shan
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Post by shan on May 9, 2010 11:14:23 GMT -5
Dennis,
I think I'm beginning to get what your driving at, and in some ways we're not a million miles apart, but---yes I'm sorry there is always a but-- I am still confused by some points. maybe I should just keep it simple and ask you about one or two at a time.
For instance you state " Several other correlations should clear this up, but will it? One of which is Martin's ride back with his note to Benteen. He had not been gone from Custer's battalion that long, perhaps 5 to 6 minutes, when he looked back and saw them in retreat on that "same hill" where Custer "first observed the village", and stated, at one time, that they had been "ambushed".
Now setting aside the ambushed bit for a moment, "same hill" where Custer "first observed the village", Generally, and I know there are arguments about this, it's assumed that Custer first observed the village either from some point along the bluffs, maybe from around the area of Renos later defensive position, or else from up on Sharpshooter ridge, with a few thinking it may have been from Weir Point. Have I got this wrong or are you intimating that Martin was talking about Custer first seeing the village from somewhere on either East Ridge or Luce?
The Curley observation is a bit more problematic, you state he says, "that as the Crows were running, Reno's men were in retreat to the bluffs, and at that same moment in time... Custer's men were also retreating from the river." So where does this place Curley if he could see all three things happening? If he is somewhere around Weir; which would seem logical, then he couldn't have been with Custers command, in which case this means that anything he has to say about what happened from the ford up to Calhoun has to be hearsay and not direct experience.
One last point. If what they are saying is true, then we have to ask ourselves what exactly are they seeing and how long did they observe it. In the case of Martin it can only have been the briefest of glances, with Curley, well, we can't really say. But I'm wondering if what they saw was the troops who had moved down into the Butler area say, moving back to deal with Wolf Tooth's sudden appearance. I'm not necessarily wedded to the idea, it's just a thought.
More later.
Shan
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Post by tbw on May 9, 2010 13:33:00 GMT -5
Shan here are a few of the other 'tidbits' I mentioned earlier, but left out. It's just too long to fit into one post, so here some of them are...
While many today try to emulate John Gray’s work, they fail miserably in a proper understanding of what really happened at the LBH. The reasons for their failures is in the misinterpretation of the facts as much as anything. And as I’ve stated before, get just one fact wrong or misinterpreted and it skews their whole theory.
Most of those who do try to emulate him, take his fine example of what Reno’s men observed of Custer and/or his men on the bluffs. The lynch-pin of their theory relies solely upon one man, DeRudio and his claim of when and where he observed who he thought was Custer and Cooke on the bluffs. As I’ve stated elsewhere on this board, his 1000 yard - nearly 2/3rds of a mile sighting of Custer and Cooke, is at best, wishful thinking on his part. Many men were dressed similarly and many of them rode the same colored horses. And if you think Cooke’s beard at a 1000 yards is proof positive that - that’s who it was, then one must try to emulate those in the field as long as they were and see who lets their beard grow. Whomever DeRudio and others observed on those bluffs, rest assured it wasn’t Custer or Cooke. Not only is this a fatal flaw in their thinking/reasoning, it wasn’t fact.
The reasons why the above simply wasn’t to be taken seriously are their ongoing attempts to determine ’horse gaits’ and how far Custer and his men advanced before being sighted there and try to ’surround’ that with what seems to be confirming evidence. But they forget or dismiss vital statements and testimony that totally refute their ridiculous notion of ’time’ and ’spatial’ placement of crucial events. One of these soldiers who did give vital information at the COI, was non other than Lt. Varnum. And it is with his testimony that most who try to ’surround’ their theorys with other facts, fail miserably to fit into their multifarous equations.
