself.

Terry's own plan expounded upon the Far West emulated Sheridan's own, that the two column's should be brought withing cooperating distance of the other. Gibbon, November 1876, "I saw Custer depart on the 22nd with his fine regiment fully impressed with the conviction that our chief aim should be to so move that whatever force might be on the LBH should not escape us - And it was fully understood between us that to give my troops time to get up and to guard against escape of the Indians to the South, he (Custer) should keep constantly feeling to his left."

Now the question here must be entertained. Why should it be that Custer give Gibbons "troops time to get up and to guard against escape of the Indians to the South", when it was known that Crooke's own were there, about 75 miles south in fact on Goose Creek? Was it because they'd infiltrated past his position before? Or was it because if Custer had taken that extra day and marched south, they might have joined up with one of Crook's outpost, and thus Crooke himself? The purpose was clearly instructed in Terry's report; Custer was supposed to have kept on going south - after he had determined where the trail led, and NOT FOLLOWED IT. The purpose was at minimum, twofold, 1) to catch any fleeing Indians, should they have tried it and, 2) just as important, to give time for Gibbon's column to come up. And possibly 3 fold, unstated but in Terry's mind, To attempt to meet up with Crooke's troops. Why this third? The plan as stated was that if the Indians fled (and wasn't that always what Custer thought they were doing or going to do?) that they could not go west because of the mountains, where they couldn't maintain their lifestyle for very long. They couldn't go north or they'd meet up with Gibbon. And couldn't go east for obvious reasons. The basics of Terry's plan was simple in design and execution as he clearly directed those columns movements in such a manner that if the Indians did flee, which he himself thought they would, that they could not escape southward without being countered by Crooke troops, with... Custer's own in pursuit. Terry's plan was not to attack them where they were, but, TO MAKE OR INDUCE THEM TO FLEE!

Terry ordered Herendeen to go with Custer, this for the expressed purpose of communicating with Gibbon's column. A coordinating effort to often abused by the ignorant; whereupon discovering the result of the examination of the upper part of Tulloch's Creek that man was to be sent back by Custer to communicate those findings to Gibbon. Obviously they wouldn't be fleeing yet would they? But then again, what did Custer know at the time the 'examination of the upper part of Tulloch's creeks' would have been made complete? Like where they, the hostiles, had been found by their own scouts on the evening of the 24th? How much information wasn't enough to impart to Gibbon? That they wouldn't be fleeing until Custer and his men saw the very whites of the Indians eyes? And that hadn't occurred yet, so, why send Herendeen?

[stumblingbear]

Thank you so much for your reply. I guess Sheridan being responsible for the plan says a lot about why he did not investigate the outcome of the battle! I forget the author's name who said,
"Custer lost because the Indians won" just about sums it all up!

[tbw]

I personally don't think its as easy as that. I think we all tend to take things for granted, I know I do. And I feel about as tall as an ant when I do that and find something that completely undermined my position.

There's certainly enough blame to go around on this thing and enough for an army bigger than this planet would hold to argue the finer points to any definitive conclusion where all would lay down their weapons of cheerful banter as far as swords and plow sheers are concerned.

I know only like you and others what has been written prior about this matter. And like you, no better, no worse, have formed opinions, most are contrary to others so I'm not so prone to discuss this as freely and openly as I used to do. But just based upon the loose evidence laying all over the place I'd have to say that "fleeing" crap had a hell of a lot to do with what happened that shouldn't have. I mean look at it.

Davern, coi

1) "The General directs you to take your three companies and drive everything before you"
2) Was anything else said?
A. Yes sir; "Colonel Benteen will be on your left and will have the
same instructions".

He was later asked to repeat what he'd made prior claim to and stated it this way

"...General directs you to take your three companies and drive everything before you. Col. Benteen will be on your left and will have the same instructions."


Reno coi

Capt. Benteen had started to the left up the hill, I had no instructions in reference to him, and I asked him where he was going and what he was going to do. I don't recollect his reply exactly; but it was to the effect that he was to drive everything before him on the hill.

Pull this all together with what Girards said and Its a no brainer.

Girard coi

At half-past 11 or so we pulled out, and got to the head of the column and waited until Gen Curter came up; and then he reported his orders to me to be sure to have the Indians follow the left-hand trail, no matter how small it might be - he didn't want any of the camps of the Sioux to escape him. He wanted to get them all together and drive them down to the Yellowstone.

