Post by tbw on Jan 2, 2014 16:47:44 GMT -5
Through all my research on this vast subject, there are several crucial points to consider while we all go forward with this work.
1) Why did every element of the 7th U.S. Cavalry become immobile on Jun 25th, 1876? The when, where and why of each battalion is each important as the next to understand as the other.
2) Clearly. The 7th Cavalry at the LBH was undermanned when trying to defend in open ground while still trying to retain forward offensive power. The latter of which is what historically Cavalry was supposed to do. In every instance on that battle field, defensive positions were sought for what purpose?
Everyone who has ever dealt with military theory knows that defending a position is easier with less men, and therefore more men could have been added into either a general reserve or strike force. So, why didn't Custer press the attack when he had the opportunity to have done so, but instead retreated into defensive position(s)?
3) I'm going out on a limb here and speculate that the 7th Cavalry was at least 50% deficient in fighting experience because of my own research on the matter. Yet. The 7th Cavalry was a mobile force, but for the lack of manpower, it was somehow compelled or forced on them to use those same implements of mobility to simply sit and survive in each and every instance on that battlefield. Why? There's a vast difference between the two choices.
4) I think it can not only be assumed, but rationalized that the paralysis of those battalions in action that day was reflected by the slowed reaction of the average individual trooper and expressed that way in the RCOI testimony. And this again has been, and perhaps always will be reflected in any modern analysis and interpretation of events. The pace at times becomes retarded until it seems as unreal as a motion picture in slow motion. Thus the energy and fire spent by both side becomes all out of proportion to the meagerness of the stakes and the numbers of men who were actively fighting to seize or hold ground. It was as if both sides were at grips with something they could neither let go of or hold. Which leads us to this question: What conditions existed which radically limited their opportunities where neither could let go of, or hold?
5) The final place where Custer's troopers died didn't then, nor does it now, make much sense. Those final placements seemed to be arbitrary and according to each local commanders whim rather than any accepted or standardized accepted fire principals of the day. Sometimes it was along the topographical crest. Sometimes it was along the military crest. And along still other ridges, where it was somewhere between the two. But all these variations didn't appear to be governed by dominant terrain conditions. For example: The topographical crest was to sheer to defend, or the military crest being rejected because it was to far down slope. In this throughout Custer's field there was no discernible pattern from any perceived beginning of that battle until its end. why?
6) The enemy. The Native American operational modus operandi were a vanishing act on a grand scale. To defend was to be unseen and towards that end the camps were placed in positions that were difficult if not impossible to detect from a distance, and were in such locations as to throw suspicion on what might be being observed from those distances even when things were observed. The cavalry wouldn't and couldn't have been said to have reserved the same for themselves. When the Indians attacked, their individuals were covert, light of foot and highly elusive, the same couldn't be said of the 7th. Sure, the Indians were a crude lot, given more to pell-mell attacks than to deception and protection. When war came to them, apart from exceptional skill and persistence with their own weapons, they were not accurate users of the white mans guns in pressing the attack home, that is until the LBH. By that time they had become as tenacious as a horde of fire ants pouring out to defend their own, and in that lay a great part of their success. Because on that day they had become as skilled as any in the world in the techniques of hitting, evading and surviving, something as timelessly natural to them as the time it took him to eat his meal without recollection of the exacting time as the white man knew it, or, for that matter, comprehended it enough to know what, if anything it meant. What did/does it mean?
7th)
When we finish here, will we know practically everything that happened to those battalions and the individual men during the fight? Will we be able to determine events in almost exact chronological order? And will we account for the manner in which most of the men had been killed or wounded as well as how effectively or ineffectively their weapons had been used? We all know of the self serving egotistical and self bleating of those insidious individual and naturally quite deceiving efforts of those in lone effort to only share and shed light upon what they believe; they, as all can do no other. Will working as a group here be enable all of us to reconstruct a confusing action where clarification becomes more possible, indeed almost inevitable by the unselfish and sharing efforts of the many? Only you know the answer to that. That while keeping to the subject(s) as presented above. There must be order to this, something the RCOI never did.
Come, join if you already have not, and add in your thoughts and vision on the subjects presented without fear of in-fight, retribution or unbridled passion. Remember the words unselfish, sharing, and I'll add yet another as equally important, caring; its important to remember these because its very obvious that not one person to this date, and possibly forever longer, knows what happened in this fight enough to fight over something they don't know. Isn't that why we are all here?
