Surprise in Warfare

[joewiggs]

Surprise in warfare has always been a crucial element in warfare. Some soldiers when suddenly and unexpectedly fired upon by hostiles become excited and can not function properly. When Apaches staged an attack an attack on a camp of the eight Fourth Cavalrymen, in Guadeloupe Canyon in 1884, the soldiers "were eating their noon meal. The ranking Sergeant was hit as the first fire. 'he fell with a biscuit and a piece of meat in his mouth and did not move again."

A recruit sentry, who boasted that he could not wait to engage the Apaches, "immediately ran and was shot down." One man ran into his tent and, "began to pray on his knees."

I do not post this to judge the actions of others. I could not have done better. the purpose of doing so is to reconcile the reality of the general boredom frontier duty and, the sudden reality of unsuspected death.

[tbw]

When 'surprise' attacks come, they usually catch people in the most vulnerable of moments. Think 911. Think Pearl Harbor. Think Battle of the Bulge.

What most students of The Little Big Horn refuse to believe is that it could have happened to Custer and his troops. Custer one moment seemed to be standing on a promontory above the village and asking where all the warriors were, and proclaiming that they would go down and make a crossing and 'finish up here and go home to our station'. And very short time later, they were all dead.

Most counter with timing perks that tend to favor a long protracted fight. Or the Medicine Tail Ford attack that never materialized as the basis for these events. But there were those who did know the truth and stated it as truthfully as they could. Yet even to this day they are called liar or 'mistaken' in what they had to say. One such man was the Indian Guide Curley, who stated that as the Crows were running, Reno's men were in retreat to the bluffs, and at that same moment in time... Custer's men were also retreating from the river.

Several other correlations should clear this up, but will it? One of which is Martin's ride back with his note to Benteen. He had not been gone from Custer's battalion that long, perhaps 5 to 6 minutes, when he looked back and saw them in retreat on that "same hill" where Custer "first observed the village", and stated, at one time, that they had been "ambushed".

There are of course more, and all within moments of these events. The problem arises when one tries to spatially place them into the context of the battle from the standpoint of the 1001 who witnessed it, and all never agreed on any one place or time, the exceptions here being Martin and Curley, for Martin also observed moments later as he descended that hill... Reno's Skirmish line in Retreat.

[joewiggs]

My dear Sir, you have, once again, hit the old nail dead on the head. Many believe that Custer's defeat was the result of too many Indians. Well, there were a lot of them but an additional factor was the "shock" of hundreds of warriors infiltrating the trooper lines from the north, south, and west which caused the soldiers to turn their backs and flee.

The shock/proximity of a ferocious enemy has caused armies all over the world to run for eons. The eye ball to eye ball encounters will continue to do so for many more years.

[tbw]

Right you are Joe...


For as long as this battle has been discussed no motive(s) for Custer’s move to the north on the right bank has ever made much sense to anyone. Yet, that is precisely what he did. And both Reno and Benteen acknowledged this move in their early statements: Reno in his official report alluded to this move, in fact knew & stated the reason for it, and Benteen in a curious statement at the Court said something about he, Benteen, expected Custer to come back to him. Benteen’s statement makes no sense either, unless our perceptions have been clouded by others misinterpretations of events. And in fact makes little sense at all unless Custer expected him to be somewhere north - the way he went.

Little if anything ever makes sense, and that includes the MTF attempt to cross there. Why do this only to - minutes if not seconds later leave companies in reserve to fend off Indians numerous as ants swarming out of an ant hill and in the process leave huge gaps between other elements of his command? Again our perceptions seem to be clouded because many today berate Custer for dividing his regiment into battalions and not attacking as a whole. But, that’s exactly what he did. And not only did he do that, according to those who would accuse him of malfeasance of the worst kind in association with dividing his regiment, they think nothing of him doing it again in the face of overwhelming odds. Yet apparently, according to them, that’s exactly what he did after falling back from MTF. Why then if he did attack, feint or whatever at MTF, would they go all the way to LSH? And why, in association with this, would his companies be so far apart? And why would Custer do this when he knew his Cavalry wasn’t designed to fight a defensive battle? The distance between the companies doesn’t seem to make much sense at all, let alone the fact that what makes even less sense is the space between his command and the others. Why indeed would Custer keep moving north away from his support especially after a failed or feinted attempt at MTF?