++++++++++++

No wonder Benteen thought his orders senseless; and that his services upon disobeying Custers senseless orders and turning back to help "on the ridge" was more important than driving and herding an enemy that wasn't having any part of it.

[joewiggs]

tbw, a great job as usual and a wonderful summation of "things" that were said that may have been forgotten, distorted, misused by witnesses.
The validity of testimony is best served when substantiated by physical evidence and valid witnesses.

To confirm the validity of a witness the witness's "motive" must be critically examined. If motive is skewed so will the testimony. Much of this occurred after the battle because the actions of several participants were questioned.

For example, Benteen's decision to return to Custer's trail was a not based upon what actually was going on but, what he assumed was going on. He assumed that the Indians had made no attempt to escape from the valley, which they hadn't.

Instead of sending a fast courier to Custer with this vital information, while still confirming his orders, he returned to the trail left by Custer's command.

He eventually espies Martin and, rather than responding to Custer's last known location, he continues to Reno Hill. Only upon reaching the base of the hill did he witness a portion of Reno's command being attacked. Then, and only then did Benteen surmise that something was amiss. Upon reaching Reno, his worse suspicions were realized.

If Benteen had continued his mission as ordered, he would have entered the village via the valley to Reno's right;a of support that may have turned the tide for the 7th. Calvary that day.

Later, when questions were asked and blame was passed, Benteen shrouded his orders in a cloud of confusion that only served to distort his participation (or lack thereof) from being known to others.

Benteen was certainly no coward and he was a tremendous fighter but, this time he was just too smart for his own britches.

[tbw]

Jul 21, 2013 16:31:22 GMT -5 joewiggs said:

tbw, a great job as usual and a wonderful summation of "things" that were said that may have been forgotten, distorted, misused by witnesses.
The validity of testimony is best served when substantiated by physical evidence and valid witnesses.

To confirm the validity of a witness the witness's "motive" must be critically examined. If motive is skewed so will the testimony. Much of this occurred after the battle because the actions of several participants were questioned.

For example, Benteen's decision to return to Custer's trail was a not based upon what actually was going on but, what he assumed was going on. He assumed that the Indians had made no attempt to escape from the valley, which they hadn't.

Instead of sending a fast courier to Custer with this vital information, while still confirming his orders, he returned to the trail left by Custer's command.

He eventually espies Martin and, rather than responding to Custer's last known location, he continues to Reno Hill. Only upon reaching the base of the hill did he witness a portion of Reno's command being attacked. Then, and only then did Benteen surmise that something was amiss. Upon reaching Reno, his worse suspicions were realized.

If Benteen had continued his mission as ordered, he would have entered the village via the valley to Reno's right;a of support that may have turned the tide for the 7th. Calvary that day.

Later, when questions were asked and blame was passed, Benteen shrouded his orders in a cloud of confusion that only served to distort his participation (or lack thereof) from being known to others.

Benteen was certainly no coward and he was a tremendous fighter but, this time he was just too smart for his own britches.

I'm not as convinced about the 'assumed' part of this as you claim. Both Benteen and Reno made it seemed they knew way to little about what was going on around them than they testified to at the COI. They seemed more than eager and more than willing to keep their heads stuck in the sand when it came to where Custer went to and what he was supposed to be doing there. AND keep the mysterious disappearance of 250 troopers under the rug, swept clean until Gibbon and Terry arrived several days later.

There was an aspect to this that most today swallow, hook, line and sinker - that is accepted at face value, and it was nothing else but a bald faced lie. And that was the 'advanced position' they took up after Reno's failed trip downstream to locate and communicate with Custer. What did they see from that 'advanced position'? Now go back and read what they said about not knowing where Custer was when Terry arrived a few days later. They knew, damned them, they knew, and the COI let them get away with that damnedable lie. Not only that, but they let them get away with the damned notion that they had no idea what Custer's plans were. They knew what those plans were and both Reno and Benteen didn't agree with them and all that was buried in the pride of the 7th, much like the 'poor Libby' excuse that was bandied around the campfires as an excuse not to let lose of that well kept secret and the reasons for it.

Girards testimony, that wasn't something the court wanted to hear is all we have of Custer's plans. And as unbelievable as it might seem, that's exactly what Custer was trying to accomplish.

Girard ROI

At half-past 11 or so we pulled out, and got to the head of the column and waited until Gen Custer came up; and then he reported his orders to me to be sure to have the Indians follow the left-hand trail, no matter how small it might be - he didn't want any of the camps of the Sioux to escape him. He wanted to get them all together and drive them down to the Yellowstone.