Lt. Varnum’s statement concerned seeing the ’white horse troop’ or more likely elements of them, because he took a glancing look at them at “point 2” on Maguire’s map. This “point 2” becomes the forefront of a direct assault on those who postulate ‘horse nonsense’ and ’ridiculous timing’ in association with their feeble attempts to de-evolve this conflict into a mindless state of ’take things slow’. Perhaps they do this because they need to ’slow’ things down to understand what happened. But rest assured, not one of those who survived from Custer’s battalion ever stated anything different than the terrific rate of speed with which they advanced down the right bank. Yet another set of facts overlooked in assuming a ’slow down’ & ’watch-em’ attitude, as if there was nothing better for Custer to do.
“Point 2” lays about 3 miles from where Reno departed Custer, and it is about a further 1 1/4th mile on to MTF. This point then becomes an ever increasing focal point of attention, because it shows the furtherst advance of Custer’s troops, be they the advanced guard of 5 men or otherwise, they were observed there by Lt. Varnum as Reno’s skirmish line deployed. F. Girard’s statements of when he observed Custer’s men on the bluffs took place about 4 to 5 minutes later and he said he observed them ’where they later set up the hilltop defense’. This point was shown on the map as ’Reno Hill’, which most assume is correct. But this wasn’t what he stated. Where they fought and where they later retreated to “Reno Hill” was two different places. And merely adjusting a few hundred yards from the putrid, gagging smell of 40 to 50+ dead animals and perhaps some of the men as well who had been killed, just wasn’t a viable option, indeed, they had to go further and they did. So where Reno fought the Indians and where they later retreated to was indeed two different places. And so, where Girard said and where they assumed it was - was two different places. This information then is unreliable to determine with any great accuracy where Girard’s sighting may have been. We simply cannot assume he meant Reno Hill.
The best evidence then lays in what Lt. Varnum stated, ‘point 2 at the time the skirmish line deployed.’ Gray in his analysis used the places and times as windows of opportunity to figure the gaits of the horses in association with surrounding events. This one event (Varnum's sighting) should tell us a lot about Custer’s rate of speed down the right bank, and it does. The earliest Reno could have set up his skirmish line after leaving Custer was about half an hour: 5 minutes to the river, 5 to cross, and 5 to reform and 15 to where he set up the skirmish line. The latest would be about 40 minutes: 5 minutes to the river 10 to cross and 10 to reform (or various other distributions to others liking of that 10 minutes) and 15 minutes to where he set up the skirmish line. This brings us to a near time when he set up the skimish line… 30 to 40 minutes later, after departing Custer.
That ‘white horse troop’ or parts thereof that Varnum witnessed at “point 2” then figures out an average gait speed of Custer’s troops down the right bank at anywhere from 8.5 to 13 mph - at the point where Varnum made his observation. These gait speeds do not conflict with what Kanipe, Martin, Curley or Thompson said or indirectly inferred that gait speed was, “a gallop all the way”, “did not stop”, ’horses giving out’ etc… There are at this point no discrepancies to anything stated, and we have not dismissed anyone’s statement or testimony, not even Girards.
Now what does one assume of this when encountering the problem of MTF and the actions there? It would have taken Custer going at a gait speed of 8.5mph, about 8 to 9 minutes to get to MTF. And at 13mph, about 6 minutes to get to MTF. The problem with this is, Custer is advancing too rapidly down the right bank. Why? Because of those errant sightings on the bluffs! Either that or Reno retreated to the woods right after setting up the skirmish line in about 6 to 9 minutes time! This places Benteen on the bluffs and looking at that 13 man skirmish line with their backs to the timber within that same 6 - 9 minute placement of time! But is this what most who were there reported?
Most of them said that G troop didn’t withdraw into the woods because of infiltrating Indians on that side until after 10 minutes on the skirmish line had passed. While this is close to the 9 minute figure earlier projected it doesn’t take into consideration what Benteen observed and when! So this withdrawal into the timber wasn’t what Benteen observed.