There are of course the multifarious attempts to say Custer was in an offensive posture all the way, and of course the unending speculation about whether or not he knew Reno had retreated. And then there is, as always, the ‘hostage’ line, that Custer was after the women and children. And the ever present thought that he was commanding ‘on the fly’, this only reinforcing Reno’s and Benteen’s assertion that he, Custer ‘had no plan.’

Those who take one, some or all of the above positions also believe for some benign reason, think that Custer’s move away from MTF wouldn’t have been a dangerous ‘on the fly’ escapade. Yet Curley’s own statements regarding that very move tell us differently, that they were virtually surrounded before they ever arrived at or near Calhoun Hill. Most who ascribe to the above also believe that he ‘could’ [as if it was a choice] leave several companies behind to stop the Indians chasing him while he pushed on with a mere handful in an attempt to ’find a ford further north’ and in the process ignored the unfavorable ground over which he rode for a ’different objective’. And yet, its at this point where their feeble attempts to explain MTF break down because apparently he wasn’t looking for or anticipating a defensive fight. Yet, according to them, he had to leave how many companies behind to “defend” while he rode off north to look for the elusive unknown “ford” and/or the non-coms?

While many today theorize about what could have or would have caused the rout that seemed to happen, the above is about as asinine an explanation as ever devised, for if Custer did that, I believe he was outright ignorant or ’to hell with honor’ nuts to have tried it, and I believe he was neither. Why? I don’t believe any of those men who commanded their wings & companies were inept, stupid or mindless idiots. Think about this: Custer tells them that he’s going to ’head north’, and for them to ’spread out the companies’ he’s leaving behind to hold off the warriors. How far would they watch him go, ½ mile, 3/4ths mile, a mile or more while they are under attack from the swarming hordes? And if you buy this, consider this: Keogh fought in the Civil War & for Garabaldi and was a capable commander in his own right. Yates was one of Custer’s staff officers, and Tom Custer was awarded the Medal of Honor two times in the Civil War, yet these capable officers were found dead at positions over 3/4ths of a mile away from each other. There can be no mistake made here, they either took their orders from a quite deranged Custer or took their companies on their separate ways to fight alone, yet somehow managed to stay within a mile of each other.

While we may dismiss Custer’s ‘orders’ as we have at other times as being what they were or should have been, what cannot be ignored is the spacing between those who were supposedly ‘left behind’ and Custer’s advance unit. One can assume the chaos of battle to play some role, but the fact remains as to where these companies were found dead. Most who ascribe to this theory also don’t think about whether or not this spacing was deliberate or merely an unintentional result of the terrain.

From the moment Custer left those men behind he was to all intents and purposes ‘on the defensive’, and he knew that; another “winging it” moment for a commander not knowing what to do, but only how to ‘react’ isn’t a commander on the ’offensive’ anymore; and those ’left behind’ knew more than anything that was a mistake. A mistake magnified by what ’Custer’s intentions’ were; and were not achievable from that moment on. It makes him look incompetent and makes him the scapegoat for his own demise. Yet where was his failure? From MTF on, if one ascribes to this theory, he failed to read the intentions of his enemy and continued further away from his support, further divided his battalion in the face of great odds which resulted in a course of action that resulted in his own annihilation.

What are the results of the above? Who benefit’s the most from this story? If Custer knew Reno had retreated, then no one could blame Reno. If he knew that one or both of his other commanders had failed in their missions, then he should have done what? What he did? The ’what ifs’ here are many, but many refuse to consider them. What if he didn’t know Reno retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was? What if he knew Reno retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was? And if he didn’t know where Benteen was?

Considering the last few questions, go back to MTF and whether a failed attack or a feint, and knowing what we know about that retreat to Calhoun from Curley and the confirming evidence from those who were ‘left behind’ to defend. Where does he go? Back to Reno Hill? Pack Train? Directly away from the village? Anywhere but where he ultimately did go? Again…What if he didn’t know Reno retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was? And if he didn't know where Benteen was?