Now where else will you ever hear what Custer's plans were that day? And what made Custer believe that he could have induced them to flee AND further more make sure their direction was towards the Yellowstone river when they did? NOTE, Not "if they did" - when they did!

There was several factors in Custer's attack that were never seriously considered. Numero Uno was of course the fleeing aspect of this he needed to have happen. If they wouldn't be scared enough to on first sight of such a demonstration, flee the largest agglomeration of white troopers ever to hit the plains, then they'd have to be convinced that such a force could and indeed would inflict enough casualties upon them that they would have no alternative than to flee the field. And in which direction? Towards the Yellowstone River which was North and right into the hands of Gibbon and Terry. AND how would that be best accomplished, the Indians located where they were?

We know the Indians knew where Crook was, in fact many of them thought it was Crook who was attacking them. And that was part of the reason they fled to the south after the battle, they didn't think he was there, they thought he was there at the LBH. Of course the other part of this was Terry/Gibbons column and their known whereabouts by the Indians, and of course when that information would have been available to them.

This after the fact information does little to confirm what Girard said Custer would be trying to accomplish. And for that one must take a look at the orders and placement of Custer's troopers undertook that day that should have made the Indians flee the opposite direction than they did take several days later. That direction - North to the Yellowstone.

What made Custer think that those Indians would have gone North? We've already discussed the cardinal issues associated with what direction they wouldn't have gone. But one card in Custer's full deck at that time was Gen. Crook and where he was and that card was played that day betting that the Indians would choose to go North not knowing whether or not it was Crook who was actually attacking them or not. And to insure this, was the reason Custer placed Reno's battalion where he did. The only unit we know of to cross the river that day. Custer then proceeded downriver for what purpose? To make sure those Indians didn't go East. It's been theorized that Custer was trying to attain the river flats below the cemetery. In fact nothing was further from the truth. He was looking for terrain where, if the Indians didn't flee, that they would after he gave them a sound thrashing. Certain events made him change his mind, and that was the non-warrior aspect of this reported by Martin at the COI - ie. where were they? And the 'oh well' aspect of this that led him to believe only the old, women and children were there for the taking. He'd been duped into believing what his eyes told him and not what his intuition should have known. But then He as well as all of his troopers were HOT, dirty, tired, thirsty and at the time hungry enough to believe anything they saw and more than willing to get it over with as quick as they could.

[tbw]

Briefly lets revisit some of this that has been passed over.

The basics of Terry's plan was simple in design and execution as he clearly directed those columns movements in such a manner that if the Indians did flee, which he himself thought they would, that they could not escape southward without being countered by Crooke troops, with... Custer's own in pursuit. Terry's plan was not to attack them where they were, but, TO MAKE OR INDUCE THEM TO FLEE! And as we now know so was the same Custer's plan as well. But. Where they one and the same?

Terry ordered Herendeen to go with Custer, this for the expressed purpose of communicating with Gibbon's column. A coordinating effort to often abused by the ignorant; whereupon discovering the result of the examination of the upper part of Tulloch's Creek that man was to be sent back by Custer to communicate those findings to Gibbon.

Obviously they wouldn't be fleeing yet would they?

But then again, what did Custer know at the time the 'examination of the upper part of Tulloch's creeks' would have been made complete? - Like where they, the hostiles, had been found by their own scouts on the evening of the 24th? How much information wasn't enough to impart to Gibbon? That they wouldn't be fleeing until Custer and his men saw the very whites of the Indians eyes? And that hadn't occurred yet, so, why send Herendeen?

It was Custer's intention to attack that village. But it went against the wishes of his superior officer, Terry. who had told him in his letter of instruction that once he'd found the trail Reno discovered that he didn't want him to 'follow it'. That he should still ignore it and maintain direction, this supposedly so that it would give Gibbon the time to get to the field of battle. And if the Indians would have fled, which direction would he, Terry, have supposed them to have gone? There was nothing in Terry's orders that would indicate that he didn't expect them to flee. In fact he knew that they would, whether by the mere sight of such that a regiment of whites should do, or, that they should after said regiment have given them a sound thrashing so they would.