Reno stated at the COI that the open skirmish line rapid fired for about 20 minutes. Taking this as our guide as to the time the open skirmish line stayed their ground, which they had to in order to ’rapid fire’. This projection of time takes us 20 minutes into the action there. What gives his statement credence is what others said of how long G troop was in the timber fighting off the infiltrating Indians. And they said they withdrew from that fight there about 10 minutes after going in. This confirms Reno’s 20 minute ’rapid fire’ of that skirmish line: 10 minutes after the SL formed, G troop went into the woods, 10 minutes later they withdrew, exactly at the same time the open skirmish line withdrew. Near this point in time was when Girard heard the firing downstream. A full 20 minutes had passed between Varnum’s observation and when that firing was first heard downstream.
This still doesn’t properly address the timing of Custer’s supposed attack at MTF. What it does do is tell us one thing. Custer didn’t know of Reno’s predicament, because of Varnum’s sighting at “point 2“ when the SL set up! Now take into consideration what Kanipe, Curley, Martin and Thompson all said about that gait down the right bank…”a gallop all the way”, “didn’t stop”, ’horses giving out’ etc… They virtually maintained that gait! If they maintained that gait “all the way”, exactly where would they have been when Girard heard that firing 20 minutes after the skirmish line set up? At 8.5 mph they would have gone about 2 3/4ths miles! At 13mph they would have gone nearly 4 1/3rd miles. And both of these are figured from where? “Point 2”! All in all, after Reno departed Custer, Custer’s rate of speed down the right bank, as it was reported from his own men, took him anywhere from 40 to 50 minutes to get there; and he went in that time 5 3/4ths miles or 7 1/3rd miles, both according to the men who rode with him, and both being well past MTF when the firing heard by Girard was reported.
As I indicated earlier, MTF was the brain child of one, Walter Mason Camp. The attack there didn’t materialize and Custer and those commanders in his group are spared the insufferable blame heaped upon them. And the reasons for this are:
Who benefit’s the most from the MTF story?
1) If Custer knew Reno had retreated, then no one could blame Reno.
2) If he knew that one or both of his other commanders had failed in their missions, then he should have done what? What he didn‘t do at MTF?
The ’what ifs’ here are many, but many refuse to consider them in light of anything beyond MTF.
1) What if he didn’t know Reno Retreated, and what if he didn’t know where Benteen was?
2) What if he knew Reno retreated, and what if he didn’t know where Benteen was?
3) And if he did know where Benteen was?
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shan
Private
Posts: 25
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Post by shan on May 9, 2010 15:15:01 GMT -5
Dennis,
first let me confess that although I've read Grays work, and Fred's new set of timings on the other board, whilst I bare them in mind, they only play a little part in my thinking about the Custer part of the battle. So, given my level of ignorence I have to say you do indeed bring up a couple of elements I've never heard about before, particularly the fact that Renos force moved their defensive postion because of the terrible smell. How come that dosen't figure in most of the books I've read, or have I just overlooked it?
Having said that I concur that all those that rode with Custer said they were travelling fast; at a gallop, as they passed along the bluffs. So I'm with you that Custer may well have travelled much further than MYC. than is usually thought.
I also agree with on you another point. I don't know who DeRudio saw, it could have been Thompson and Watson, or the Crows moving away or even some of the Rees, but I don't believe his positive identification of Custer or Cooke, you cannot see whether a man has a beard from that distance, indeed you can hardly make out a head fron the general body shape.
So please put us out of our misery, where do you think Custers command was when Girard heard that firing, and if it was much further on towards say ford D. how do you see the battle developing?