Now for the tough questions. If Custer wasn’t on the offensive, which we have proven that he was not, then the only reasonable conclusion is, is that he and his individual companies were driven to where they were found dead. Now consider this: What situation developed at MTF where the Indians outmaneuvered Custer, flanked him and acquired his ’front’ and a ’strong force was coming up from the rear’ - where his only option was to retreat to Calhoun hill?


Whatever Custer’s options were, if MTF was involved in any way, from that moment on his movements and orders were reactionary in nature. He was ‘reacting’ to an ‘on the fly’ situation which to all intents and purposes says the man and his battalion was on the defensive from that moment on. The only viable reason to go on downstream was to ‘find an unknown ford’, and he didn’t have enough men to pursue that goal alone, surely not if he was forced to head north after MTF. And if he wasn’t forced north under any circumstances, and didn’t attack in any fashion at MTF? Again… What if he knew Reno retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was? What if he didn’t know Reno Retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was? And if he didn’t know where Benteen was?


MTF was the dream child of Walter Mason Camp. Many soldiers, including Benteen saw very little evidence of fighting at MTF, and there wasn’t any circumstance that would have committed itself at that moment in time for Custer’s full battalion to be “forced north” from there at that time. About 5 to 10 minutes earlier, Custer according to those who ascribe to the MTF theory should have observed the ’entire village’ from Weir peak, yet he started his attack there anyway knowing what he was headed for? He had from this position an entire panorama of what lay ahead of him, a full 360 degree chance to see those Indians who would later be ’in front of him’ only moments later… To see all those ’hundreds’ who came up from the rear and chased him away from the ford. Everything lay before him to see from there, yet he fell into their cleverly laid trap? Try as we might to give Custer every excuse, every break against all common sense, Custer’s path north could not have been this way, either that or he was blind as a bat, because in about 15 minutes his men would be nearing Calhoun Hill and totally surrounded by the Indians before they arrived there.

There is nothing more revealing nor complicated or less compelling than the truth. And it isn’t me who is violating the facts nor creating new myths where none existed. The old theories are exercises in futility, based upon Reno’s men who thought they saw Custer on the Bluffs from nearly a 2/3rds of a mile away. And based upon Reno’s men who thought they saw Custer’s whole battalion on the bluffs, all merely old indistinct allegations of wishful thinking and not solid fact - either upon the part of those telling it or more likely those vainly trying to interpret it.

[shan]

Hi Dennis,

Dennis let me start by confessing that I had some trouble following your argument. I'm not saying that this is your fault, much more likely mine as I sometimes get caught up in words themselves and find myself losing what may have been the main theory.

If we were to all to state our main idea of what might---MIGHT! have happened after Custers command entered the general East ridge/Luce/ MTC area, and then what may have happened subsequently, perhaps we could then examine and unpick other posters arguments and see where we agree and disagree.

Now I know that that sounds as if we all have a clear idea of what we wish to present, and I have to confess that as I start this outline of mine, I am plagued by 2 contradictory ideas fighting for prominence in my own head.

So let's have a go. From Indian testimony, it would seem that a number of them saw Custer command appear on the high hills that I take to be Luce. A number also say that they saw soldiers---most don't make it clear whether they mean all the soldiers or just some---- start to move down towards the ford. Again most Indian testimony indicates that at that time there were very few warriors in the area, maybe twenty, many of whom were dismounted. The fact that at least four/maybe five of these Indians are actually named, and have thus been mythologized makes me believe that these accounts are based on some truth.

Now this is where it becomes less clear. But if we take the general consensus of what was being said by the Indians, it seems as if the troopers approaching the river never came nearer than 2/3 hundred yards at the most. Indeed some place them as much as half a mile back from the ford. Obviously the Indians have their own reasons for thinking why this was, which naturally tends to lead them to imagine that the soldiers became scared and apprehensive, or else were deterred by the brave defence those few warriors were prepared to put up. Had any of Custers command survived, they would have almost certainly had a very different take on what was happening.

At some point after Custers command started their move towards the river; hard to say when or where, Wolf Tooth and Big Foot's 50 or so Cheyenne stumbled across them as they were riding in from the East. There was a little skirmishing---enough to leave a certain amount of firing refuse up and around Luce's Southern and Eastern slopes, but all in all I don't think they posed any real threat and were soon driven away. That's not to say Custers command weren't initially worried by this development, after all here were Indians appearing on their flanks, and at the time, they may have worried that there may have been a lot more out there who might appear at any time.