1) Why did every element of the 7th U.S. Cavalry become immobile on Jun 25th, 1876? The when, where and why of each battalion is each important as the next to understand as the other.
2) Clearly. The 7th Cavalry at the LBH was undermanned when trying to defend in open ground while still trying to retain forward offensive power. The latter of which is what historically Cavalry was supposed to do. In every instance on that battle field, defensive positions were sought for what purpose?
Everyone who has ever dealt with military theory knows that defending a position is easier with less men, and therefore more men could have been added into either a general reserve or strike force. So, why didn't Custer press the attack when he had the opportunity to have done so, but instead retreated into defensive position(s)?
3) I'm going out on a limb here and speculate that the 7th Cavalry was at least 50% deficient in fighting experience because of my own research on the matter. Yet. The 7th Cavalry was a mobile force, but for the lack of manpower, it was somehow compelled or forced on them to use those same implements of mobility to simply sit and survive in each and every instance on that battlefield. Why? There's a vast difference between the two choices.
4) I think it can not only be assumed, but rationalized that the paralysis of those battalions in action that day was reflected by the slowed reaction of the average individual trooper and expressed that way in the RCOI testimony. And this again has been, and perhaps always will be reflected in any modern analysis and interpretation of events. The pace at times becomes retarded until it seems as unreal as a motion picture in slow motion. Thus the energy and fire spent by both side becomes all out of proportion to the meagerness of the stakes and the numbers of men who were actively fighting to seize or hold ground. It was as if both sides were at grips with something they could neither let go of or hold. Which leads us to this question: What conditions existed which radically limited their opportunities where neither could let go of, or hold?
5) The final place where Custer's troopers died didn't then, nor does it now, make much sense. Those final placements seemed to be arbitrary and according to each local commanders whim rather than any accepted or standardized accepted fire principals of the day. Sometimes it was along the topographical crest. Sometimes it was along the military crest. And along still other ridges, where it was somewhere between the two. But all these variations didn't appear to be governed by dominant terrain conditions. For example: The topographical crest was to sheer to defend, or the military crest being rejected because it was to far down slope. In this throughout Custer's field there was no discernible pattern from any perceived beginning of that battle until its end. why?
6) The enemy. The Native American operational modus operandi were a vanishing act on a grand scale. To defend was to be unseen and towards that end the camps were placed in positions that were difficult if not impossible to detect from a distance, and were in such locations as to throw suspicion on what might be being observed from those distances even when things were observed. The cavalry wouldn't and couldn't have been said to have reserved the same for themselves. When the Indians attacked, their individuals were covert, light of foot and highly elusive, the same couldn't be said of the 7th. Sure, the Indians were a crude lot, given more to pell-mell attacks than to deception and protection. When war came to them, apart from exceptional skill and persistence with their own weapons, they were not accurate users of the white mans guns in pressing the attack home, that is until the LBH. By that time they had become as tenacious as a horde of fire ants pouring out to defend their own, and in that lay a great part of their success. Because on that day they had become as skilled as any in the world in the techniques of hitting, evading and surviving, something as timelessly natural to them as the time it took him to eat his meal without recollection of the exacting time as the white man knew it, or, for that matter, comprehended it enough to know what, if anything it meant. What did/does it mean?
7th)
When we finish here, will we know practically everything that happened to those battalions and the individual men during the fight? Will we be able to determine events in almost exact chronological order? And will we account for the manner in which most of the men had been killed or wounded as well as how effectively or ineffectively their weapons had been used? We all know of the self serving egotistical and self bleating of those insidious individual and naturally quite deceiving efforts of those in lone effort to only share and shed light upon what they believe; they, as all can do no other. Will working as a group here be enable all of us to reconstruct a confusing action where clarification becomes more possible, indeed almost inevitable by the unselfish and sharing efforts of the many? Only you know the answer to that. That while keeping to the subject(s) as presented above. There must be order to this, something the RCOI never did.
Come, join if you already have not, and add in your thoughts and vision on the subjects presented without fear of in-fight, retribution or unbridled passion. Remember the words unselfish, sharing, and I'll add yet another as equally important, caring; its important to remember these because its very obvious that not one person to this date, and possibly forever longer, knows what happened in this fight enough to fight over something they don't know. Isn't that why we are all here?
.