Shan
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Post by joewiggs on May 9, 2010 18:23:06 GMT -5
The shock factor should not have effected Custer so severely in an OFFENSIVE situation. Strange Fox makes a good point in his book when he describes mental debilitation (shock) that may occur in any state of a battle. One of the predominate (their are several) precursors for mental shock while engaged in warfare is the proximity of the enemy believe to be superior in manpower and/or weaponry. An example of such a situation would be the final moments at Calhoun Hill. The skirmish lines there consisted of two companies who, for a while, held the Indians at bay. Suddenly, Indian infiltration and fire from the west, south, and east decimated the soldiers to such a degree that firepower was totally diminished. Realizing this, warriors from all three areas rushed forward and overwhelmed the soldiers who quickly bolted and fled toward Keogh's position. Unfortunately, shock can occur while in a defensive as well as offensive movement. Undoubtedly, as you pointed out, Keogh must have been shocked to see the warriors swarming over soldiers who were fleeing for their very lives towards his startled and disbelieving "I" troopers. |
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Post by tbw on May 9, 2010 21:30:10 GMT -5
Joe, sorry to stray from the subject. I think we need a thread on MTF or my discussion needs to be discussed on the Nye-Cartwright Ridge thread. Will see what we can do about this. Shan etal. take that part of the MTF discussion to the Nye Cartwright Ridge thread, unless of course we would like to discuss the "shock" or "awe" of what did or didn't happen around MTF.  I'd have to agree Joe, shock can and did occur on Custer Battlefield, and it could and did happen in either circumstance, offense & defense. |
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Post by strange on May 10, 2010 6:41:59 GMT -5
The shock factor should not have effected Custer so severely in an OFFENSIVE situation. Strange Fox makes a good point in his book when he describes mental debilitation (shock) that may occur in any state of a battle. One of the predominate (their are several) precursors for mental shock while engaged in warfare is the proximity of the enemy believe to be superior in manpower and/or weaponry. An example of such a situation would be the final moments at Calhoun Hill. The skirmish lines there consisted of two companies who, for a while, held the Indians at bay. Suddenly, Indian infiltration and fire from the west, south, and east decimated the soldiers to such a degree that firepower was totally diminished. Realizing this, warriors from all three areas rushed forward and overwhelmed the soldiers who quickly bolted and fled toward Keogh's position. Unfortunately, shock can occur while in a defensive as well as offensive movement. Undoubtedly, as you pointed out, Keogh must have been shocked to see the warriors swarming over soldiers who were fleeing for their very lives towards his startled and disbelieving "I" troopers. I actually meant my Keogh sentiment to the effect that I believe he was one of the first to be seriously overwhelmed and certainly surprised. I am of the belief that Crazy Horse struck there and did quite well, and that a large portion of Keogh fell from a surprise attack. I'm actually quite amazed to the effect of your post because it seems like you're switching my scenario around to Calhoun, which means I may be mistaken about something or vice versa. I think Calhoun held very firm, a bulk of the overall manpower was centered in his area. Strange |
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Post by tbw on May 10, 2010 7:35:21 GMT -5
Hmmmm... On the horns of a real dilemma here. Now which was it? Or, just maybe, perhaps it could have been - both?  |
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Post by joewiggs on May 10, 2010 15:50:51 GMT -5
Fox makes a good point in his book when he describes mental debilitation (shock) that may occur in any state of a battle. One of the predominate (their are several) precursors for mental shock while engaged in warfare is the proximity of the enemy believe to be superior in manpower and/or weaponry. An example of such a situation would be the final moments at Calhoun Hill. The skirmish lines there consisted of two companies who, for a while, held the Indians at bay. Suddenly, Indian infiltration and fire from the west, south, and east decimated the soldiers to such a degree that firepower was totally diminished. Realizing this, warriors from all three areas rushed forward and overwhelmed the soldiers who quickly bolted and fled toward Keogh's position. Unfortunately, shock can occur while in a defensive as well as offensive movement. Undoubtedly, as you pointed out, Keogh must have been shocked to see the warriors swarming over soldiers who were fleeing for their very lives towards his startled and disbelieving "I" troopers. . I'm actually quite amazed to the effect of your post because it seems like you're switching my scenario around to Calhoun, which means I may be mistaken about something or vice versa. Strange You need not be. I was merely addressing a specific point that you made. A point, rightly or wrongly, wherein I assumed you were stating that (shock" could not be severe in an offensive situation. I believe in can occur in both offensive and defensive tactics. Did I misunderstand you or you I? |
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Post by strange on May 10, 2010 21:35:34 GMT -5
Well, Wiggy, anything CAN happen and will happen (and certainly it DID happen to Reno), but shock (of Reno's type) should not seep into the mind of any soldier on the offensive. If it does, then that particular person should seriously reconsider their military careers.