Whilst parts of the command were dealing with Wolf Tooth's men, to their front, growing numbers of warriors who had been late getting into the Reno fight, turned instead to dealing with Custer. Now here's where I have to branch out on my own as there is very little Indian testimonies that states what happened next. There are illusions to masses of Indians heading for the ford and driving Custers men back, which again is their perception of what they thought was happening. Custer may never have intended to cross, he may for instance have wanted to draw warriors towards him to relieve the pressure on Reno and thus allow him and Benteen to push on into the village and put the warriors in two minds. We can never know. But what we do know is that the part of the command that had come closest to the river moved away, almost certainly covered by those up on Luce, and that they did this without incurring serious casualties, if any at all.

At this point I'd like to bring in Curley. I'll begin by saying that I'm pretty sure Curley never got any further than the Weir Point area. He may have seen something of what was going on from somewhere up there, but I think he got most of the information that eventually came to make up some parts of his stories, from other sources later on. Personally I find several of the things he describes as happening in and around the ford and then up towards Finley and Calhoun, have the ring of truth about them. The story of the trooper losing control of his horse and being carried across the river into the Indian camp for instance. His description of Indians swarming across the ford and being on two sides of the retreating command, and the troopers who were sent to Findley to try and stem the flow being quickly killed. There is a possibility he witnessed some of these events, but I think it far more likely that he came to hear some of these stories at a later date, probably during some of those inter tribal gatherings the government arranged to try and get the tribes to forgive and forget. Indeed some of those stories may have been directed at him in the form of insults by the Sioux and Cheyene warriors who had fought at the battle. "Look what we did to your erstwhile master down by the ford , where we you when we were killing them," that sort of thing. There is a lot more to said about Curley, but I'll leave that for now, suffice to say that his stories, alongside some of the hostile accounts, relate that large numbers of warriors very quickly accumulated on Custers heels as the command moved towards Calhoun, and that whatever Custer thought was going on, the Indians felt they had him in their sights.

Dennis, you would be quite right to accuse me of too many words----more than I intended when I started this post---and not enough theory. WhatsmoreI haven't had the grace to reply to some of the points in your post, so I'm going to stop here and re-read them. I shall come back and try and finish off what I've started, and attempt to lay out how I think the battle unfolded, the trouble is, I may change my mind before I get to tomorrow.

Blue Dog

[tbw]

Shan, I wouldn't accuse you of to many words or for anything else. However I would accuse myself of not putting into proper context what may appear to be the proper case.

Last night when I composed this, I left out a few beginning paragraphs which I had started on another page and quite naturally forgot to re-incorporate it back into the post before I posted it. I re-edited it this morning and put those beginning paragraphs in there. It is my hope this explains the rest of what followed, which your address was made to.

To help your or others to follow the reasoning presented it is my belief that there was:

1) No move was ever made by Custer or any other command upon MTF.

2) The previous discussion by me discusses the various events that "surrounded" that supposed event to prove #1.

3) While perusing my work, keep #1 and #2 in mind.

And last, if the above does not help at all, I shall try to re-edit it for clarity or withdraw the remarks all together.

cheers...

[joewiggs]

May 8, 2010 5:45:50 GMT -5 shan said:

Hi Dennis,

Now this is where it becomes less clear. But if we take the general consensus of what was being said by the Indians, it seems as if the troopers approaching the river never came nearer than 2/3 hundred yards at the most. Indeed some place them as much as half a mile back from the ford. Obviously the Indians have their own reasons for thinking why this was, which naturally tends to lead them to imagine that the soldiers became scared and apprehensive, or else were deterred by the brave defence those few warriors were prepared to put up. Had any of Custers command survived, they would have almost certainly had a very different take on what was happening.

Blue Dog

Your post is well articulated and factual and, even more importantly, exemplifies why the diversity among students as to what actually occurred is so abundant.

Both of the above seemingly contradictory and impossible to correlate statements are both correct! The Sioux who returned to the environs of MTC after chasing Reno can truthfully testify that Custer never really approached the ford. The Cheyenne, whose village was directly below where the monument now stands can equally testify that the soldiers did respond to the ford where they were fired upon by the Cheyenne. Obviously, the Sioux arrived to late to see that movement.