How do we know that Custer wanted something special from this battle? Patton once said, "information is like eggs, the fresher the better." And Terry had constructed a set time and place for Custer to report back. There was not one condition in Custer's orders that allowed him to shrug off making that report, and the time and place it should have been accomplished. And it was that Herendeen business. It didn't matter whether they found Indians, traces of Indians, or no signs of Indians on the Tullochs. The purpose of that scout and the sending back of that information was crucial for Terry to know where Custer was and in that regard what Terry would have had Gibbon do to either make up time or slow Gibbon down to coordinate those two columns when and where they needed to have been. In concert with this Terry specifically instructed Custer to find the trail Reno spoke of but also specifically instructed Custer NOT to follow it. And again the reasons for that are perfectly clear. Terry would know how long it would take for Custer to keep going in that coordination effort to make double sure both columns met where they were supposed to have met on the 26th.

Did Custer disobey orders. Not exactly, because he was given certain liberties, on his own, when "nearly in contact with the enemy" which Custer took full advantage of without the notion that they couldn't do the job alone.

[tbw]

Of course none of this matters much if they didn't know where each other's column was or would have been. Did they?

6/8/1876
“Hand,” Indian courier reports 1273 lodges of S.B.’s warriors on way to Powder River to fight General Crook. On May 17 this group told Egan that they had met Custer about May 10 and had fought them all day…many killed on both sides. Spotted Tail people are at home and that many (Indians) have left Red Cloud and other agencies on the Missouri river. This info forwarded 6/9 by General Sheridan.

6/20/1876 Sheridan forwarding Terry’s report of 12th on arrival at junction of the Powder & Yellowstone rivers, and giving intended movements of his command.

“Camp at junction of Powder & Yellowstone rivers at a point 24 miles above here late on the 7th inst. No Indians east of Powder river. Reno with 6 companies 7th Cavalry is now well up the river on his way to the forks whence he will cross to and come down Mispah Creek and thence by Pumpkin Creek to Tongue river where I expect to meet him with the rest of the cavalry fresh supplies. I intend then if nothing new is developed to send Custer with nine companies of his regiment upon the Tongue and thence across to and down the Rosebud while the rest of the 7th will join Gibbons who will move up the Rosebud. Have met Gibbon and concentrated movements with him. Troops and animals in fine condition. Signed, Alfred H. Terry, Brigadier General”


6/24/1876 Relating to Sheridan announcing results of Crook’s several hours of fight with Sioux on 17th … and that Terry & Gibbon have formed a junction and will resume fight where Crook left off.

“To: Sheridan, Chicago, June 19 … Fm: Crook, Camp south of Tongue River, Wyo … Returned to camp today having marched as indicated in my last telegram. When about 40 miles from here on Rosebud Creek, Montana, morning of 17th inst., Scouts reported Indians in vicinity and within a few minutes we are attacked in force. The fight lasting several hours. We went near the mouth of a deep cañon through which the creek ran. The sides were very steep, covered with Pine and apparently impregnable. The village supposed to be at the other end about 8 miles off.. They displayed strong force at all points, occupying so many and such covered places that it is impossible to correctly estimate their number. Their attack, however, showed that they anticipated that they were strong enough to thoroughly defeat the command. During the engagement I tried to throw a strong force through the cañon but I was obliged to use it elsewhere before it had gotten to the supposed location of the village. The command finally drove the Indians back in great confusion following them several miles. The scouts killing a good many during the retreat. Our casualties were 9 men killed and 15 wounded Second Cavalry, 3 man wounded 4th Infantry, and Captain Henry, 3rd Cavalry, severely wounded in the face. It is impossible to correctly estimate the losses of the Indians, many being killed in the rocks, others being gotten off before we got possession of that part of the field. 13 dead bodies being left. We remained on the field that night and having nothing but what each man carried himself, we were obliged to return to the train to properly care for our wounded who were transported here on mule litters. Are comfortable, all doing well. I expect to find those Indians in rough places all the time. I have now ordered 5 companies of Infantry and shall not probably make an extended movement until they arrive. Officers and men behaved with marked gallantry during the engagement. Crook, Brig. Gen’l”

“The movements of Gen’l Terry indicated in his dispatch of 12th that lead me to believe that he is at or near the Rosebud. About this time he had formed a junction with Gibbon and will undoubtedly take up the fight which Crook discontinued for want of supplies and to take care of his wounded. I communicated to Gen’l Crook by carrier from Feterman the position and instructions of Gen’l Terry. He must have received it before this date. Sheridan, Lieut. General”

[joewiggs]

Understood and appreciated! Thank you
sir!