Keogh (in my view) fell to a surprise hit that occurred when the Indians asserted to an offensive mode. The change of roles is what may have done serious shock to even a BULK of Custer's men at the Last Stand. I don't think Keogh panicked during an offensive like Major Marcus Reno, but rather he transformed into the DEFENSIVE and panicked there (a panic that was much different than Reno. Not losing his head, just simply being overwhelmed and and struck with some thing that was not expected).
I'm still trying to figure out if we're on the same page about who suffered the more instant and serious blows. I think Calhoun held out as one of the stronger pillars of that battle, and that Keogh fell quicker and harder. Individually, there seems to be a credible rumour that Calhoun was one of the first to be wounded in the battle, but the Calhoun area assembly as a whole should have held quite a solid grounding in my opinion (an opinion that may be wrong), a much more solid footing than I'd expect from Keogh who simply did not get a chance to display his full strength in that battle. I am waiting for your insight.
Strange
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Post by tbw on May 11, 2010 18:31:21 GMT -5
First things first. 1 I certainly hope strange, that you asked Joe his permission to use the ‘nickname’ you chose for him. I know Joe, and to tell you the truth, it may be disrespectful in this instance. Please show him a little courtesy & ’respect’ and simply use Joe.
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I think one must look at this battle from the perspective of what the Indians said about it, to fully appreciate what ’may’ have happened. Not that it did, but it certainly could have. There apparently was a huge failure somewhere along the way, because if that battle on Custer Field only lasted about ½ hour, I certainly tend to think that someone, somewhere was most certainly ’shocked’ to have over 200 men killed in that amount of time.
No matter which ford it was, I think the ’shock’ came there, just as Curley said about those “hundreds of mounted warriors coming up from the rear”. This event, while it cannot be positively shown to be the cause of Custer’s turn and quartering back up on a ridge, never the less Curley stated that’s exactly what Custer did at that time. Was this the “Shock” event that not only stopped any attempt to take the village, but ultimately killed Custer and his men? By appearance, it looks that way doesn’t it? Who was on the offensive? Who was ’shocked’? And who retreated?
Several things to consider here strange. Take a look at this from the perspective of MTF or for that matter ANY ford. I think if Custer went there at all, he took every man he had there! And it wasn’t to ‘feint’ as some claim, because he knew just as any sane man today would know, that ‘feints’ only work against an enemy with similar tactics. The Indians, while they may have known about such things, didn’t use it in battle, they swarmed, just like they stated. Any soldiers caught within shooting distance of any ford was going to be swarmed. Why? The women and the children had not cleared the area, this is evident from their statements. Custer knew this as well. And he had to have known that any ‘feint’ action he committed would be met by stiff resistance and pursued, which he was. The only reason to ‘feint’ was to set up an ambush to lead them back into it. If that was tried, they failed miserably and things went horribly south.
The other thought is that they went to MTF, if that’s what they did (consider this statement again as “any ford“), to ’attack’ the village there. And if they did that, then Custer most certainly took his whole outfit there. And if that happened how do you explain Keogh’s company going the furtherst to Nye Cartwright ridge from the river? Panic maybe?
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Post by strange on May 12, 2010 12:11:08 GMT -5
I usually add a "Y" to names of a lot of people. Wiggy is also the name of one of my favorite cats who was eaten by a Rotweiller (forgive spelling) a couple years back. I meant it very affectionately, sorry for any possible hurt feelings.
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Post by tbw on May 12, 2010 13:25:27 GMT -5
I didn't think you meant any harm. And that's why I approached it the way I did. I just didn't want things to get out of hand and feelings to be hurt on either side of this. I know you meant well. I just thought you should know, was all.
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