Warriors are highly individualize fighters and, in the heat of combat, they see and remember the field of battle upon which they personally rode upon. This individualize action becomes a part of their "folklore" and is relived through socialized, group story telling. If they did not see it, it did not happen. Ironically, unlike the mind of the "Whites" who willingly incorporates speculation in their reporting of incidents, the Indian was excessively truthful to a fault, refusing to speak of which they did not know or experience.

It is true that in the Indian society, it was not frowned upon to engage in a reasonable exaggeration of their own exploits. It was perfectly acceptable to "too your own horn."

In summation, there is much information to be glean from Indian testimony that must be studied in a comparative fashion. To toss out all Indian testimony, as I have read advocated on other forums, is just ethnocentric arrogance.

Great job Shan!

[shan]

Joe and Dennis

I'm writing this in a hurry but hope to come back to the subject later, Joe I think it worth bearing in mind that if something like 1000 or more warriors managed to get into the Reno fight, there would have been at least 700/800 odd who didn't, and of these, allowing for those that wanted to stay close to their families, and some others who for various reasons couldn't initially get into the fight, in my opinion, that still leaves at least some 4 to 5 hundred who could, and I believe did. More than enough to keep Custer busy in the initial stages of the fight.

This also applies to those who witnessed Custers appearence up on the hills. The sad thing we have so few Indian witness statements with which to build a comprehensive picture, but quite a number, { I haven't got my books to hand, but Young Two Moon sticks in my brain, } did see Custers movements, albeit from a distance, so we are not reliant on those warriors arriving back from the Reno fight.


thanks Shan Alias Blue Dog

[strange]

The shock factor should not have effected Custer so severely in an OFFENSIVE situation. This is the big move where Reno dropped the ball for everyone. He lost his nerve when he was on the attack.

Other victims of shock, by my own personal opinion, were men like Keogh. It was not that Keogh wasn't ready to fight, but was rather exposed and left wide open and attacked with more Indians than what should have been prepared in his direction. Keogh seems to have been dead (poetically speaking) as soon as Reno lost his nerve. Keogh is probably the one guy who would've turned up dead no matter what Benteen could have done to possibly assist the others. When Keogh was compromised, I think Custer then made a move to try and salvage Keogh and to stay in a certain place where Reno and Benteen might catch up (and themselves not be compromised). My main thought about Little Bighorn is that Custer died trying to save others and that the favor was not returned. It seems to be very clear that it was something like this that turned around his offensive.

Strange

[strange]

Great post from Shan!

I agree likewise on the factor that Custer may have wanted to "draw the warriors out" to relieve Reno. This is the strategy I promote as the surest way to tackle the numerical superiority of the Indians. They can't can't be every where at once, they won't know who to hit first, and they would not have even had time to think IF Reno had held his weight, and if Reno had been more considerate of others. I am very certain that Custer was thinking about a lot of people other than himself when he took the fight to the Indians from some of the precarious areas he happened to occupy, the areas that gave us the great mystery of thinking why he chose them. I say that Custer did it for Reno, Benteen, and Keogh (who was compromised because of Reno and who Custer would have been even more immediately aware about).

I also enjoy your feelings about Indians filling in the blanks of what they observed from the soldiers. It is something that really sheds some insight into some of the things they say. We have to know that this was a time when both cultures were still trying to get to know one another, and so both of the cultures were studying each other in a learning sort of way. Reading from Custer himself is like opening up the book of a great white hunter in Africa or a National Geographic magazine or a PBS documentary. Indians apparently had similar feelings. Just like a mirror.

Strange

[stumblingbear]

I think it is wonderful that so much interesting information can be gathered so quickly from these great posts. I never imagined that Keogh could be a victim of shock but it makes sense. Can you just imagine what must have run through his men when hoards of Indians just over ran his position?

With all the soldiers he had in front of him he must have believed that his position was safe.

[shan]

Dennis,

I've just re-read your post a couple of times, and forgive me if I'm wrong, but I get the feeling that you are saying that Custer force not only took some other route than the one that is generally put forward, i.e Cedar coulee to Luce, and then over Nye to Calhoun etc, but that he did this thinking that Reno and Benteen would be either elsewhere than where they actually were, or; that they would be acting differently to the way they did. Again I apolgise if I am getting hold of the wrong end of the stick.

I remember having a debate with Gordie on the other board; both on the board and privately, about his theory that the battle actually flowed North to South, in other words Custer went straight to ford D, was met and repulsed, and was generally driven back towards the South from there on. I've reduced his theory to banner headlines which he might not have been happy with were he still here, but that in essence is what he believed. Incidentally, in part, this theory arose out of conversations he himself had over the years with a number of Sioux and Cheyenne who had a very different take on the battle than the one that is usually given.

Now I am neither a Custer Groupie nor a Custer hater, I try to deal with the man who fought and died during this battle. His previous Civil war experiences, and the fairly limited one he had fighting Indians can tell us certain things, but in my opinion we have to deal with what he did during this battle, and I would contend that those previous experiences weren't by and large, of much use to him that day.

In some ways it's a bit like coming across the scene of a serious accident. A car full of people has collided with a lorry and all the occupants in the car are dead. During the investigation there are arguments on both sides as to whether the driver was a good driver or not, the balance maybe coming down on the side that he was. Naturally the investigation then turns to who was to blame for the accident, the lorry or the car. The skid marks on the road seem to indicate that the car was going to fast and had veered across into the path of the oncoming lorry, but even allowing for that, it still isn't clear why the driver didn't take avoiding action. Of course keeping things as simple as this analogy doesn't really help much, excepting to remember that these things happen, and that good drivers get killed on the road as well as bad.

I said in the post before last that I had 2 competing idea fighting for prominence in my head, one of which is that in all the years I been reading and re-reading the Indian testimony, the overiding feeling one gets is that once they had crossed the ford----I'm guessing that they are referring to ford B.---- they pushed the soldiers up the hill and along the ridge until all were killed. Now a close reading of these accounts shows that there was a good deal of compression in these descriptions---more than likely this is the fault of the translators who, to be fair to them, probably thought that the army people who they were translating for didn't want to listen to an Indian rambling on and on about what he did or saw. But even when you allow for compression, plus time and place distortion, one is left with the feeling that this seems to be the experience of many of the warriors who took part in the fight.

Of course the minute you decide; YES, that's it, I've cracked it, you come across anomalies, such as the fact there seems to have no dead men or horses from either E. and F. companies found along Finley, Calhoun, or the Keogh areas. In the kind of fire fight and confused retreat that the Indians are talking about, this would have been virtually impossible, so----back to the drawing board then.

Shan

[strange]

Shan,

This might be one particular area where I am very happy to part ways from some of the more "serious" researchers of the battle. I don't know how much progress some one is gonna make out of talking to the relatives of Indians when it relates to the geographical layout of the Battle. Relatives are mostly good for telling stories of people who are no longer with us and giving descriptions of the people, but specific descriptions of a battlefield and the movements of combatants is a major longshot. I think our Gordie fellow was taking a gambit with his acquired facts.

Strange

[strange]

Oh, and Shan.... another possibility!

If the Indians engaged in a tense firefight from a certain area that did not produce any bodies later, a possible explanation could be to the effect that Custer's people may have pulled men to another location... like if there were a lot of wounded rather than dead or if they didn't even want to leave the dead behind. Thats my longshot at trying to assist any theory you've worked on, I also opened a thread to ask the question of whether the Indians may have moved bodies for the possible convenience of looting and mutilating (sorta like making a workman's bench at one particular area of the field so that they don't have to roam back and forth to rob or mutilate the bodies.). I'd even be curious to know (and this is a very, very far off long shot) if the Indians might try some psychological warfare, like arranging the bodies a certain way so as to give the appearance of a different type of battle when others came to assess the situation (as they predictably would).

And if the Indians wanted to plan a surprise attack on a burial team, they might also want to arrange the bodies to certain areas where the burial team would be inconvenienced in a moment of attack (by the way, has this ever happened? Benteen and his soldiers apparently gave a hasty burial to Custer because they feared a possible attack on the area). The Indians are very mysterious and they have a lot of tricks.

Strange

[tbw]

I think it worthy at this time to restate a post that has been lost in the discussion at hand, I think some may have missed the point, and I would like to restate it and clarify the post further.

Reply #1 this thread:

“When 'surprise' attacks come, they usually catch people in the most vulnerable of moments. Think 911. Think Pearl Harbor. Think Battle of the Bulge.

What most students of The Little Big Horn refuse to believe is that it could have happened to Custer and his troops. Custer one moment seemed to be standing on a promontory above the village and asking where all the warriors were, and proclaiming that they would go down and make a crossing and 'finish up here and go home to our station'. And very short time later, they were all dead.

Most counter with timing perks that tend to favor a long protracted fight. Or the Medicine Tail Ford attack that never materialized as the basis for these events. But there were those who did know the truth and stated it as truthfully as they could. Yet even to this day they are called liar or 'mistaken' in what they had to say. One such man was the Indian Guide Curley, who stated that as the Crows were running, Reno's men were in retreat to the bluffs, and at that same moment in time... Custer's men were also retreating from the river.

Several other correlations should clear this up, but will it? One of which is Martin's ride back with his note to Benteen. He had not been gone from Custer's battalion that long, perhaps 5 to 6 minutes, when he looked back and saw them in retreat on that "same hill" where Custer "first observed the village", and stated, at one time, that they had been "ambushed".

There are of course more, and all within moments of these events. The problem arises when one tries to spatially place them into the context of the battle from the standpoint of the 1001 who witnessed it, and all never agreed on any one place or time, the exceptions here being Martin and Curley, for Martin also observed moments later as he descended that hill... Reno's Skirmish line in Retreat.”


It seems we all get stuck in a time warp, like trying to advance our spaceship through a worm hole and getting stuck about half way through, especially when discussing the battle. Our own canted and somewhat mistaken impressions many times lead us to wrong conclusions, and just one of those mistakes makes all the difference in the world of Custer’s Last Stand. Get just one impressionable thing wrong and one’s timeline, one’s opinion of what happens changes forever what really happened so long ago.

The above post was a post that showed if one was careful to read the veracity of BOTH Martin and Curley’s observations and statements about what they observed and when they observed it. In case some may have missed the point, read again. And for those who still miss the point, here it is:

Both Curley and Martin saw the very same thing at the same time. In one of Martin’s statements, and right now I don’t have access to it, but he stated that when he topped that very ‘same hill’ where Custer "first observed the village", he looked back and made the observation that they (Custer’s battalion) had been "ambushed". Before leaving that same ‘hill’ he made the observation in another statement, I believe at the COI, that he observed Reno’s men in Retreat. Martin’s statements are fragmented, and in several different sources, but when one puts his statements all together one gets the above. Curley in his observations of the beginning of the Custer fight, stated that he observed the Crows running at the same time that Reno’s men ran, and while that was going on he observed Custer’s men were also running or (retreating) from the ford. The two corroborate each others stories. Each saw within a short span of time, perhaps within 2 to 3 minutes, one from the other, the events Curley described to a T.

“There are of course more, and all within moments of these events. The problem arises when one tries to spatially place them into the context of the battle from the standpoint of the 1001 who witnessed it, and all never agreed on any one place or time, the exceptions here being Martin and Curley.

One now has a “start time” framework for the near beginning of Custer’s fight, and if both Martin and Curley are correct in their observations, both battalions, Custer’s and Reno’s were “retreating at the same time”! This places Custer and his troops at ‘some ford’, and for now we’ll say Ford “B” in an attempt to understand what followed; at the very moments when Reno’s own battalion retreated to the hills.

Now ask yourself, is this timing corroborated by any other participant? (Notice here, I’ve not mentioned ‘any time’, like 12 noon, or 3 pm, because at this point it is totally unnecessary.) F. Girard, with DeRudio’s confirmation, stated to the COI that he heard the firing downriver about 10 to 15 minutes prior to Reno’s retreat from the woods. Watch this closely:

1) Most men state that the longest time Reno stayed in the woods was about 10 minutes, but this varies from 5 minutes to 15 minutes according to some. Now back up those 15 minutes to when Girard stated he heard the firing downstream.
A) If it was 15 minutes prior to the retreat when Reno’s skirmish line fell back to the woods, then Reno and his men ’went through one side, “not stopping” and came out the other side in their flight to the hills. And this ‘hallmark’ event was noted by F. Girard, and this is when he heard the firing downstream.

B) If it was 10 minutes, as most state, then it barely gives Reno and his men on the skirmish line, 5 minutes to retreat back to the woods, remain there for 10 minutes before retreating.

C) If it was 5 minutes, the least amount recorded for Reno’s men to be in the woods. Then about 10 minutes prior to this, Reno’s men started their orderly retreat to the woods, waited there for 5 minutes before they retreated.

Why is this ’hallmark’ event so noteworthy? Because now we have confirming evidence of what Reno’s men were doing; while, as both Curley and Martin’s statements confirm, Custer was also retreating from ’some ford’, assumed to be Ford “B:”.

Got it figured out yet? If not let me muddy the waters a bit more. Somewhere in the mix of all this excitement, during this 15 minute period of time Benteen, was atop the bluffs ’somewhere’, and for now we won’t assume anything the man said was correct, except for ’what he said he observed’ because others did corroborate that statement.

He said that he observed about 13 men with their backs to the timber and the Indians were overrunning their position, which left him the distinct impression that the ’whole outfit’ had been ’sacked’. This had to have occurred within the 15 minutes of which Girard spoke. Now go back and apply that situation to A,B or C above.

There is more, but for now this information should suffice for our purposes. Why? Because now we have an interconnection between all three battalions of what they were doing, when and now all we have to do is assume “where”.

Now go back and read my “reply #3” again, keeping in mind it took Reno & most of his men about 5 and no more than 10 minutes to retreat to the bluffs. (NO, don't continue here until you do, or once again you'll miss some vital information!!!) Come back and finish here after you do....
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If you were to assume that most of the men stood directly behind Sharpshooter hill and thus it ’blocked their line of sight’ to the battlefield, you would be assuming wrong. Why? Because just a few steps northeast and one can see the Nye-Cartwright ridge area where Keogh’s men were supposed to have been! Reno and Benteen were not blind as bats, wherever they were, and while they wanted to stick their heads in the rocky soil and ground of Reno Hill, it just wasn’t sandy enough, and I won’t let them. Why? Because if your going to assume that all 200 some men just stood there and didn’t fan out behind Sharpshooter hill, you’d be dead wrong. Now place Weir into this equation and it muddies those waters more. Indeed Reno and Benteen - what did you know that you didn’t want the Court to know? That is, if MTF was the focal attack - that everyone thinks it is.

While many ascribe Custer’s actions at the assumed MTF area as “support” for Reno, think again. Just as it wasn’t in the nature of Reno or Benteen to “save” Custer, it wasn’t in Custer’s nature to “save” Reno, he would have to fend for himself, which he did. The primary goal wasn’t to ‘defend’ anything. The primary goal was to round up those hostiles and bring them back to the reservations. And if any one element of Custer’s command got into trouble, it was their responsibility to get out of it.

In case you missed the point of my ‘post #3’, I think it worthy to mention this again at this time:

"From the moment Custer left those men behind (Calhoun and Keogh and perhaps a platoon of C) he was to all intents and purposes ‘on the defensive’, and he knew that; another “winging it” moment for a commander not knowing what to do, but only how to ‘react’ isn’t a commander on the ’offensive’ anymore; and those ’left behind’ knew more than anything that was a mistake. A mistake magnified by what ’Custer’s intentions’ were; and were not achievable from that moment on. It makes him look incompetent and makes him the scapegoat for his own demise. Yet where was his failure? From MTF on, if one ascribes to this theory, he failed to read the intentions of his enemy and continued further away from his support, further divided his battalion in the face of great odds which resulted in a course of action that resulted in his own self annihilation in an meaningless attempt to attack a ford, and in the process place his own command in peril.

What are the results of the above? Who benefit’s the most from this story?

1) If Custer knew Reno had retreated, then no one could blame Reno.

2) If he knew that one or both of his other commanders had failed in their missions, then he should have done what? What he did? Attack MTF?"

The ’what ifs’ here are many, but many refuse to consider them.

"1) What if he didn’t know Reno Retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was?

2) What if he knew Reno retreated, and what if he knew where Benteen was?

3) And if he didn’t know where Benteen was?"

Which of the three or perhaps more above applies to MTF and the competent Custer we all know would not have attacked there, without that information?